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Abstract
Foreign Direct Investments are the most complex form of internationalization. A large part of the
recent international trade literature has focused on their determinants on the ground that they
spur growth and have a positive impact on development. This thesis examines FDI along two
diﬀerent and understudied lines. The ﬁrst line of research focuses on cultural factors promoting
bilateral investments ﬂows. In chapter 1 and chapter 3, I propose a novel deﬁnition of Cultural
Proximity wich separates the eﬀect of cultural similarity from the role of perceptions and cultural
aﬃnity. I am able to innovate with respect to the existing literature by capturing the eﬀect of
time varying and possibly asymmetric patterns in the reciprocal cultural appreciation between
two countries. In Chapter 1 I explicitly deal with the potential asymmetry in bilateral cultural
appreciation, and test for the emergence of non reciprocal cultural patterns in the analysis of
bilateral Greenﬁeld FDI. An example clariﬁes what I mean: consider South Korea and Latin
America. The so called Korean Wave, consisting of soap operas and Korean pop music has
become extremely popular in Latin America since the mid 2000s, despite of geographic and
cultural distance in terms of language and ethnicity. Yet, there is no evidence of a symmetric
rise in popularity of Latin American culture in South Korea. The underlying idea is that the
"new" positive perception of Korea enhances bilateral (trade and) FDI. In Chapter 3 I highlight
the heterogeneity of FDI and the non-linearities that could emerge in the relationship between
cultural aﬃnity and bilateral M&A. In the empirical exercise, I use an econometric model that
allows me to disentangle the impact of the diﬀerent level on M&A. The second line of research
explores the role of migrants' ﬂows on bilateral FDI. Borrowing the tools from social network
analysis, in Chapter 2 I investigate whether and how the position of a country in the International
Migration Network aﬀects a country's bilateral investment ﬂows beyond the direct role of its local
emi(immi)-grant population. The empirical application is on Greenﬁeld FDI.
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Introduction
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) grew relentlessly in the last decade, even during the ﬁnancial
turmoil generated by the 2008 global ﬁnancial crisis (UNCTAD, 2017). Despite such trend
slighlty reversed in 2017, their growth appears to be only temporarily suspended (UNCTAD,
2018). FDI constitute one of the most complex (and debated) mode of ﬁrm internationalization.
Such complexity translates in the substantial heterogeneity of the existing economic literature.1
This thesis contributes to the existing literature by focusing on the cultural determinants of
bilateral investments decisions, adopting a macroeconomic partial equilibrium perspective. Un-
derstanding the factors promoting FDI is a matter of the utter importance for many countries
worldwide, whose economic policies must face the increasing competition from abroad and the
rising pressures from domestic ﬁrms which often demand for more protection or to relocate
segments of the production abroad.
While the analysis of the institutional and political conditions on bilateral investments has been
a object of enormous interest in the past, the role of diﬀerent types of promoting factors gained
substantial interest only in the last 10-15 years. In this thesis I focus on two speciﬁc drivers of
bilateral investments. In Chapters 1 and 3 I explore the concept of Cultural Proximity (CP),
and its role in promoting bilateral FDI. I begin by discussing the idea of CP and the limitations
of the mainstram approach, which does not acknowledge the possibility that diﬀerent countries
might pereceive diﬀerently the cultural aspects that classify them as similar. Then, I propose
an empirical deﬁnition of CP which encompass the role of such subjectively perceived aﬃnity
as a distinct factor complementing the idea of CP in terms of similarity between cultures. I
empirically test the implications of such an augmented deﬁnition of CP on both Greenﬁeld FDI
(Chapter 1) and on Mergers and Acquisitions (Chapter 3). Even though both chapters hinge on
CP, they tackle diﬀerent conceptual and methodological issues, to shed light on diﬀerent aspects
of the Investments-CP relationship. On the one hand, Chapter 1 insists on the properties of
aﬃnity itself, thanks to the use of trade ﬂows in cultural goods as a proxy for the asymmetric
and time varying component of CP. On the other hand, Chapter 3 focuses on the characteristics of
the distribution of bilateral FDI data, to investigate how the asymmetric component introduced
in Chapter 1 responds to the heterogeneity that derive from the investment distribution at world
1Beyond the division between diﬀerent sides of the existing debate, it is important to notice the pluralism
that characterize the analysis of both the determinants and impacts of international investments worldwide:
international business scholars, as much as international economists and economic geographers all contributed to
shed light on the phenomenon as it is undestood today, and the cross-ﬁeld contributions are rapidly increasing
(as they are in many other ﬁelds of research).
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level. Diﬀerently, Chapter 2 detach from the concept of CP, to investigate the role of Migrants'
Networks as a determinant of bilateral greenﬁeld FDI. The literature insists on a substantially
positive eﬀect of a country's migrant population on FDI. Indeed, migrants are credited to favor
the ﬂow of information and to dispose of the right type of social capital which is necessary
to make international investments proﬁtable. However, the strict bilateral approach that is
usually adopted in the litearture is at odds with the fact that emigrants might not only maintain
relationships with their motherland, but could also establish preferential connections with fellow
nationals migrated to diﬀerent destinations. Using a complex network approach, I investigate
whether and how the position of a country in the International Migration Network (IMN) aﬀects
its bilateral investment position beyond the direct eﬀect of its local emi(immi)-grant population.
More speciﬁcally, in Chapter 1, I explore the relationship between Greenﬁeld FDI and Explicit
Cultural Preferences (EP Hellmanzik and Schmitz, 2017) as a component of a broader concept
of Cultural Proximity. Despite the fact that the notion of CP is not recent, it remained conﬁned
to the idea of the existence of some objective similarity between countries. Nonetheless, CP
might be also aﬀected by factors other than those deﬁning similarity. The way such similarity is
perceived (in terms of aﬃnity and attractiveness) is nonetheless ignored by the largest majority
of the literature, and still lack of a clear framing. The main contribution of this chapter lies in
the provision of a new conceptual framework for analyzing such an extended concept of Cultural
Proximity. The aim is to interpret the mechanisms linking similarity to cultural preferences,
and to understand how the two contribute to explain bilateral greenﬁeld investment ﬂows at
global level. Thus, I question the idea that the cultural relationship between countries has to
be reciprocal, as it is implicit in the choice of the traditional meaasures of proximity/distance
used in most of the existing international economic literature. As a matter of fact, there is no
theoretical prior to assume that the intangible factors that concur to determine the concept of
cultural proximity (which narrow the burden of otherwise deﬁned remoteness between economic
actors) have the same eﬀect in both sides of a bilateral economic exchange. Interestingly, the
scarce empirical evidence suggests that CP (and other types of intangible factors) is far from
being undirected and symmetric. The deﬁnition of CP introduced in the chapter roots in the area
of the cognitive traits of remoteness (Bergamo and Pizzi, 2014), of which the cultural component
represents a fundamental building block.2 In point of fact, considering CP as a cognitive process
opens to the possibility for it to be asymmetric and not-objective. If this is the case, it follows
that the traditional proxies of similarity cannot be able to capture the true impact of CP on
economic exchanges. Limiting CP to the objective similarity between countries would exclude
the possibility for a country to implement active (and relatively rapidly adjusting) investment
2As a small caveat to footnote , it is worth noticing here that international economists detach from the other
economic disciplines dealing with cultural proximity, though they generally exchange notions and tend to examine
similar phenomena from diﬀerent angles. For what concerns the international economics approach, Bergstrand
and Egger (2013) include CP within the class of factors that aﬀect economic exchanges by either introducing or
relieving what they deﬁne as the unnnatural frictions to international exchanges (i.e., all those obstacles that
do not refer directly to geography and natural impediments in general). Thus, the gravity approach is mostly
interested in undestanding how factors such as CP aﬀect bilateral ﬂows, and on how do they explain the eﬀects
of speciﬁc policies on the relationship between countries. In this sense, the concept of cultural proximity and
the approach to attrition factors in economics I follow is also related to the economic geography approach, that
developed a similar classiﬁcation scheme (Boschma, 2005).
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promotion policies3 based on cultural promotion initiatives (such as those carried on by the
Chinese cultural promotion agency among others). Empirically, I assume CP as a composite
construct, in which perceived cultural aﬃnity co-determines cultural similarity.4 In order to
capture the explicit cultural preferences (EP)component, which in turn captures the directed and
potentially asymmetric elements of cultural proximity, I use trade in cultural goods as a proxy
(UNESCO, 2005; UNCTAD, 2010; Disdier et al., 2010). Using trade data has the remarkable
advantage of an almost global coverage, but requires in turn some important premises. Indeed,
dealing with a notion of Cultural Proximity at global level requires a strong assumption on what
should be considered as culturally valuable. The idea of CP was ﬁrst used in the (relatively
homogenous) developed context. For this reason, using international classiﬁcations to include
developing and transition economies into the frame requires to re-think the deﬁnition of culture
itself, of the measures that are better able to capture it, and of the channels through which culture
can be transmitted and exchanged. On the one hand, the deﬁnition of what can be considered
as culturally valuable is subject to substantial evolution over time as much as across disciplines.
For instance, Capone and Lazzeretti (2016) include heritage within the notion of cultural goods,
while according to Meigs (1987), food too should be considered the product of a country's cultural
identity. On the other hand, a similar reasoning applies concerning the channels through which
cultural products are traded and exchanged, which are also subject to constant evolution. Think
for instance to ITunes, Youtube, Reddit, and Spotify: they represent just the tip of the iceberg
of a new set of cultural intermediaries through which cultural products (mostly in the form of
music and video media products) ﬂow across users, and eventually countries. Yet, they are not
included in oﬃcial trade data statistics: ignoring such channels limits the capacity of cultural
trade data to properly represent explicit cultural preferences between countries5. Therefore, a
trade oﬀ exists between the adoption of a measure of cultural proximity applicable to a large set
of highly heterogeneous countries, and the eﬀective capability of that measure to capture the full
extent of the cultural exchanges between them.
The empirical application turns around the investigation of the impact of explicit cultural pref-
erences, and of proximity in general, on Greenﬁeld FDI (Financial, 2017)6. Despite the same
mechanisms might be valid for any type of economic exchange, I restrict the analysis to Green-
ﬁeld FDI as they represent the perfect case study to test the extent of the asymmetric eﬀect of
EP. Indeed, CP is a particularly eﬀective at mitigating informative and trust-related barriers,
which are particularly relevant for this type of investment (Harding and Javorcik, 2011; Sula and
Willett, 2009). After discussing the issue of reciprocity in the reciprocal cultural appreciation at
bilateral level, I discuss how the lack of a theoretical justiﬁcation to treating CP as symmetric
or time invariant ﬁnds conﬁrmation in the data, which points in favor of a redeﬁnition of the
3The same reasoning could apply to other types of ﬂow
4This formalization opens up interesting policy scenarios, where governments may actively inﬂuence foreign
perceptions through active trade and promotion policies.
5This limitation got increasingly relevant in the recent years, given the substantial increase in the diﬀusion
of streaming platform for cultural products. Thus, to understand the processes of cultural transmission cannot
disregard the search for a way to account for or estimate those new channels for cultural products transmission.
6Data are accessed in 2015, and include all Greenﬁeld FDI recorded by the data provider for the period
2003-2014, excluding the investments in natural resources.
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idea of cultural proximity7. The descriptive evidence and the resulting interpretative framework
are ﬁnally plugged into an existing theoretical model of Greenﬁeld FDI (de Sousa and Lochard,
2011), which is conveniently adapted to include my broader deﬁnition of proximity based on the
dichotomy similarity/aﬃnity.8 The model is estimated by mean of a poisson pseudo-maximum
likelihood estimator (PPML) with high dimensional ﬁxed eﬀects (HDFE), able to account for
the appropriate set of multilateral resistance terms (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003; Yotov et
al., 2016; Larch et al., 2017).
The results reject the hypothesis that the culture-driven preference between two countries sym-
metrically aﬀect bilateral FDI. Not only, they suggest that perceived aﬃnity, as captured by the
directed and time varying EP terms, may act as a bridge between otherwise culturally dissim-
ilar countries. In particualar, I identify a dominant eﬀect of an investment's destination side
cultural perceptions' channel over the origin's side perceived aﬃnity. This ﬁnding is ultimately
reasonable: nonetheless, the existing literature substantially ignored it. Thus, a ﬁrm located in a
country might be encouraged to invest where it is more likely to be favourably welcome, either by
the potential customers or by the presence of preferential treatments by the government. As the
existing related literature on EP ignored so far the possibility for investments to be driven by the
consideration of the recipient side, I introduce, discuss, and ultimately test two potential mech-
anisms that might explain the insurgence of asymmetric patterns in cultural proximity between
countries. On the one hand, to capture the destinations' consumers' preference for an investing
country, I split investments between those that are likely to explicitly target the destination
market, and those which are more likely to constitute a platform for re-exporting production.
I expect the destination's cultural preference for a country to be more relevant for the formers
than for the latters. On the other hand, to capture the eﬀect of the political economy adopted
by a potential recipient country, I split the sample between countries with high government ac-
countability and countries with lesser accountability. A government that is accountable in front
of its citizen will be more inclined to fulﬁl its requests/aspiration. For this reason, cultural pref-
erences at destination should be more relevant in presence of highly accountable governments.
The analysis conducted on both mechanisms, renamed Destination Consumers' Demand channel
and the Destination Political Economy channel respectively, validate the conceptual framework
proposed in this paper, and demonstrate the importance of dealing with cultural preferences
alongside the usual measures of cultural similarity.
Overall, the notion of cultural proximity deﬁned and adopted in Chapter 1 allows us to un-
derstand more accurately the eﬀect of culture and of cultural preferences on greenﬁeld FDI.
Nonetheless, other factors concur to reduce informative barriers and other intangible frictions
between countries, facilitating in this way the decision of a ﬁrm to invest in a speciﬁc destina-
tion. In chapter 2 I tackle one of them investigating the role of migrants' networks on greenﬁeld
FDI. According to the economic literature, migrants can facilitate bilateral economic exchanges
7A similar conclusion is achieved by Boschma et al. (2016), who studied the role of asymmetry in various
forms of proximity measure, applied to the Italian M&A case.
8The model is not redeﬁned and reelaborated. Starting from its implications and its predictions, the ﬁnal
empirical equation is augmented consistently.
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in many diﬀerent ways. For instance, diaspora increase trade by fostering the foreign demand
for goods produced in the country of origin or by increasing the demand for goods emigrants
bring back home (White, 2007; Peri and Requena-Silvente, 2010; Giovannetti and Lanati, 2016).
Similarly, migrants can also be beneﬁcial for bilateral FDI: think for instance of their role in lift-
ing the informative barriers that prevent entrepreneurs from taking advantage of opportunities
abroad (Flisi and Murat, 2011; De Simone and Manchin, 2012). Not last, migrants favor cul-
tural assimilation and can aﬀect the distance that is perceived across countries, by signalling the
national predisposition toward their host country, or by acting as intermediaries with their home-
land productive system. Despite the fact that the relationship between international migration
and economic exchanges has already been extensively investigated by the economic literature
(especially at bilateral level), some aspects still remain to be fully understood. For instance,
the way the economic performance of a country is aﬀected by the global set of interactions its
emigrant community maintains at global level (and that determine the position of a country
within the international migration network) is still far from being clear. In this sense, the fact
that emigrants communities tend to be highly transnational make this lack of clarity particularly
relevant. In facts, diaspora are transnational in the sense that they tend to develop connec-
tions with the respective homelands as well as with their fellow nationals located elsewhere. In
addition, migrants communities in host countries tend to integrate with each other, often over-
coming national identity (Docquier and Lodigiani, 2010; Rapoport, 2018). Nonetheless, most of
the existing literature linking FDI and Migration is still in a bilateral perspective(Bertoli and
Moraga, 2013). In chapter 2 I abandon this pure bilateral approach by considering international
migration as a complex network of global relationships. This means to shift the focus from the
single bilateral channel toward considering how the position of a country in global internation
migration network (IMN) aﬀects its economic relationships. The existing literature on migration
and FDI as complex networks is quite limited: with the sole exception of Garas et al. (2106),
most of the existing related studies focus on trade (see Fagiolo and Mastrorillo, 2014; Schiavo
et al., 2010; Sgrignoli et al., 2015, among others). From an operational viewpoint, I approach
migration and FDI ﬂows as two layers of the same global economic network, to study how the
structure of the migrants' network and the position of a country within it aﬀects bilateral FDI
ﬂows. The strength of this approach consists of the possibility to analyze the direct, as much as
the indirect eﬀects of international migration on FDI (thus, taking into consideration the poten-
tial transnational eﬀect of a country's migrant community). The chapter contributes to diﬀerent
aspects of the existing literature. First, it constitutes the ﬁrst attempt to investigate the eﬀect
of skilled migration as captured by the structure of its network. The decision to focus on skilled
migration as opposed to overall migration recognizes the relevance of the skill composition of
the migrants community. Indeed, the economic impacts of migration ﬂows in both the host and
the home country is highly heterogeneous, and depends on the skill composition of the migrant
community. While this evidence is widely accepted in the non-network based literature on the
economic impacts of migration (see for instanc Docquier and Lodigiani, 2010; Peri and Requena-
Silvente, 2010; D'Agosto et al., 2013, among others), it fails to ﬁnd a consistent application in
network related applications.9 I depart from most of the related network literature by retaining
9Despite data availability of migration ﬂows with skill intensity break-down implies a substantial restiction of
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the directed nature of both the migrant and the investment networks (and avoiding to fall in
what I deﬁne as the undirectdness attribution problem). This point is particularly interesting, as
most of the literature estimates the impact of a country's position in the network on economic
exchanges by mean of a gravity model. However, obtaining consistent estimates of monadic (i.e.
related to one country instead of being couple speciﬁc) terms is not immediate if the suitable
set of FE (to control for multilateral resistance) is included. Existing studies either consider
international ﬂows as undirected networks (Fagiolo and Mastrorillo, 2014, among others), or
limit the number of ﬁxed eﬀects in the empirical gravity estimation. This strategy may not be
appropriate as it fails to consistently account for the multilateral resistance term (Anderson and
Van Wincoop, 2003), even though it allows to retain the monadic, directed network characteris-
tics that would otherwise be absorbed by the country-speciﬁc multilateral resistance terms (see
for instance Garas et al., 2106). As recommended by Head and Mayer (2014), the correct pro-
cedure to estimate monadic variables in a conventional gravity framework would be to explicitly
model the stochastic and deterministic component of the empirical model. This point leads to
the third contribution. Instead of estimating a structural gravity equation via ﬁxed eﬀects, as
done in the scant related literature, I apply a multilevel regression model (Rabe-Hesketh and
Skrondal, 2012) with random intercept. This innovative methodology allows greater ﬂexibility
in the deﬁnition of the stochastic component of the empirical model, and avoids to ﬂatten a
large portion of variability between observations, as it is the case in ﬁxed eﬀects estimation.10.
The results suggest a strong and consistent role of IMN centrality and prestige of a country on its
bilateral greenﬁeld FDI exchanges, and highlight the importance of third party network eﬀects as
magnifying factors for bilateral investments. The backbone of the chapter is represented by the
empirical section, which is based on three steps: ﬁrst, I propose an in-depth analysis of the co-
evolutionary patterns between the International Migrants Network (IMN) and the Greenﬁeld FDI
Network (GFDIN) at world level. The clear patterns highlighted by the graphical comparison of
the two networks suggests a positive correlation between the two. In order to explain the stylized
facts emerging from the comparative analysis, I develop a conceptual framework to capture the
mechanisms through which the position of a country in the migrants network might aﬀect bilateral
investments, beyond the established direct migrations channel. To test the hypotheses emerging
from the conceptual model, I include a set of IMN-related measures of network centrality in the
econometric analysis. Each measure reﬂects in turn a diﬀerent aspect of a country's relevance
and position in the global network. In line with the existing evidence on migrants networks and
FDI, I detect a positive and signiﬁcant impact of the migrants' network on greenﬁeld FDI, with
the position in the global network acting as a magnifying factor.
Finally, in the third and ﬁnal chapter I examine go back to the link between Explicit Cultural
the estimation sample.
10Innovative refers to the ﬁeld of application, not to the methodology itself. As a matter of fact, the multilevel
regression is well established in many other economic applications, but it is an outsider of the gravity literature.
Nonetheless, multilevel regression allows to retain monadic coeﬃcient estimates without resorting to multiple steps
estimation procedures, as it is necessary in ﬁxed eﬀects estimation. A two steps-Fixed Eﬀects gravity equation
is reported in the appendices, to benchmark the coeﬃcients obtained via multilevel regression. Estimates hold
across the diﬀerent methodologies, scoring in favour of the econometric approach adopted.
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Preferences and FDI, focusing this time on bilateral M&A. As a matter of fact, the analysis
conducted in the ﬁrst chapter does not address two main issues. On the one hand, while providing
a mechanisms valid for Greenﬁeld FDI, it cannot be immediately generalized. On the other
hand, it does not take into consideration the possibility that Cultural Preferences and Cultural
Proximity could impact diﬀerently diﬀerent types and size of investment ﬂows. In other words,
it does not take into account the role of heterogeneity in the CP-FDI relationship. In Chapter 3 I
extend the analysis conducted in the ﬁrst chapter in both directions. To begin with, I investigate
the eﬀects of cultural proximity (as deﬁned in the ﬁrst chapter) on bilateral M&A, which are
characterized by a higher degree of reversibility when compared to greenﬁelds (Barba Navaretti
et al., 2006); in addition, according to the data I use, their entity also appears to be smaller (on
average).
Relying on (and expanding) the conceptual framework developed and tested in Chapter 1, I
expect the asymmetric patterns identiﬁed in the EP terms when dealing with Greenﬁeld FDI
not to hold for M&A (despite the directed and time varying components of EP might remain
signiﬁcant).11 As far as the methodological approach is concerned, I depart from analyzind the
average eﬀect of cultural proximity (and EP) on bilateral FDI (as implicitly done in the ﬁrst
chapter), to explicitly deal with the high heterogeneity of bilateral investment ﬂows. Heterogenous
ﬂows imply that their determinants are likely to have diﬀerentiated impacts according to a wide
set of contingent factors, not last the size and intensity of the single bilateral channel (in terms
of both number and value of the aggregate projects) between a country and a given economic
partner. Thus, the presence of a large heterogeneity causes the traditional mean-value estimators
(ppml or pooled OLS among others) to hide a substantial amount of information. To answer
all those questions left open from Chapter 1, I extend a partial equilibrium model of aﬃliate
sales developed by Head and Ries (2008) in two directions. First, I extend their reasoning to the
longitudinal case. Then, I also extend the empirical panel gravity equation, to explicitly tackle
the overdispersion issue that characterize bilateral M&A data. To do so, I apply a Censored
Quantile Regression (CQreg) with High Dimensional Fixed Eﬀects (HDFE) (Powell, 1986; Canay,
2011; Figueiredo et al., 2014) to analyze the extent of the potential heterogeneity in the cultural
determinants of M&A, controlling at the same time for the Multilateral Resitance Term by mean
of Fixed eﬀects and the large presence of null ﬂows in the lower quantiles of the distribution of
bilateral M&A through censoring. In contrast with the results of the ﬁrst chapter, the ﬁndings
not only suggest a smaller relevance of the economic and business environment at destination,
but also that the asymmetric patterns highlighted in the case of greenﬁeld FDI does not emerge
for the case of M&A. This result is robust across estimators, conﬁrming the initial concerns
about the universality of the asymmetric impacts of cultural preferences. Despite both directions
of EP, deﬁned in terms of perceived aﬃnity between countries, remain statistically signiﬁcant
11Nonetheless, there might be other mechanisms in play. Indeed M&A are generally looked at with great
concern when they aim strategic or traditional companies. Think for instance to the recent (2018) strife between
the Italian company Fincantieri and the French government for the acquisition of the majority share of a large
French shipyard. Assuming that a greater consideration on the French side might have eased the acquisition (and
that such fact applies universally to M&A), the role of the destination side appreciation mechanisms detected in
Chapter 1 might play a crucial role for M&A too. This issue remains ultimately an empirical issue to be tested
in the data.
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both at mean level estimation (obtained via ppml) and across quantiles, there is no statistical
evidence of the asymmetric patterns detected in the case of Greenﬁeld. The comparison of the
coeﬃcients across quantiles ﬁnally suggests that if an asymmetric impact of EP on M&A exists
in quantitative terms, it is not statistically relevant. Interestingly, both directions for EP remain
signiﬁcant across quantiles (that is, they are both relevant in quantitative terms), but their
discordant trends suggest that the relative importance of either EP channel depends on the size
of the bilateral ﬂow between two countries.
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Chapter 1
Asymmetric Cultural Preferences and
Greenﬁeld FDI
This paper investigates the role of asymmetric cultural proximity (CP) on greenﬁeld
foreign direct investment (FDI) from an origin to a destination country. We build a
conceptual framework that explicitly accounts for cultural attractiveness as an asymmet-
ric dimension within a broad notion of CP. We revisit the existing origin-side theories
of bilateral FDI to derive a gravity equation suited for testing the impact of (i) the
attractiveness of destination's culture for citizens in the origin country, and (ii) the
attractiveness of origin's culture for individuals in the destination economy. While the
role of the former direction of CP is well understood in the literature, we propose new
mechanisms to rationalize that of the latter. We use exports and imports of cultural
goods to proxy for the two directions of asymmetric and time-dependent CP in the same
empirical speciﬁcation. The econometric analysis conﬁrms a positive role of asymmetric
CP as a determinant of Greenﬁeld FDI. Moreover, it suggests a stronger investment ef-
fect of the origin's culture attractiveness for the destination country. Finally, it provides
support for the mechanisms proposed in the theoretical discussion.
Keywords: Greenﬁeld FDI, Gravity, ppml, Cultural Preferences.
1.1 Introduction
The role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in generating net gains for both origin and destination
countries is well documented. The growth-enhancing potential of FDI has spurred an in-depth
analysis of its determinants. One of the most robust ﬁndings pertains to the cultural relation-
ships between the investing and the receiving country: investment from origin to destination is
relatively higher if the two countries share similar cultural traits, such as those embedded in
language, religion, ethnicity or genetics (see for instance Blonigen and Piger, 2014). However,
economically relevant dimensions of cultural relationships go well beyond the symmetric (and
largely time-invariant) nature of proxies capturing the extent to which individuals in two coun-
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tries speak the same language (Melitz and Toubal, 2014) or share similar genetic traits (Shenkar,
2001; Felbermayr and Toubal, 2010; Tung and Verbeke, 2010). In this sense, the recent study
by Melitz and Toubal (2018) on the role of genetics and its impact on international economic
exchanges is particularly interesting: the authors ﬁnd co-ancestry to have a more reliable inﬂu-
ence on bilateral trade than other cultural variables: yet, the possibility that cultural preferences
shape international exchanges beyond the role of those measures of objective similarity still re-
mains substantially neglected. This leads to the question of whether and how asymmetric (and
time-dependent) cultural variables, such as preferences for cultural systems or bilateral trust,
play out as determinants of investment patterns. The literature here oﬀers only half of the an-
swer. While the seminal contribution by Guiso et al. (2009) has shown that investment increases
if individuals in the investing country trust the citizens of the receiving economy, the potential
role of the opposite direction of trust is left unexplored. More generally, we lack a comprehensive
assessment of the asymmetric dimensions in bilateral cultural relationships as determinants of
FDI. Given the premise that the cultural relationship between two countries, say Kenya and
the UK, features a potentially asymmetric element such as the appreciation of each other's cul-
tural systems, it is a fairly safe assumption that the way individuals in Kenya appreciate British
culture might be very diﬀerent from how Kenyan culture is attractive for the UK. It is equally
safe to expect that these patterns are likely to change over time. How do these two diﬀerent
and evolving forces aﬀect British FDI in Kenya? Is one more relevant than the other? These
are questions that motivate this paper, which represents a ﬁrst attempt to assess the eﬀect of
cultural proximity (CP) on FDI, explicitly accounting for the asymmetric and time-dependent
dimensions of CP, based on countries aggregate preferences. To this end we ﬁrst provide a simple
conceptual framework for the notion of CP. By encompassing contributions from international
business scholars and economists, we present a workable deﬁnition of CP accounting for multiple
dimensions of the cultural relationship between two countries. These include symmetric sharing
of common cultural traits as well as asymmetric cultural attractiveness. The latter component
is allowed to vary over time. I refer to such manifestation of cultural attractiveness as Explicit
Cultural Preferences (EP) (Hellmanzik and Schmitz, 2017). The word preference denotes both
the fact that you something or someone more than another thing or person" and an advantage
that is given to a person or a group of people" (McIntosh, 2017). Therefore the term EP is linked
to the possibility of an economic actor to signal a positive attitude toward a potential partner, a
signal that might in turn imply the possibility for a preferential treatment, beyond the existence
of an objective cultural proximity between the two actors1.
In line with Disdier et al. (2010), we use bilateral trade in cultural goods as a proxy for asymmetric
and time-dependent CP. Indeed, the value of imports of cultural goods reﬂects the attractiveness
of the exporter's culture for the importer. Moreover, bilateral cultural trade is correlated with
standard, symmetric and time-invariant measures of CP, showing the capacity of this proxy to
capture all dimensions of CP. We provide some suggestive evidence of the asymmetry embedded
in bilateral cultural relationships with a descriptive exercise, conducted on a broad sample of
countries. The perspective on cultural asymmetry embedded in cultural trade data diﬀers from
1The deﬁnition of Explicit Cultural Preferences is resumed and expanded in Chapter 2 of this thesis.
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and complements the seminal work by Guiso et al. (2009), where data on bilateral trust are
analyzed on a sample of European countries. The variation in cultural relationships that can
be captured with trade in cultural goods covers both developed and developing countries, an
advantage with respect to other asymmetric measures which tend to be conﬁned to EU countries.
This is particularly relevant when greenﬁeld FDI is the object of interest, as the scale and scope
of South-South greenﬁeld FDI is growing at fast pace (UNCTAD, 2017) and North-South and
South-North greenﬁeld has increased their size and relevance.
Equipped with a deﬁnition and an empirical measure of CP that account for asymmetry and
time variation, we investigate the linkages between CP and greenﬁeld FDI. The paper revis-
its the theories used in the literature to derive gravity equations of greenﬁeld FDI. These are
partial-equilibrium, supply-side models that subsume all gravity forces into monitoring and trans-
action costs which ultimately determine the investment decisions of the multi national enterprise
(MNE). In this context we discuss the role played as determinants of investment decisions of
both directions of asymmetric CP, i.e. the attractiveness of the culture in the origin country for
individuals in the destination and the attractiveness of destination's culture for the origin. On
the one hand, we argue that the cultural attractiveness of the destination country plausibly (and
exhaustively) operates via the monitoring-transaction cost channel. On the other hand, the cul-
tural attractiveness of the origin country for the destination is likely to play a role also through
other channels. If the FDI project is conducted to serve consumers demand in the destination
country (i.e. horizontal FDI), the attractiveness of the origin country's culture for (destination)
consumers positively aﬀects the value they put on the output of the origin's MNE and therefore
increases the payoﬀ of the FDI project. We denote this mechanisms as `destination consumers
demand' channel. Moreover, the realization of an FDI project can be facilitated (or opposed) by
political pressures in the destination country. Under the assumption of political accountability,
politicians in the destination country will allocate pressures to facilitate FDI projects also accord-
ing to the degree by which the culture of the origin countries are attractive for the individuals
(voters) in the destination (we call this the `destination political economy' channel). All in all,
the monitoring-transaction costs channels and the `destination-side' mechanisms unambiguously
imply a positive role of both directions of asymmetric CP in determining greenﬁeld FDI from
the origin to the destination country. However, the assessment of the relative importance of one
direction over the other is an empirical matter.
A structural gravity equation, fully consistent with our theoretical discussion, is brought to the
data. The primary source of information on bilateral greenﬁeld FDI is the fDIMarket Database,
collected by the FDI Intelligence Unit of the Financial Times ltd. The database contains detailed
information on all the greenﬁeld investment projects across more than 150 origin/destination
countries for the period 2003-2014. Relying on the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML)
estimation technique, our baseline results show a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of asymmetric
CP on greenﬁeld FDI. As for the relative importance of each direction of asymmetric CP, our
ﬁndings suggest that investment projects from an origin to a destination country tend to increase
more with the attractiveness of the origin for the destination. More precisely, the elasticities of
the number of greenﬁeld investment projects amount to 0.30 and 0.07 for (origin to destination)
cultural exports and (origin from destination) imports, respectively. This baseline pattern holds
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across a number of alternative speciﬁcations, including the addition of source-destination dyadic
ﬁxed eﬀects and instrumentation of cultural trade. Moreover, results are robust to the use of
total and average value of greenﬁeld FDI as dependent variables and to diﬀerent approaches in
the deﬁnition of cultural trade.
Our ﬁndings shed new light on the mechanisms linking asymmetric CP and greenﬁeld investment.
In particular they suggest a stronger role of the `destination-side' mechanisms. We extend the
core analysis of the paper by conducting an empirical test of `destination consumers demand'
and the `destination political economy' channels and ﬁnd supportive evidence for the existence
of these mechanisms. We also investigate whether and how the eﬀect of the asymmetric and
time-dependent dimension of CP varies at diﬀerent levels of its symmetric and time-invariant
components. We ﬁnd that time-contingent positive shocks in the asymmetric component of CP
increase greenﬁeld FDI only at low levels of the time-invariant, symmetric dimension of CP. This
is consistent with a relationship of substitutability between (i) time-contingent, asymmetric and
(ii) time-invariant, symmetric dimensions of CP in triggering FDI, with the former operating as
a bridgehead between otherwise culturally distant countries.
1.1.1 Related literature
Our paper speaks to the growing literature that considers culture as an important determinant
of economic outcomes (see among others Guiso et al., 2006; Fernández, 2008, 2011; Alesina and
Giuliano, 2015). We contribute in particular to the debate on whether and how the relationship
between cultures aﬀects exchanges and investment patterns across countries (see for instance
Head and Mayer, 2014; Giuliano et al., 2014).
To the best of our knowledge this is the ﬁrst analysis that explores the relationship between
CP and FDI fully accounting for the asymmetric nature of CP.2 This complements the seminal
contribution by Guiso et al. (2009) that focus on the impact on international transactions of a
related cultural variable: trust. While trust is inherently asymmetric these authors only focus
in their FDI gravity regression on one direction of the cultural relationship: i.e. how much
individuals in the FDI origin country trust on average individuals in the destination country.
While CP and trust are two diﬀerent cultural variables, their positive correlation (empirically
assessed by the these authors in the same paper) and our results suggest that FDI could also
positively respond to the trust of citizens in the destination country for those in the country
where FDI is coming from.
Our paper is closely related to the two existing studies on the relationship between asymmetric
CP and international trade: Disdier et al. (2010) and Felbermayr and Toubal (2010). The former
introduces for the ﬁrst time cultural trade as a proxy for asymmetric and time-dependent CP,
2There exist empirical studies of bilateral FDI that, while not centering their research question on the link
between CP and FDI, include a symmetric (and often time-invariant) regressor to capture CP in an FDI gravity
equation. These include Javorcik et al. (2011) and Blonigen and Piger (2014). They all ﬁnd a positive relationship
between CP and FDI. Similar symmetric and often time-invariant measures of CP have been used extensively in
gravity equations for trade (see among others Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003; Head and Mayer, 2014; Feenstra,
2015) as well as migration ﬂows (Bertoli and Moraga, 2013; Beine et al., 2016).
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the latter uses instead the Eurovision Song Contest voting results. They both ﬁnd a positive role
CP as determinant of trade patterns. Beside the focus on FDI, we contribute to this literature by
providing a unifying conceptual framework for CP. In doing that we establish a connection with
a related strand in the international business literature, where scholars have started to criticize
the symmetric and time-invariant concept and measures of CP well before economists. We draw
from the seminal work of Shenkar (2001) and propose a deﬁnition of CP which accounts for many
of the critiques emerging from that literature. From the same strand in international business
we acknowledge the recent contribution by Li et al. (2017). These authors focus on role of
cultural attractiveness for FDI related outcomes. Diﬀerently from our approach, they construct
a measure of cultural attractiveness using survey data from the GLOBE project covering 62
societies (House et al., 2004) and do not rely on a structural gravity econometric framework.
Moreover, similarly to Guiso et al. (2009), while both directions of cultural attractiveness can
potentially aﬀect the same direction of the economic relationship, these authors only focus on
the attractiveness of the destination's culture for the origin country, showing a positive role of
attractiveness for FDI. Our ﬁnding of a strong role of the the origin's culture attractiveness for
the destination country extends and complements their investigation.
Our conceptual framework speaks to the theoretical literature that provides micro-foundations to
a structural gravity equation for FDI, notably Head and Ries (2008) and de Sousa and Lochard
(2011). The `destination-side' channels that explain the role of the origin's culture attractiveness
for the destination country bring novel forces in the existing supply/origin-side gravity models,
providing a rationale for the introduction of an additional term in the gravity equation to capture
multilateral resistance from the side of the destination country. Our empirical results suggest
that these forces are actually at work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 builds a conceptual framework that
explicitly accounts for the asymmetric dimension of CP and presents our proxy based on cultural
trade. Section 1.3 discusses the various elements of the econometric framework proposed to
assess the empirical role of CP as a determinant of Greenﬁeld FDI. Baseline estimation results
and robustness checks are discussed in Section 1.4 while Section 1.5 presents our extensions to
the main analysis. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Asymmetric cultural proximity
Economists and international business scholars have successfully used the concept of culture
to identify factors that - in their cross-country variation - (i) explain international economic
interactions and (ii) are not captured by relevant parameters such geographic distance or other
forms of transaction costs.3 The deﬁnition of culture used in this paper is willingly broad and
it accounts for the ideas (values, beliefs, norms) and practices (behavioral patterns) prevailing
3While not departing from this approach, we acknowledge that it is not uniformly adopted across social sci-
ences. Indeed, many anthropologists tend to refuse the notion of cultures as bounded, essentialized and internally
homogenous entities that can be used to classify, diﬀerentiate and compare groups of individuals (see for instance
Abu-Lughod, 1996; Appadurai, 1996).
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among respective groups of agents (Leung et al., 2005).
The characterisation of CP between two countries - i and n - as the degree by which the shared
ideas and practices of one country tend to be similar to the ones of the other suﬀers from
important limitations which have been highlighted in both the international business and the
economic literature. Numerous studies including Shenkar (2001), Tung and Verbeke (2010) and
Li et al. (2017) demonstrate how cultural relationships which are relevant in the context of
international investment are far from being symmetric. For instance Shenkar (2001) relabels the
assumption of symmetry in CP as the illusion of symmetry. One key element is that symmetry
between (1) the distance perceived by country n economic actors vis-à-vis country i and (2)
the distance perceived by country i economic actors vis-à-vis country n, is often not warranted
(Tung and Verbeke, 2010). Ultimately, the behaviour of economic agents will be aﬀected by their
perceptions and therefore needs to be taken as a function of an asymmetric construct of CP. The
analysis conducted by these papers provides empirical ground to support this critique. Using
data from the GLOBE Project survey Li et al. (2017) ﬁnd evidence of asymmetry in CP once
cultural practices of a target country are mapped with values of an observer country. Practices
records represent how a number of cultural elements (such as assertiveness, future orientation,
gender egalitarianism) are according to the respondents in target while perceptions reﬂect
how the same elements should be according to respondents in the observer country. Similar
conclusions have been reached by economists. Felbermayr and Toubal (2010) state that [a]
country's citizens can display respect and sympathy for the cultural, societal, and technological
achievements of another country without this feeling necessarily being reciprocal. They argue
that such asymmetric assessment is relevant in determining bilateral economic interactions among
countries and therefore call for a broad notion of CP capable of reﬂecting asymmetric aﬃnity
between two countries. Similar considerations can be found in Guiso et al. (2009) and Disdier
et al. (2010) even though, because the empirical exercise in these papers involve only one focal
country, the asymmetric aspect of CP is reduced to imply symmetry.
Consistently with these approaches, we assume cultural relationships to be asymmetric and we
propose a notion of CP that accounts for that. We explicitly introduce cultural attractiveness as
an element of CP. Indeed, individuals in country i can attribute desirable properties to the culture
of country n independently on actual similarity between the two cultures.4 Overall, attractiveness
is asymmetric and varies over time. For instance, certain historical events happening in a country
could alter the degree by which foreigners ﬁnd that country's culture attractive. The election of
a new president in the United States is likely to change the way countries around the world ﬁnd
American culture attractive as a function of the ideas and practices which are more represented
by the elected candidate as well as the speciﬁc perceptions of each observer country. This alters
the distribution of the US culture's attractiveness across foreign countries, not necessarily having
any eﬀect on the way Americans ﬁnd foreign cultures attractive.
The implication of this discussion is that the asymmetric dimension in the relationship between
4Li et al. (2017) derive the construct of cultural attractiveness from the interpersonal attraction framework
introduced by the social psychology and sociology literature. The analysis in the present paper does not depart
from that conceptualisation.
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two cultures can potentially aﬀect economic interactions, and therefore needs to be taken into
account when investigating the role of CP for international trade or investment. Formally, we
deﬁne CP between two countries i and n as
CPni,t = f(Sni;Ani,t) (1.1)
where f is an increasing function on the unspeciﬁed support between minimum and maximum
CP . Sni denotes the actual similarity between i's culture and n's culture, with Sni = Sin,
while Ani,t is the attractiveness of the n's culture for individuals in i. A is asymmetric as the
identity Ani,t = Ain,t is potentially not veriﬁed. Finally, we allow Ani,t to vary over time.5
In practice Sni can also be subject to time variation. Patterns of migration or geo-political
design of national entities are two potential time dependent factors shaping religious, ethnic,
linguistic similarity between two countries. We neglect this dimension for three reasons. First,
its inclusion does not alter in any way the key results of our study. Second, changes in Sni
tend to take place in the long run while variations in the asymmetric component of CP can be
relatively quick. This is because attractiveness might respond to a much broader set of events:
from the changes of political representation (as in the case of the election example above),
to the adoption of new communication technologies capable of better transmitting/accessing
cultural contents across countries (for instance the development of machine learning translation
algorithms), to the eﬀectiveness of governments to promote the visibility of national cultures
abroad, to the international diﬀusion of pop music from one particular country (e.g. the big
success of pop music from South Korea in South America in 2016 and 2017). Third, a symmetric
component of CP which is also time invariant represents the exact conceptual counterpart of
the standard symmetric and time invariant empirical measures of CP and therefore will allow us
for a more direct mapping between the theoretical constructs and the empirical measures (see
Section 1.5.2).6
1.2.1 Bilateral cultural trade as a proxy for CP
We argue that bilateral trade ﬂows in cultural goods can be used as meaningful proxies for CP.
In particular, the value of i's imports of cultural goods exported by n at time t - CulIMPni,t -
is an accurate proxy for CPni,t. As discussed by Disdier et al. (2010), CulIMPni,t directly and
intuitively accounts for n's culture attractiveness for individuals in i. Similarly, the value of
i's exports of cultural goods imported by n - CulEXPni,t - is an accurate proxy for CPin,t. As
for the capacity of cultural trade to capture the symmetric component of CP, our data shows
that there exists a statistically signiﬁcant empirical relationship between the two, indicating that
5This deﬁnition and the subsequent analysis do not rest on the assumption that cultures and perceptions are
ﬁxed over time and therefore avoid the illusion of stability (Shenkar, 2001).
6The deﬁnition given in (1.1) is silent on the potential relationships between Sni and Ani,t or Ani,t. The
theoretical discussion of these links remain to a large extent outside the scope of the current paper. However, on
an empirical ground there exists a positive correlation between Sni and Ani,t (see Appendix 1.B). Moreover, the
subsequent empirical exercise allows us to assess the qualitative nature of the relationship between Sni and Ani,t
(whether they are complements or substitutes) as determinants of patterns of FDI.
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attractiveness is positively correlated with similarity.7
Bilateral cultural trade ﬂows are constructed from the BACI dataset by CEPII8 and cultural
goods identiﬁed through the classiﬁcation of proposed by UNCTAD (UNCTAD, 2010).9 Table 1.1
reports the products which are classiﬁed as cultural goods. The UNCTAD classiﬁcation divides
them into two categories, `core' and `optional' cultural goods, listed in the ﬁrst and second
column of Table 1.1 respectively. Each category has two headings, arts and media within the
`core' category and heritage and functional creation within the optional one. Core cultural goods
generally embed a higher cultural content and they are listed across other available classiﬁcation
schemes such as the one developed by UNESCO.
Table 1.1: Categories of Goods with Cultural Content (UNCTAD, 2010)
Core Cultural Goods Optional Cultural Goods
Arts (Performing and Visual) Heritage (Arts Crafts)
Music (CD, Tapes), Printed Music, Painting,
Photography, Sculpture and Antiques
Carpets, Celebration, Paperware, Wickerware,
Yarn and Other
Media (Publishing and Audio-Visual) Functional Creations (Design and New-Media)
Books, Newspaper, Other Printed Matter, Film Architecture, Fashion, Interior, Glassware, Jew-
ellery, Toys, Recorded Media and Video Games
Notes: Further information on the classiﬁcation can be found in UNCTAD (2010). This table replicates Table 4.2, p. 112 of
UNCTAD (2010).
Before the merging with FDI and other data the cultural trade database has a coverage of 176
countries on the period 2003-2014. On average across countries and over time trade in cultural
goods accounts for 2.7% of total trade in this sample. As noted in Disdier et al. (2010), cultural
trade is highly concentrated. Summing cultural trade ﬂows across importers and over time, the
top ﬁve exporters - China, Germany, USA, Italy and France - account for 55% of total cultural
trade. When looking at all trade instead, the top 5 exporters - China, Germany, USA, Japan
and France - account for 37% of the total.
1.2.2 A detour on asymmetry
Before turning to the main research question in the paper, we provide some descriptive evidence
of the asymmetry embedded in the bilateral ﬂows of cultural goods.
Stepping from the descriptive exercise proposed by Felbermayr and Toubal (2010), we construct
an empirical measure of asymmetry in EP. The construction of the empirical asymmetry measure
is done by replicating the simple descriptive exercise of Felbermayr and coauthor, and is made of
two steps. First, we estimate a simple linear model where cultural trade CulIMPni,t is regressed
7See Appendix 1.B.
8See http://www.cepii.fr/cepii/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=1 and Appendix 1.A for a detailed
discussion of the data.
9The choice of the UNCTAD classiﬁcation to deﬁne the relevant set of cultural goods serves the purpose of
maximizing the country coverage of the resulting estimation sample. We depart from Disdier et al. (2010) that
deﬁne cultural goods following a diﬀerent scheme. The implications due to the adoption of a diﬀerent classiﬁcation
scheme are discussed in Appendix 1.A.
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on importer-time ﬁxed eﬀects δi,t; country pair ﬁxed eﬀects γni; and an error term εni,t. The
empirical estimate γˆni has a useful economic interpretation: it captures, on average over time,
how much individuals in (importing) country i consider the culture of (exporting) country n
attractive above or below the attractiveness of the average country (this is what Felbermayr
and Toubal refer to as excess). Second, for each (undirected) pair of diﬀerent countries we
compute the absolute value of the diﬀerence between γˆni and γˆin. We interpret the result as a
proxy for the degree of asymmetry in the CP between two countries. While the data - covering
bilateral cultural trade for 176 countries - would in principle allow to estimate this measure for
15400 country pairs, due to the high number of zeros we are able to derive both γˆni and γˆin
only for 4137 pairs. However, despite they account for just less than one third of all potential
combinations, these 4137 pairs account for 49.1% and 55.8% of total trade and total trade in
cultural goods respectively. This exercise, counterposed to Felbermayr and Toubal's estimates,
provide an interesting insight on the importance of keeping the unit of analysis into consideration.
Diﬀerently from their study, our sample is much larger and involves a far more heterogeneous set
of actors: the result is a generally lower excess among European countries as opposed to the
estimates obtained focusing on their restricted sample. The issue of overestimated asymmetry in a
narrower and relatively homogeneous sample is made clearer by ﬁgure 1.1, where the distribution
of asymmetry premia in our data is plotted against diﬀerent samples used in the related literature.
Despite the distribution is much more skewed in the total sample (the solid blue line) than in
both the sample used by Felbermayr and Toubal (2010) and Guiso et al. (2009) (the green dash-
and-dot line and the red short-dashed line respectively) it is worth noticing that both samples
in the abovementioned studies are positioned in the increasing segment of the blue line. This
fact suggests that the asymmetry in cultural premia identiﬁed for instance by Felbermayr and
Toubal or by Guiso and coauthors is actually overestimated, since the asymmetry measure among
similar countries exibits much smaller magnitude when less homogeneous partners are taken into
consideration. The discussion on asymmetry premia and sample selection is further explored in
Appendix 1.C.
Kernel density distribution of asymmetry premia according to diﬀerent sample selection.
Full sample includes all 4137 country pairs for which both aﬃnity premia were available;
F&T 2010 refers to the sample used by Felbermayr and Toubal (2010); GSZ 2009 includes
Guiso et al. (2009) sample.
To illustrate the scope of the asymmetry embedded in cultural trade, table 1.2 reports the
country pairs with the highest and the lowest value of the asymmetry measure. For these two
pairs we report the directed attractiveness premia and the resulting value of asymmetry implied
by cultural trade.
Table 1.2: Max and Min Asymmetry
Country n Country i
Attractiveness premium Attractiveness premium Asymmetry
of i for n (γˆni) of n for i (γˆin) (∣γˆni − γˆin∣)
China Paraguay 7.211 -3.686 10.897
Morocco Singapore 0.047 0.046 0.001
Notes: The table lists the two pairs showing respectively the higher (lower) asymmetry in attractiveness premia
awarded to each other, according to the full sample of countries for which the estimated measure of asymmetry is
available.
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of Asymmetry Premia according to diﬀerent Sample selections.
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Table 1.2 shows the maximum and minimum values taken by the measure of asymmetry described
above. The highest asymmetry estimated from our sample is between Paraguay (i) and China
(n). In particular, China appears much more attractive for Paraguay relative to the average
country (γˆni = 7.211). On the contrary the attractiveness of Paraguay's culture for China is
lower than the average country's attractiveness (γˆin = −3.686). In other words, individuals
in Paraguay tend to put a positive attractiveness premium on Chinese culture while Chinese
individuals tend to ﬁnd Paraguay's culture less attractive than others. In order to get a more
concrete understanding of this maximum asymmetry one can look at the actual value of the
relevant cultural trade ﬂows in the whole sample of bilateral cultural trade. In particular, the
average value - across years and exporters - of Paraguay's imports of cultural goods is USD
2,087,000 while on average across years Paraguay imports from China USD 273,137,000 (almost
131 times the cross country average). On the other hand, the average Chinese imports of cultural
good (across years and exporting countries) is USD 29,563,000 while its average yearly imports
from Paraguay is just USD 23,000 (0.08% of the average value across exporters).10 Minimum
asymmetry is found between Morocco and Singapore. In this case there exists a very balanced
neutrality, with each country awarding the other with a very low attractiveness premium.
We complement the discussion of the extreme values of asymmetry by exploring the case of the
UK and its bilateral cultural relationships with the other countries. The UK is the sixth biggest
exporter and the second importer of cultural goods.11 Because of the British Empire the legal,
linguistic and cultural connections of the UK are many and relatively well known. For these rea-
sons the UK represents a useful reference point for this exercise. Figure 1.2 provides a graphical
10This case seems to be suggestive of a potential correlation between asymmetry in export capacity and high
asymmetry in cultural relationships: indeed, even if the table only shows the upper bound, this pattern ﬁnds
support in the data. See Appendix 1.C for a simple assessment of this correlation. A comprehensive investigation
of the determinants of asymmetry in CP goes beyond the scope of the preset paper.
11This ranking is based on total trade ﬂows for the period 2003-2014 across 176 countries.
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representation of the distribution of asymmetry in the 156 available country pairs involving the
UK. The colors denote the four quartiles of the distribution over these 156 observations: darker
tones indicate higher asymmetry.
Figure 1.2: Asymmetry in CP Between the UK and the Rest of the World
A low degree of asymmetry in the cultural relationship reﬂected in cultural trade involving the
UK is apparent for many European countries (with the notable exception of Ireland); for many
economies in the South-East Asia region; for Russia; for the North American countries; and
for some Latin American ones. High asymmetry emerges between the UK and countries in the
African continent (with few exceptions below the median level of asymmetry including Madagas-
car and South Africa); countries in the Central Asia region; and few countries in Latin America.
Relatively low asymmetry in the cultural relationships with European countries highlights the
capacity of our empirical framework and of its wide country coverage to complement previous
studies on the role of asymmetric cultural variables for economic transactions with a focus on Eu-
ropean countries. Indeed, both Guiso et al. (2009) and Felbermayr and Toubal (2010) document
the existence of a signiﬁcant degree of asymmetry in patterns of trust and of aﬃnity by using
data on a relatively narrow and homogeneous set of countries. The case of the UK presented
in Figure 1.2 suggests that intra Europe bilateral cultural relationships appear relatively more
symmetric when extrapolated from a global empirical framework.
Finally, while the exercise in Figure 1.2 provides suggestive evidence for the distribution of the
asymmetric component in cultural relationships, it remains largely uninformative regarding the
type of asymmetry in each country pair. For instance, the relatively high asymmetry between the
UK and Ireland (2.700) originates from a very high aﬃnity premium placed by Ireland on the UK
(γˆGBR,IRL = 8.677) and only partly reciprocated by the still high aﬃnity premium of the UK for
Ireland (γˆIRL,GBR = 5.977). On the contrary, the almost identical asymmetry score between the
UK and Honduras reﬂects a low aﬃnity premium of Honduras for the UK (γˆGBR,HND = 0.175)
to which the UK corresponds a negative one (γˆHND,GBR = −2.525).
The descriptive detour proposed in this section served the purpose of illustrating the existence
and scope of asymmetry in CP as an empirical phenomenon captured by bilateral cultural trade.
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A focus on such asymmetry is central to our main research question, which we now turn to
address.
1.3 Econometric framework
The econometric framework used to assess the empirical relationship between CP proxied by
cultural trade and Greenﬁeld FDI is constructed in several steps. First, we introduce a gravity
model of bilateral FDI building on Head and Ries (2008) and de Sousa and Lochard (2011). Then,
equipped with the deﬁnition of CP given in Section 1.2, we discuss theoretical mechanisms linking
CP and greenﬁeld FDI. Finally, the estimation strategy and data are presented.
1.3.1 Asymmetric CP and FDI gravity models
To assess how bilateral, asymmetric and time-varying CP aﬀects bilateral patterns of greenﬁeld
FDI, we follow the theoretical model of greenﬁeld FDI proposed by de Sousa and Lochard (2011)
which is rooted in the seminal theory by Head and Ries (2008). Both models are characterized
by a partial equilibrium, supply side perspective. Moreover, their gravity nature accounts for
multilateral frictions, i.e. decisions made by MNEs to invest in a particular destination are not
independent on their investment decisions into other countries.12
The theory is simple. Greenﬁeld FDI projects are modelled as inspection games between the
manager of a MNE (MM) and that of its foreign subsidiary (Sub). The payoﬀ of the MM
denoted by ν is a negative function of an inspection cost c and a transaction cost τ . The former
reﬂects the standard costs of monitoring which can be implemented by the MM in order to
detect a shirking behavior of Sub. The latter materializes whenever Sub exerts eﬀort and adds
value to the investment project. τ encompasses all types of costs associated with greenﬁeld FDI
beyond inspection costs. Examples includes the costs of dealing with currency risks, exchange-
rate transaction costs, trading- and liquidity-related costs as well as diﬀerentials of taxation,
accounting, and legal standards in a broader interpretation (de Sousa and Lochard, 2011, p.
554). Both c and τ are functions of a vector of formal investment policies, geographic and cultural
proximity.
In a multi country framework with stochastic MNE's payoﬀ functions, MM chooses to invest in
a country where the highest value of a project is higher than the highest value of projects in all
other countries. The model allows to represent the number (or value) of greenﬁeld FDI projects
from origin country i into destination country n with a structural gravity equation of the kind
FDIni =KiA−1i MnTni (1.2)
The term Ki is a function of the origin/parent country speciﬁc parameters, such as the total
12This approach diﬀerentiates these models from the knowledge-capital model of MNEs.
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number of investment projects that can be ﬁnanced (the total capital stock). A−1i is a multilat-
eral resistance component, capturing the attractiveness of alternative locations for investors in
country i. Mn is a function of the destination/host country speciﬁc parameters, which include
the total number of potential investment projects and the average contribution of Sup across
projects. Finally, Tni is the bilateral component, a function of both monitoring and transaction
costs, but also of the vector of formal investment policies, geographic proximity and CP. Intu-
itively, the model speciﬁes Tni as a decreasing function of c and τ . The qualitative relationship
between these costs and formal investment policies as well as geographical distance parameters
is taken from Head and Ries (2008) and de Sousa and Lochard (2011). The existence of FTAs
(Free Trade Agreements) or BITs (Bilateral Investment Treaties) between i and n can poten-
tially reduce both monitoring and transaction costs, which are also assumed to decrease with
geographical proximity.
The way c and τ depend upon the symmetric component of CP is not new to the FDI gravity
literature in economics: higher similarity between the two cultures implies lower monitoring as
well as lower transaction costs. What has not been discussed is how monitoring and transaction
costs react to the asymmetric component of CP. In what follows we address this in a broader
discussion on how greenﬁeld FDI from origin i to destination n depends upon both CPni,t and
CPin,t.
Higher CPni,t reduces the costs that the parent MNE has to pay to monitor the activities of its
foreign subsidiary. This is intuitive if higher CPni,t reﬂects higher Sni. Indeed, for many sym-
metric dimensions of CP (common language, similar legal practices and contracting behaviour)
clearly facilitate monitoring activities. However, Ani,t, the degree of attractiveness for individu-
als in the origin country i of the ideas and practices which are prevalent among individuals in
destination n, is also a determinant of lower monitoring costs. It minimizes assessment errors
and facilitate the assessment processes themselves by making easier for i individuals (that have
to evaluate the eﬀort exerted by the subsidiary located in i) to establish an eﬀective interaction
with n agents, beyond a common language framework. By eﬀective interaction we mean an inter-
action that favours a quicker and more precise understanding of what the other is saying as well
as of what she is hiding. As for transactions costs, both Sni and Ani,t minimize the costs to cope
with diﬀerent accounting/legal standards and in general with all corporate standards that might
diﬀer across the parent and the host country. Finally, from the point of view of country i parent
personnel, if an inspection activity or the work needed to harmonize diﬀerent corporate-related
standards involves interaction with n's individuals and/or business trips to country n, higher
appreciation by country i individuals of the culture of country n reduces the costs associated
with these activities.13 These mechanisms altogether unambiguously predict a positive eﬀect of
CulIMPni,t on greenﬁeld investment from i to n.
Let us now consider the role of CPin,t in explaining greenﬁeld FDI from origin country i to
destination n. Notice that our arguments on the role of Sni apply to Sin as well due to the
symmetric nature of S. Discussing the role of CPin,t therefore amounts to consider the role
13For a detailed review of the mechanisms that make destination's cultural attractiveness for the origin country
a relevant driver of origin's MNEs' FDI decisions see Li et al. (2017).
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of Ain,t, i.e. of the attractiveness of the i's culture for individuals in n. From the point of
view of the subsidiary personnel in the destination country n, the attractiveness of i's culture
for them results in a good attitude toward interactions with the parent's personnel. Smoother
interactions reduce inspection as well as transaction costs for the MNE. But Ain,t can be relevant
for i's investment in n beyond its eﬀect on i's MNE monitoring and transaction costs. First,
in so far as the n subsidiary is intended to serve the n market, the value that consumers in
n put on the output of i's MNE increases the average payoﬀ from a greenﬁeld investment in
country n. This preference value is likely to be a positive function of how much individuals
(consumers) in n are attracted by i's culture (Ain,t), also relatively to the cultures of other
potential investors. This `destination consumers demand' channel is likely to be particularly
relevant (i) when the outcome of the FDI project is a ﬁnal consumption good and (ii) in sectors
where FDI is the prevailing mode of international provision, as it is still the case for many services
sectors. Second, the realization of an FDI project by i can be facilitated or opposed by political
pressures in the host country n. A plausible assumption is that political pressures to facilitate
inward foreign investment will be allocated to i's projects, also according to the degree by which
individuals (voters) in n appreciate i's culture with respect to those of other potential investors.
We expect this `destination political economy' channel to be more pronounced for destination
countries with higher political accountability, i.e. where politicians tend to be less independent
from voters preferences in their political and economic decisions.
These `destination-side' mechanisms are not accounted for in the classical theoretical framework
of de Sousa and Lochard (2011) and they call for an additional term in the gravity equation to
capture multilateral resistance from the side of the destination country n. We rewrite (1.2) as
FDIni =KiA−1i MnB−1n Tni (1.3)
where B−1n is a function of the attractiveness of alternative investors for n's consumers and/or
voters.
The micro-foundation of the destination-side mechanisms by extending the theory of de Sousa
and Lochard (2011) is a task that goes beyond the scope of the current paper: in fact they do
not suggest any theoretical ambiguity about the sign of the relationship between CPin,t and i's
investment into n. All in all, the discussed mechanisms unambiguously imply a positive eﬀect of
CPin,t on greenﬁeld investment from i to n.
1.3.2 Baseline estimation, identiﬁcation strategy and data
The structural gravity model (1.3) can be brought to the data. Following Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006) we rely on the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) as our workhorse
estimator14. We are aware of the existence of some limitation of the PPML approach, limitations
that call for additional considerations when choosing it among potential alternative estimators.
14See Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2011) and Martinez-Zarzoso (2017) for a detailed debate on the capacity of
such estimator to handle large shares of null ﬂows.
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Concerning our framework, the more stringent issues to be considered are represented by the
actual distribution of the error term, the eﬀective capability to deal with a substantial frac-
tion of zeroes, and the possibility to eﬃciently control for the Multilateral Resistance terms
(MR, Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003). Inherently to the ﬁrst two observations, we follow
Head and Mayer (2014), as we compare the results from diﬀerent alternative estimators (each of
them characterized by a diﬀerent set of desirable features): our favourite PPML, the EK-Tobit
(Eaton and Kortum, 2001), the Negative Binomial, the Gamma Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood
(GPML), and the pooled OLS. The results of this preliminary exercise hold across diﬀerent
estimators/econometric techniques and are in line with the estimates presented in Section 1.4
and 1.5. Unfortunately, such an exercise is plagued by a substantial limitation: none of the
proposed estimator (with OLS as the only exeption) is able to properly control for the suitable
set of ﬁxed eﬀects that would be necessary to control for MR15 (which should at least consider
origin×year and destination×year FE, according to Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006). In short, the
large amount of dummy variables controlling for FE triggers a form of curse of dimensionality,
which prevents standard statistical packages from converging in large samples. Yet, this issue is
particularly relevant, given the importance of the correct speciﬁcation of the MR term to prop-
erly identify the eﬀect of cultural preferences on FDI, net of initial condition and of the country
speciﬁc unobservable factors which might aﬀect the estimates. For this reason, we rely on PPML
as our preferred technique, estimated via the recent ppml_panel_sg STATA package (developed
by Tom Zylkin and introduced by Larch et al., 2017), which is able to absorb high-dimensional
ﬁxed eﬀects (HDFE) without incurring in convergence issues. The results related to the other
estimators, are available upon request to the corresponding authors.
The dependent variable used in the baseline estimation exercise is Cni,t, the number of Greenﬁeld
FDI project from an origin country i to a destination country n at time t. The origin and
destination speciﬁc components Ki,t and Mn,t, as well as the multilateral resistances A−1i,t and
B−1n,t are accounted for through origin-time and destination-time ﬁxed eﬀects. The elements of
the bilateral component Tni,t are captured through (i) the log of the distance between origin
and destination (lndistni); (ii) a dummy for geographical contiguity (contigni) as proxies for
transportation costs; (iii) the number of FTAs and BITs involving i and n which are in force at
time t (FTAni,t and BITni,t) as measures of formal investment policy. The elements of Tni,t which
pertain to CP are proxied with both directions of cultural trade between i and n, (CulIMPni,t
and CulEXPni,t) at current time. One could expect a time lag between time-varying cultural
attraction factors and FDI. The time lag is not taken into account in the baseline speciﬁcation,
as it is speciﬁcally dealt with when we discuss about the potential sources of reverse causality (in
Table 1.6)16. Finally, in order to identify the speciﬁc role of the asymmetric component of CP
(Ani,t and Ain,t) we control for its symmetric component (Sni = Sin) by adding to our speciﬁcation
the standard symmetric and time-invariant measures of CP (a former colony dummy colonyni,
linguistic langni, religious comreligni, and institutional proximity comlegni). We acknowledge
from the outset that our identiﬁcation can be potentially undermined by endogeneity arising
15They only include dummies for year, origin, and destination country separately
16As reported in Table 1.6, the results of the speciﬁcations including lags do not experience a substantial
change in the point estimates.
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from omitted variable or reverse causality issues. We address this concern in Section 1.4.2.
The fDiMarket Database we use, collects information on greenﬁeld FDI from January 2003
onward, and it is constantly updated. To the best of our knowledge, it constitutes the most
reliable and complete existing source of greenﬁeld investment data.17
In addition to Greenﬁeld FDI information for the dependent variables and the data on cultural
trade ﬂows which constitute the main regressors of interest (see Section 1.2.1 above), we include
in the gravity speciﬁcation measures of linguistic proximity from Melitz and Toubal (2014) and
Adsera and Pytlikova (2015). These indices integrate the standard bilateral linguistic measures
adopted in the majority of gravity models that do not focus on CP. Data on bilateral investment
treaties come from the UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub. All remaining gravity and distance
related variables used throughout the empirical analysis come from the CEPII's geodist and
gravdata datasets. See Appendix 1.A for a more thorough description of data sources and how
the dataset is created.
The dataset used for the baseline estimation consists of an unbalanced panel of 87,448 observa-
tions. It features 144 origin and 178 destination countries over the 12 years period from 2003 to
2014. Summary statistics for the variables used in the baseline estimation are given in Table 1.3.
Table 1.3: Summary Statistics from Baseline Estimation Sample
Variable Mean Median sd Min Max
Cni,t 1.551 0 8.897 0 400
lndistni 8.482 8.747 0.910 4.107 9.892
colonyni 0.032 0 0.177 0 1
langni 0.157 0 0.364 0 1
comreligni 0.173 0.033 0.266 0 0.989
contigni 0.038 0 0.190 0 1
comlegni 0.293 0 0.455 0 1
FTAni,t 0.269 0 0.444 0 1
BITni,t 0.393 0 0.488 0 1
lnCultIMPni,t -0.454 -0.429 3.273 -6.908 10.644
lnCultEXPni,t -0.145 -0.086 3.114 -6.908 10.644
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the variables used in the baseline estimation exercise (see Table 1.4).
The related estimation sample consists of 87,448 observations.
1.4 Results
In this section we present the results of the empirical analysis. We discuss the baseline estimation
results in Section 1.4.1 and then the main robustness tests in Section 1.4.2. Further extensions
17Completeness does not exclude misreporting or missing data, but such missing data are likely to be
very limited and continuously revised by the dataset provider (http://www.fdiintelligence.com/fDi-Tools/
fDi-Markets).
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to the core analysis of the paper are discussed separately in Section 1.5.
1.4.1 Baseline results
Table 1.4 below presents the main results of our empirical exercise. The positive and statistically
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of lnCultIMPni,t in column (1) shows that the attractiveness of the n's
culture for individuals in country i (Ani,t) is a determinant of the number of greenﬁeld FDI
projects from i to n. In particular, the number of investments from an origin country to a
destination economy increases with Ani,t as captured by the value of i's cultural imports from n.
Analogously, the estimated coeﬃcient of lnCultEXPni,t in column (2) is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant, showing that the number of greenﬁeld FDI projects from origin i to destination n is
higher for stronger attractiveness of the i's culture for individuals in the in n (Ain,t). Finally,
both bilateral ﬂows of cultural goods between the origin i and the destination n are included in
the speciﬁcation reported in column (3) of Table 1.4. Their estimated coeﬃcients remain positive
and highly signiﬁcant but the magnitude of the point estimate for lnCultIMPni,t is more than
halved. Overall, the impact of trade in cultural goods on the number of greenﬁeld FDI projects
is identiﬁed beyond the role of the other gravity variables and of the standard proxies for CP.
This shows that the asymmetric component of CP plays a role above and beyond its symmetric
elements.
These results suggest that investment projects from i to n tend to increase more with the at-
tractiveness of the origin's culture for individuals in the destination - Ain,t - rather than with
Ani,t. Relying on the point estimates in column (3) of Table 1.4, the elasticities of cultural trade
on the number of greenﬁeld investment projects amount to 0.30 and 0.07 for (source to destina-
tion) exports and (source from destination) imports respectively. This ﬁnding sheds some light
on the relative importance of the theoretical mechanisms linking asymmetric CP and greenﬁeld
investment. In particular it points to a relatively stronger role of those mechanisms discussed
in Section 1.3.1 that explain greenﬁeld FDI of i into n with the attractiveness of the culture
of the origin country i for individuals in the destination country n. Our results conﬁrm that it
certainly matters how much the manager of the i MNE appreciates the culture in the country
where the company invests, as this would imply expectations of lower monitoring and transaction
costs. However, it matters more how much individuals in the destination economy appreciate
the culture represented by the aﬃliate of the MNE in their country. Our conceptual framework
(see Section 1.3.1) suggests that this too can be due to the MNE manager's expectations of lower
monitoring and transaction costs (because of smoother interaction with agents that appreciate
the culture represented by the MNE) but also to destination-speciﬁc channels. These are a higher
propensity of the individuals in the destination country to buy the output of the MNE aﬃliate
in their country (`destination consumers demand' channel) as well as to approve political (and
economic) support toward the FDI project by their government (`destination political economy'
channel). Both channels increase the proﬁtability of the FDI project and therefore stimulate
greenﬁeld investment.18
18In Section 1.5 we present a more detailed test of the `destination consumers demand' and the `destination
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Table 1.4: Impact of CP on Greenﬁeld FDI (Number of Projects)
Dep. Var. Count Cni,t
(1) (2) (3)
lnCultIMPni,t 0.165*** 0.0690***
(11.87) (5.90)
lnCultEXPni,t 0.330*** 0.305***
(23.71) (21.91)
lndistni -0.407*** -0.214*** -0.179***
(-11.60) (-6.19) (-5.13)
colonyni 0.478*** 0.387*** 0.366***
(7.89) (6.95) (6.85)
langni 0.254*** 0.189*** 0.181**
(4.20) (3.73) (3.53)
comreligni 1.002*** 0.893*** 0.883***
(9.47) (9.51) (9.21)
contigni -0.114 0.0752 -0.0977
(-1.71) (-1.21) (-1.61)
comlegni 0.253*** 0.170*** 0.153***
(6.01) (4.59) (4.06)
FTAni,t 0.172** 0.135* 0.118*
(3.02) (2.49) (2.19)
BITni,t 0.0398 0.0119 0.0115
(0.93) (0.29) (0.29)
Imp×Year FE √ √ √
Exp×Year FE √ √ √
Obs 87448 87448 87448
% Zeros 0.749 0.749 0.749
R2 0.9056 0.9216 0.9221
Test 1 - - 585.19
Test 2 - - 141.81
Estimator PPML PPML PPML
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by trading-pair.
The dependent variable Count Cni,t is the bilateral number of Greenﬁeld FDI projects from country i to country n.
It includes the zero ﬂows.
The estimates are obtained with PPML using the PPML panel sg command written by Thomas Zylkin which simultane-
ously allows to absorb pair-wise as well as origin-by-time and destination-by-time FEs (see Larch et al., 2017). The model
includes origin×time and destination×time FEs. The sample size in this table is invariant to the number of covariates
included and refers to the regression which features both imports and exports of cultural goods. The information which
belong to groups with all zeros or missing values are automatically dropped by the estimator as FEs cannot be computed.
TESTS: Test 1 refers to the joint signiﬁcance χ2 test over the two coeﬃcients for explicit preferences (H0 ∶
lnCultIMPni,t = lnCultIMPni,t = 0. Test 2 reports instead the χ ∗ 2 test inherent to the statistical diﬀerence between
lnCultIMPni,t and lnCultIMPni,t (H0 ∶ lnCultIMPni,t − lnCultIMPni,t = 0.
1.4.2 Robustness checks
In this section we present some robustness checks dealing with the potential endogeneity of our
proxy for CP - i.e. trade in cultural goods. We argue that all sources of endogeneity - namely
political economy' channels. Table F-1 in appendix 1.F replicates the same speciﬁcation as above with the
coeﬃcients of interests expressed in terms of share over aggregate imports (exports) respectively. Such an exercise
allows to clean the coeﬃcients accounting for Cultural Preferences from potential shocks aﬀecting bilateral cultural
trade. The estimates from this additional robustness check conﬁrm the results reported in the main text.
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omitted variables, reverse causality and measurement error - may potentially contribute to the
bias of our parameters of interest. In what follows we discuss and address each of these sources.
Controlling for time-invariant unobserved factors and reverse causality
The correlation of the error term with CP and the determinants of Greenﬁeld FDI in (1.3) may
arise primarily because of the omission of dyadic speciﬁc unobserved factors. In particular, as
noted by Felbermayr and Toubal (2010) and Disdier et al. (2010) these unobserved elements
are often related to initial conditions, since the mutual learning due to strong pre-existing ties
may favor convergence of cultural characteristics which in turn can trigger even more intense FDI
ﬂows. Furthermore, the relationship between CP and FDI can also be subject to reverse causality
as there might be determinants of FDI that drive both economic outcomes as well as cultural
attractiveness, making it diﬃcult to establish a clear direction of causation (see Felbermayr and
Toubal, 2010; Guiso et al., 2009). Indeed, positive FDI shocks may increase the interactions with
foreign partners which in turn could lead to mutual learning and further cultural convergence
and appreciation. We deal with these ﬁrst two sources of endogeneity - namely omitted variables
and reverse causality - through the inclusion of asymmetric dyadic ﬁxed eﬀects and by adopting
an instrumental variable (IV)approach, respectively.19
We start discussing the inclusion of dyadic ﬁxed eﬀects. Table 1.5 compares our benchmark
results with the fully speciﬁed model. The inclusion of dyadic ﬁxed eﬀects absorbs all the cross
section variability in our sample, so that the impact of CP depends solely upon time contingent
cultural factors. To allow for comparison of the results, the sample size is identical in all columns
as we maintain the same sample for the fully speciﬁed model across all speciﬁcations. The models
with country×year ﬁxed eﬀects (columns 1-3) deliver roughly the same results as Table 1.4, so
the reduction of the sample size does not signiﬁcantly alter our benchmark estimates. On the
other hand, similarly to Felbermayr and Toubal (2010) and Disdier et al. (2010), the inclusion
of dyadic ﬁxed eﬀects in column (4) substantially aﬀects our parameters of interest. Trade in
cultural goods retains a positive impact on FDI, but the magnitude of both the elasticities of
cultural imports and exports is much lower with respect to the benchmark equation, indicating
that CP is partly captured by an unobservable time invariant component. In addition, only the
impact of exports remain statistically signiﬁcant, which suggests that only the time variation of
attractiveness of the origin's culture for the individuals in the destination economy plays a role
in the MNE decision to invest.
We now move to the issue of reverse causality. In the literature the simultaneity problem has
been commonly addressed with an IV strategy where current levels of CP are instrumented with
their past values (see for instance Felbermayr and Toubal (2010)). This strategy hinges on the
assumptions that (i) lagged bilateral values CP predict their current levels suﬃciently well and
that (ii) current shocks in the gravity equation are uncorrelated to past cultural relationships.
19In Appendix 1.D we further test the consistency of our benchmark results by augmenting the speciﬁcation
with the inclusion of observable variables of dimension nit that might capture (part) of the unobserved time-
varying dyadic factors.
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Table 1.5: Impact of Cultural Proximity on Greenﬁeld FDI: Adding Country Pair FE
Dep. Var. Count Cni,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnCultIMPni,t 0.145*** 0.0522*** 0.00677
(10.35) (4.43) (0.78)
lnCultEXPni,t 0.314*** 0.295*** 0.0499***
(22.57) (21.04) (3.72)
lndistni -0.404*** -0.208*** -0.181***
(-11.94) (-6.27) (-5.42)
colonyni 0.481*** 0.388*** 0.372***
(8.04) (7.14) (7.08)
langni 0.244*** 0.180*** 0.173***
(4.06) (3.58) (3.43)
comreligni 0.957*** 0.855*** 0.847***
(9.04) (9.06) (8.84)
contigni -0.0905 -0.0578 -0.0754
(-1.40) (-0.96) (-1.28)
comlegni 0.246*** 0.164*** 0.151***
(5.90) (4.43) (4.03)
FTAni,t 0.147** 0.109* 0.0976 0.0499
(2.62) (2.09) (1.87) (1.12)
BITni,t -0.0145 -0.0368 -0.0358 0.117
(-0.34) (-0.93) (-0.92) (1.41)
Imp×Year FE √ √ √ √
Exp×Year FE √ √ √ √
Country Pair FE
√
Obs 49702 49702 49702 49027
% Zeros 55.99 55.99 55.99 55.99
R2 0.9053 0.9222 0.9224 0.9686
Test 1 - - 526.13 14.85
Test 2 - - 146.33 6.92
Estimator PPML PPML PPML PPML
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by trading-pair.
The dependent variable Count Cni,t is the value of the aggregated bilateral ﬂow of greenﬁeld investments from country
i to country n, including zero ﬂows. The estimates are obtained with PPML using the PPML panel sg command writ-
ten by Thomas Zylkin which simultaneously allows to absorb pair-wise as well as origin-by-time and destination-by-time
FEs. The columns (1) to (3) replicate table 1.4 results, and include origin×time and destination×time FEs only. Column
(4) includes Country Pair FE, to address multilateral resistance, Baldwin and Taglioni (2006), Baier and Bergstrand
(2007), Head and Mayer (2014) and Piermartini and Yotov (2016) among the others, suggest to include country×time
dummy and trading pair dummies.
TESTS: Test 1 refers to the joint signiﬁcance χ2 test over the two coeﬃcients for explicit preferences (H0 ∶
lnCultIMPni,t = lnCultIMPni,t = 0. Test 2 reports instead the χ ∗ 2 test inherent to the statistical diﬀerence between
lnCultIMPni,t and lnCultIMPni,t (H0 ∶ lnCultIMPni,t − lnCultIMPni,t = 0.
While we ﬁnd the ﬁrst validity condition plausible, the latter which refers to the exogeneity of the
instrument is neither obvious, nor easy to demonstrate. For instance, it could be argued that part
of the current variation of FDI is associated to the evolution of cross-country cultural relationships
and therefore depends on past shocks of CP. Indeed, FDI normally requires a long-term focus and
the MNEs decision to invest is likely to depend even more on past than current levels of CP. In
our conceptual framework an alternative way to address the issue of reverse causality is to adopt
a completely diﬀerent approach by replacing current levels of cultural trade with their lagged
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values as the main variable of interest. The advantage of this strategy is that trade ﬂows are
predetermined with respect to FDI, a condition which attenuates the issue of reverse causality,
without (ii) being a binding/necessary condition for the consistency of the estimator. Although
they are based on somewhat contrasting assumptions, in our robustness analysis we propose both
strategies - the IV and the lagged approach - to address the simultaneity problem. In the ﬁrst
two columns of Table 1.6 we estimate our baseline speciﬁcation with the predetermined values
of cultural trade at t-2 and t-5 in columns 1 and 2, respectively. The point estimates of our
parameters of interest in both regressions are very close to the baseline results, which we ﬁnd as
reassuring. In addition, the very limited variation over time of the impact of trade in cultural
goods suggests a persistence in bilateral cultural tastes or, alternatively, a very similar variation
in CP over time for all country pairs. This ﬁnding corroborates the relatively low impact of the
time variation of CP on FDI obtained by introducing country pair ﬁxed eﬀects in Table 1.5.
The IV strategy reported in the remaining two columns of Table 1.6 builds on Combes et al.
(2005), Briant et al. (2014) and Felbermayr and Toubal (2010) and exploits the longitudinal
nature of the BACI dataset by instrumenting current levels of cultural trade ﬂows with lagged
values of the same variables (t − 12).20 Columns 3 and 4 compare the PPML estimates with
the correspondent coeﬃcients obtained with IVPPML using the reduced sample of Felbermayr
and Toubal (2010). Concerning our parameters of interest, controlling for endogeneity leads to
results that are in line with the literature and consistent with the estimates of the fully speciﬁed
model. The elasticity of imports of cultural goods roughly maintain the same magnitude as in the
PPML model, but becomes statistically not signiﬁcant. As for exports, when instrumented their
coeﬃcient remains statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% conﬁdence level, and substantially increases
in magnitude. Hence, once we control for reverse causality, we ﬁnd that only cultural attrac-
tiveness of the origin country for potential destinations have an impact on greenﬁeld investment.
Furthermore, the instrumented exports' elasticity is more than twice as large, suggesting a down-
ward bias in the impact of exports of cultural goods. However, the resulting downward bias is
substantially smaller compared to previous studies (see Guiso et al. (2009) and Felbermayr and
Toubal (2010)), as in our gravity speciﬁcation the elasticities are far closer across estimators.21
On the Measurement Error
In our econometric analysis the issue of measurement error is particularly compelling as the
accuracy of our results may be severely aﬀected by imprecise measures of both Asymmetric CP
and Greenﬁeld FDI. More speciﬁcally, while asymmetric CP may not be fully reﬂected by the
20The earliest year available from BACI dataset is 1995: this forces us to reduce the time span (2007-2014)
in our IV analysis. The time varying lagged instrument is relevant as it is strongly correlated to the endogenous
variable as showed in Appendix 1.E. The IV strategy is performed with the Stata command IVPOISSON which
doesn't allow for the inclusion of high dimensional ﬁxed eﬀects. In order to include a comprehensive set of ﬁxed
eﬀects which account for time varying importer and exporter heterogeneity, our strategy is to reduce the sample
size to ensure convergence in the estimation.
21In Felbermayr and Toubal (2010) the impact of cultural proximity on trade is more than ten times higher
when instrumented. The gap between OLS and 2SLS estimates is even higher in the analysis of Guiso et al.
(2009) when the dependent variable is FDI.
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Table 1.6: Impact of Instrumented Cultural Proximity on Greenﬁeld FDI
Dep. Var. Count Cni,t
2 year lag 5 year lag Baseline IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnCultIMPni,t 0.0658** 0.0736
(2.96) (1.35)
lnCultEXPni,t 0.247*** 0.619***
(9.43) (6.54)
ln lagged CultIMPni,t−2 0.0740***
(6.32 )
ln lagged CultEXPni,t−2 0.296***
(21.27)
ln lagged CultIMPni,t−5 0.0784***
(6.59 )
ln lagged CultEXPni,t−5 0.286***
(19.51)
lndistni 0.179*** 0.182*** 0.806*** 0.350**
( 5.08) ( 5.17) ( 11.26) ( 2.70)
colonyni 0.380*** 0.385*** 0.0193 0.0177
(7.14) (7.23) ( 0.23) ( 0.18)
langni 0.167** 0.152** 0.0723 0.0436
(3.26) (2.99) (0.70) ( 0.30)
comreligni 0.877*** 0.872*** 0.118 0.206
(9.02) (8.99) ( 0.95) ( 1.49)
contigni 0.106 0.117 0.147* 0.283***
( 1.75) ( 1.92) ( 2.36) ( 3.93)
comlegni 0.155*** 0.157*** 0.330*** 0.219**
(4.07) (4.17) (5.89) (3.20)
FTAni,t 0.127* 0.133* 0.394*** 0.0725
(2.34) (2.45) (3.49) (0.48)
BITni,t 0.00909 0.0311 0.172* 0.0757
( 0.23) ( 0.78) (2.23) (0.83)
Imp×Year FE √ √ √ √
Exp×Year FE √ √ √ √
Obs 84568 80057 10596 10040
Estimator PPML PPML PPML IV PPML
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. z statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by trading pair.
The dependent variable Count Cni,t is the bilateral number of Greenﬁeld FDI projects from country i to country n.
It includes the zero ﬂows. The estimates in columns (1) to (3) are obtained by PPML using the PPML panel sg
command written by Thomas Zylkin which simultaneously allows to absorb pair wise as well as origin by time and desti-
nation by time FEs. The model includes origin×time and destination×time FEs. Estimates in column (4) are computed
via IVPPML using the ivpoisson command built in STATA 13. Due to convergence reasons, in column (3) and (4)
the sample is reduced to the subset of importing and exporting countries as in Felbermayr and Toubal (2010). A draw-
back of IVPOISSON command is that it cannot handle high dimensional FE. Nonetheless, the estimates are consistent
to a broader sample estimated with a reduced set of ﬁxed eﬀects (available upon request to the authors), suggesting that
they are robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
TESTS: Test 1 refers to the joint signiﬁcance χ2 test over the two coeﬃcients for explicit preferences (H0 ∶
lnCultIMPni,t = lnCultIMPni,t = 0. Test 2 reports instead the χ ∗ 2 test inherent to the statistical diﬀerence between
lnCultIMPni,t and lnCultIMPni,t (H0 ∶ lnCultIMPni,t − lnCultIMPni,t = 0.
intensity of bilateral exchanges in cultural trade - either for the gross nature of cultural trade
and/or because of the issue of global value chain - also the data on Greenﬁeld FDI from the FT
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dataset include estimates for capital investment (derived from algorithms) when a company does
not release the information (see Desbordes and Wei, 2017; Lee and Ries, 2016). Here we address
these two sources of measurement error in turn.
Asymmetric CP: Speciﬁc characteristics of cultural goods may fail to adequately represent local
cultural identity and therefore, as a result, the intensity of their cross-country exchanges may
not appropriately reﬂect the actual patterns of asymmetric CP. For instance, facing a world
trading system where global supply chains are prevalent, one may argue that Chinese exports
of fashion products or toys (included in the category of optional cultural goods) to an import
country not only (and not necessarily) reﬂect Chinese cultural content, and therefore the cultural
attractiveness of China for the importer, but also some third country's cultural content embedded
in the fashion or pottery design performed in that country before actual manufacturing happening
in China. This concern is legitimate as long as few countries in our sample have a comparative
advantage in the manufacture of a number of cultural products, fostering a disproportionate
concentration of production in (and export from) these countries of cultural goods embedding
foreign cultural value added. This might actually be the case for several Asian countries and for
some of the products included in the sub-category of optional cultural goods (see Table 1.1). It is
well known that countries in the so called Factory Asia have an international specialisation in the
manufacturing of low tech goods, including for instance toys (see Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez,
2015). The average revealed comparative advantage (RCA) across optional cultural goods for the
period of our analysis is equal to 1.2 for China and above the threshold value of 1 also for India,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam.22 These arguments intuitively point to a downward
bias of the impact of CP estimated in our baseline analysis, as the error in measuring actual
CP is likely to be positively associated with both the extensive and intensive margin of cultural
trade. This conjecture is also supported theoretically (see for instance Kukush et al., 2004) for
the Poisson estimator, although to the best of our knowledge the conclusions have not been
extended to models with multiple regressors and with non-classical measurement error. Columns
1-3 of Table 1.7 compares our benchmark results of Table 1.4 with the estimates obtained with
only core and optional cultural goods, respectively. The distinction between core and optional
hinges on the cultural content embodied in these types of products: hence, it is reasonable to
expect the impact of CP as mostly driven by the trade (in either direction) of core cultural
goods as they are likely to better capture proximity in cultural tastes.23 However, optional
cultural goods represent the lion share of cultural trade from and between developing countries:
failing to account for these ﬂows would exclude many South countries from the analysis, limiting
the impact of CP on speciﬁc FDI channels (especially North-North). The pattern of results is
stable across diﬀerent measures of cultural trade, showing the capacity of both types of cultural
goods to reﬂect the same underlying forces. The stability of our results across core and optional
cultural goods also suggests that this potential source of measurement error is not biasing our
results as the average RCA of the listed Asian countries across core cultural goods is always well
22RCA is computed following the Balassa index.
23The distinction between core and optional cultural goods is described in detail in the Appendix 1.A.
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below one (for instance it is equal to 0.378 of China and 0.165 for Vietnam).24 In Column 4
we restrict our analysis to Newspapers which is arguably a category less subject to GVC bias as
the papers are produced locally and plausibly reﬂect more strongly the cultural identity of the
country where these goods are purchased from. The estimates conﬁrm the asymmetric nature of
CP and the predominant role of lnCultEXPni,t in inﬂuencing Greendﬁeld FDI. Finally, we test
the robustness of our analysis by including both directions of bilateral trust as an alternative
measure of CP. Data on trust are from Table I of Guiso et al. (2009) and measure the average
level of trust among selected EU countries from citizens of country of origin to citizens of country
of destination. While the use of this alternative proxy imposes obvious limitations in terms of
sample size and composition, we believe it is the best available proxy to compare the validity
of our conclusions with. Indeed, trust is time varying, can be safely assumed to be strongly
dependent on (at least some elements of) cultural proximity (see for a discussion Guiso et al.,
2009) and - most importantly - allows to test for the role of the asymmetric nature of CP.
Column 5 shows that the elasticity of Trust from the destination to the origin of FDI is the most
important determinant of the MNE's decision to invest: this ﬁnding corroborates the soundness
of our conclusions on the stronger investment eﬀect of the origin's culture attractiveness for the
destination country and at the same time substantiates the validity of cultural trade as a valid
proxy for CP.
Measure of FDI: The focus on the number of projects (count) as opposed to their total or aver-
age value has the advantage of minimizing the potential distortions induced by the imputation
techniques used in the construction of the value-related variables,25 but has its own limitations:
for instance it is equivalent to imposing to all projects the same weight in terms of economic
relevance, without discriminating them for their actual size. For instance, an investment in a
legal consultant oﬃce (the business sector with the lowest average capital investment in our
sample) is implicitly evaluated as an investment in a plant for oil reﬁnery, which is roughly 257
times larger (5.344 millions US$ against more than 1.372 billions US$ on average for the two
types of investments respectively). Beyond these measurement related considerations, the size
of bilateral FDI and the number of investments may (or may not) react diﬀerently to variation
in CP as they capture diﬀerent aspects of internationalization. This is ultimately an empirical
question. The reported results in Table 1.8 (column 1) show that while the impact of CP is still
positive but generally lower when considering the value (Vni,t) as dependent variable, imports
of cultural goods become statistically not signiﬁcant. These combined ﬁndings suggest that the
destination side mechanisms are relevant across diﬀerent measures of bilateral volume of FDI,
and that the decision on whether or not to invest is more sensitive to the asymmetric components
of CP than the actual size of bilateral FDI. Similar conclusions apply when we investigate the
impact of asymmetric CP on the intensive margin of investment as captured by the average value
of investment (V¯ni,t). The estimates reported in Column 2 indicate that, despite being halved in
their magnitude, the coeﬃcients of both lnCultIMPni,t and lnCultEXPni,t remain statistically
24A better test of the implications of relying on gross cultural trade would require the use of value added trade
data. Unfortunately available sources such as the OECD/WTO TiVA database fail to match the country coverage
and product desegregation required by the research design of the present study.
25See Table A-3 in Appendix 1.A for a more precise assessment of the scope of imputation.
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Table 1.7: Diﬀerent Measures of CP: Core VS Optional Cultural Trade
Dep. Var. Count Cni,t
Total Cultural Core Cultural Optional Cultural Newpapers Trust
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lnCultIMPni,t 0.0690*** 0.0925*** 0.0525*** 0.0468***
(5.90) (8.22) (4.34) (5.59)
lnCultEXPni,t 0.305*** 0.285*** 0.249*** 0.112***
(21.91) (20.18) (19.43) (10.23)
ln trustni,t 0.975
(1.74)
ln trustin,t 1.379*
(2.48)
Imp×Year FE √ √ √ √ √
Exp×Year FE √ √ √ √ √
Obs 87448 67192 76951 19022 172
% Zeros 75% 53% 64% 8% -
R2 0.922 0.920 0.913 0.925 0.949
Estimator PPML PPML PPML PPML OLS
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by trading-pair.
The dependent variable Count Cni,t is the bilateral number of Greenﬁeld FDI projects from country i to country n. It
includes the zero ﬂows. All estimates but in the last column are obtained by PPML using the PPML panel sg command
written by Thomas Zylkin which simultaneously allows to absorb pair-wise as well as origin-by-time and destination-
by-time FEs. The model includes origin×time and destination×time FEs; the last column is computed using the OLS
equivalent of ppml, reghdfe, developed by Sergio Correia.
The ﬁrst column replicates column (3) of table 1.4. The second column refers to the eﬀect on greenﬁeld FDI of `core'
cultural trade, while the third refers to `optional' cultural trade, as deﬁned by UNCTAD (2010). The fourth perform
the same exercise with newspaper trade only, while the ﬁnal column perform a similar exercise with the measure of trust
as in Guiso et al. (2009). NOTICE: The sample is substantially reduced in column (4) and column (5), due to the
large number of null values that are dropped when taken in logarithmic form. The absence of a coeﬃcient estimate for
contiguity, FTA, BIT, and colony in the last column is due to the very small sample of countries for which the Euro-
baromenter Survey is available.
TESTS: Test 1 refers to the joint signiﬁcance χ2 test over the two coeﬃcients for explicit preferences (H0 ∶
lnCultIMPni,t = lnCultIMPni,t = 0. Test 2 reports instead the χ ∗ 2 test inherent to the statistical diﬀerence between
lnCultIMPni,t and lnCultIMPni,t (H0 ∶ lnCultIMPni,t − lnCultIMPni,t = 0.
signiﬁcant at least at the 5% conﬁdence level.
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Table 1.8: Impact of Cultural Proximity on Value of Greenﬁeld FDI
Dep. Var. Value Vni,t Average Value V¯ni,t
(1) (2)
lnCultIMPni,t 0.0221 0.0390*
(1.07) (2.11)
lnCultEXPni,t 0.269*** 0.137***
(11.44) (6.11)
lndistni -0.237*** -0.166**
(-4.44) (-3.20)
colonyni 0.364*** 0.0290
(4.76) (0.25)
langni 0.109 0.0222
(1.20) (0.24)
comreligni 1.210*** 0.750***
(8.42) (5.09)
contigni -0.0952 0.0874
(-0.94) (0.66)
comlegni 0.0724 0.0215
(1.28) (0.32)
FTAni,t 0.260*** 0.120
(3.52) (1.34)
BITni,t -0.0443 0.284***
(-0.74) (4.33)
Imp×Year FE √ √
Exp×Year FE √ √
Obs 87448 87448
% Zeros 0.749 0.749
R2 0.9221 0.4961
Test 1 196.27 59.70
Test 2 41.24 8.33
Estimator PPML PPML
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by trading-pair.
The dependent variable Cni,t is the value of the aggregated bilateral ﬂow of greenﬁeld investments from country i to
country n, including zero ﬂows, while V¯ni,t represents the average value of bilateral greenﬁeld investments.
The estimates are obtained with PPML using the PPML panel sg command written by Thomas Zylkin which simultane-
ously allows to absorb pair-wise as well as origin-by-time and destination-by-time FEs. The model includes origin×time
and destination×time FEs. The sample size in this table is invariant to the number of covariates included and refers to
the regression which features both imports and exports of cultural goods. The information which belong to groups with
all zeros or missing values are automatically dropped by the estimator as FEs cannot be computed.
fDIMarket database provides information on the value of each greenﬁeld. When no oﬃcial ﬁgures are provided by the
parent company, the value is estimated by FDIIntelligence unit. Information about the estimation algorithm can be
found on fDIMarket website. the χ2 refers to the cultural trade (trust) coeﬃcients equivalence. Rejecting the null
implies the two direction to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other.
TESTS: Test 1 refers to the joint signiﬁcance χ2 test over the two coeﬃcients for explicit preferences (H0 ∶
lnCultIMPni,t = lnCultIMPni,t = 0. Test 2 reports instead the χ ∗ 2 test inherent to the statistical diﬀerence between
lnCultIMPni,t and lnCultIMPni,t (H0 ∶ lnCultIMPni,t − lnCultIMPni,t = 0.
1.5 Extensions
This section proposes three extensions to the analysis conducted so far. First, we propose two
empirical tests of the `destination-side' mechanisms as introduced in the conceptual framework
laid out in Section 1.3.1. Then, we test whether the role of asymmetric and time-dependent com-
ponent of CP changes at diﬀerent levels of its symmetric and time-invariant component. Finally,
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we test whether similar conclusions about the stronger role of the destination side mechanisms
apply to diﬀerent forms of economic exchanges such as overall trade and M&A.
1.5.1 Destination-side mechanisms
The empirical analysis so far has established the relative importance of the two directions of
asymmetric CP in explaining Greenﬁeld FDI from an origin country i to a destination n. In
particular the attractiveness of the i's culture for individuals in n - Ain,t proxied by CultEXPni,t
- seems to play a much stronger role than the attractiveness of the destination for the origin,
Ani,t proxied by CultIMPni,t. This is somehow at odds with the standard theories of bilateral
FDI which tend to focus on `origin-side' mechanisms and calls for a more careful consideration
of `destination-side' mechanisms. In this section we propose an empirical test of the `destination
consumers demand' and the `destination political economy' channels introduced in Section 1.3.1.
According to the `destination consumers demand' channel, Ain,t can be relevant to explain FDI
from i to n because the preferences of consumers in n for the the aﬃliate's production in their
country would be a positive function of i's cultural attractiveness for them. This leads us to
expect Ain,t to be more relevant with respect to Ani,t when the FDI projects are intended to
target consumer demand in the destination country rather than to serve as an intermediary step
in a global supply chain type of production. In the case of horizontal FDI the attractiveness of
the origin's culture for consumers in the destination country could be a stronger driver of the
investment decision as it might positively aﬀect the expected revenues of the FDI project. This
is conﬁrmed empirically by the estimation results presented in Table 1.9.
Both columns replicate results as in column (3) of Table 1.4 on two diﬀerent subsamples. Column
(1) includes only FDI projects in those sectors that are more likely to target the consumers
demand in the destination country, i.e. that include consumption (ﬁnal) goods and services.
Conversely, the estimation sample used to derive the results presented in column (2) is restricted
to those sectors where the importance of local consumption is lower compared to the location
advantages of diﬀerent kind: such sectors include mainly intermediate goods.26 Taking the ratio
between the point estimates of the coeﬃcients for lnCultEXPni,t and lnCultIMPni,t as a measure
of the relative importance of Ain,t with respect to Ani,t in explaining Cni,t we notice that this
ratio is higher when the estimation sample is restricted to those sectors that are more likely to
target the consumers demand in the destination country. We take this a suggestive evidence of
the existence of the hypothesized `destination consumers demand' channel in determining the
role of CP for FDI.
The `destination political economy' channel, on the other hand, rationalizes the role of Ain,t in
determining greenﬁeld FDI from i to n, through the potential political and economic support
26The estimation sample in the ﬁrst column includes only FDI projects classiﬁed in the following sectors:
beverages, consumer electronics, consumer product, ﬁnancial services, food and tobacco, leisure and entertain-
ment, software and ICT devices, and transportation. T`he estimation sample in the second column instead includes
only the following sectors: automotive components, biotech, building and construction material, ceramics, glasses,
chemical, coal, oil gas, electronic component, engines and turbines, industrial machinery, metals, minerals, plastic,
rubber, semiconductors.
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Table 1.9: Destination Consumers Demand Channel
Dep. Var. Count Cni,t
FDI targeting consumers in n More likely Less likely
(1) (2)
lnCultIMPni,t 0.0768*** 0.0731***
(5.85) (4.12)
lnCultEXPni,t 0.317*** 0.255***
(20.12) (14.70)
lndistni -0.258*** -0.0730
(-7.34) (-1.42)
colonyni 0.315*** 0.369***
(4.48) (5.50)
langni 0.244*** 0.0386
(3.97) (0.46)
comreligni 1.047*** 0.872***
(9.60) (6.50)
contigni -0.153* -0.0963
(-2.21) (-1.13)
comlegni 0.204*** 0.0174
(4.64) (0.31)
FTAni,t 0.0138 0.171*
(0.24) (2.15)
BITni,t 0.0467 -0.0522
(1.10) (-0.83)
Imp×Year FE √ √
Exp×Year FE √ √
Obs 78697 62989
% Zeros 0.82 0.83
R2 0.90 0.88
Test 1 5389.02 2310.47
Test 2 874.19 331.26
Test Imp 0.05
Test Exp 13.49
Estimator PPML PPML
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by trading-pair.
Both columns replicate results as in column (3) of Table 1.4. The estimation sample in the ﬁrst column includes only
FDI projects classiﬁed in the following sectors: beverages, consumer electronics, consumer product, ﬁnancial services,
food and tobacco, leisure and entertainment, software and ICT devices, and transportation. the estimation sample in
the second column instead includes only the following sectors: automotive components, biotech, building and construc-
tion material, ceramics, glasses, chemical, coal, oil gas, electronic component, engines and turbines, industrial machinery,
metals, minerals, plastic, rubber, semiconductors.
TESTS: Test 1 refers to the joint signiﬁcance χ2 test over the two coeﬃcients for explicit preferences (H0 ∶
lnCultIMPni,t = lnCultIMPni,t = 0. Test 2 reports instead the χ ∗ 2 test inherent to the statistical diﬀerence be-
tween lnCultIMPni,t and lnCultIMPni,t (H0 ∶ lnCultIMPni,t − lnCultIMPni,t = 0. Test Imp and Test Exp reports
the result of a χ2 test on the equality of the coeﬃcients across speciﬁcations (Low vs High) for cultural imports and
exports respectively. For practical reasons, the last two tests are performed on a reduced set of ﬁxed eﬀects and ap-
proaching the estimates via GLM instead of HDFE absorbing routines, and comparing the two equation via Seem-
ingly Unrelated Estimation (SUEST). Formally, Test Imp = H0 ∶ lnCultIMPHni,t = lnCultIMPLni,t = 0; Test Exp =
H0 ∶ lnCultEXPHni,t = lnCultEXPLni,t = 0.
granted by the government in n to an FDI project coming from i. In a political economy model
this would need to respond - at least to some extent - to the preferences of voters in n, aﬀected
by their appreciation of the culture in i. This mechanism implies a stronger relative importance
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of the origin's cultural attractiveness for the destination when politicians in the destination
country are subject to a higher degree of accountability with respect to their citizens, i.e. when
their allocation of support across projects coming from diﬀerent sources is likely to more closely
reﬂect voters' preferences. The estimates reported in Table 1.10 represent an empirical test of
this implication.
Table 1.10: Destination Political Economy Channel
Dep. Var. Count Cni,t
Accountability in n Low High
(1) (2)
lnCultIMPni,t 0.0966*** 0.0466
(5.00) (1.65)
lnCultEXPni,t 0.229*** 0.486***
(10.07) (16.23)
lndistni -0.635*** -0.509***
(-6.37) (-4.33)
colonyni 0.814*** 0.771***
(5.89) (4.59)
langni 0.176 -0.133
(1.72) (-0.79)
comreligni 0.144 -0.279
(0.63) (-0.56)
contigni 0.167 0.0688
(1.27) (0.32)
comlegni -0.00287 -0.111
(-0.03) (-0.80)
FTAni,t 0.0613 1.249***
(0.49) (6.40)
BITni,t 0.0938 -0.0934
(1.13) (-0.87)
Imp×Year FE √ √
Exp×Year FE √ √
Obs 3755 2376
% Zeros 0.76 0.68
R2 0.85 0.99
Test 1 174.09 270.38
Test 2 15.02 107.60
Test Imp 1.10
Test Exp 17.01
Estimator PPML PPML
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by trading-pair.
Both columns replicate the speciﬁcation as in column (3) of Table 1.4. The estimation sample used to derive the es-
timates reported in the ﬁrst (second) column is restricted to destination countries in the ﬁrst (fourth) quartile of the
accountability score below. Accountability is measured with by the World Bank CPIA indicator, which reports a coun-
try's perception on Corruption, Accountability and Transparency.
TESTS: Test 1 refers to the joint signiﬁcance χ2 test over the two coeﬃcients for explicit preferences (H0 ∶
lnCultIMPni,t = lnCultEXPni,t = 0. Test 2 reports instead the χ ∗ 2 test inherent to the statistical diﬀerence be-
tween lnCultIMPni,t and lnCultEXPni,t (H0 ∶ lnCultIMPni,t − lnCultEXPni,t = 0. Test Imp and Test Exp reports
the result of a χ2 test on the equality of the coeﬃcients across speciﬁcations (Low vs High) for cultural imports and
exports respectively. For practical reasons, the last two tests are performed on a reduced set of ﬁxed eﬀects and ap-
proaching the estimates via GLM instead of HDFE absorbing routines, and comparing the two equation via Seem-
ingly Unrelated Estimation (SUEST). Formally, Test Imp = H0 ∶ lnCultIMPHni,t = lnCultIMPLni,t = 0; Test Exp =
H0 ∶ lnCultEXPHni,t = lnCultEXPLni,t = 0.
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Both columns replicate the speciﬁcation as in column (3) of Table 1.4. The estimation sample
used to derive the estimates reported in the ﬁrst (second) column is restricted to destination coun-
tries with an accountability score below (above) the sample median. Accountability is measured
with the accountability index, from the World Bank CPIA indicators on Corruption, Account-
ability and Transparency perception. The ratio between the point estimates of the coeﬃcients for
lnCultEXPni,t and lnCultIMPni,t is higher for the subsample of high accountability destination
countries, suggesting a relative higher importance of Ain,t when politicians in the destination
country are more accountable vis-à-vis their citizens and therefore providing empirical evidence
for the existence of the hypothesized `destination political economy' channel27.
1.5.2 Heterogeneous impact of the asymmetric and time-dependent dimen-
sion of CP
This section tests how the asymmetric and time-dependent component of CP aﬀects bilateral
investment ﬂows at diﬀerent degree of the symmetric and time-invariant component of CP. In
order to do so, we explore the eﬀect of trade in cultural goods at diﬀerent values (above and
below the median value) of three symmetric, and time-invariant measures of cultural proximity
previously used in the literature: religious proximity, the Melitz and Toubal (2014) Common
Spoken Language (CSL) measure of linguistic proximity, and the composite index of linguistic
proximity (AP Index) by Adsera and Pytlikova (2015).28 Moreover, to identify the impact of
time-contingent shocks in CP all regressions include a full set of ﬁxed eﬀects as in Table 1.5. The
inclusion of dyadic ﬁxed eﬀects absorbs all the cross section variability in our sample, a necessary
feature if we are interested in exploring the time-varying dimension of cultural trade. Results
are reported in Table 1.11 below.
Consistently with the results presented in Table 1.5 the reported estimates suggest that only time
contingent shocks in terms of cultural attractiveness of the origin country for the destination
seem to trigger investments. However, it seems that those results are mainly driven by pairs
characterized by low level of time-invariant and symmetric CP: time contingent shocks to the
cultural attractiveness of the origin country for the destination only play a role when the level of
pre-existing or historical cultural ties is relatively weak. This is consistent with a relationship of
substitutability between time-contingent, asymmetric and time-invariant, symmetric dimensions
of CP in triggering FDI, with the former operating as a bridgehead between otherwise culturally
distant countries.
27To test this assumption, replicating the baseline speciﬁcation with both cultural export- and import-related
interactions would be necessary. However, the large heterogeneity that characterizes FDI ﬂow data does not allow
to draw statistically meaningful conclusions. In addition, collinearity causes the coeﬃcients of the export-related
interaction terms to be dropped systematically.
28The choice of these measures is constrained by our intention to split the estimation sample. The majority
of the traditional measures used in existing literature have a binary structure and for this reason they are not
suitable to split our sample in a simple and eﬀective way.
46
Asymmetric Cultural Preferences and Greenfield FDI
Table 1.11: Heterogeneous impact of the asymmetric and time-dependent dimension of CP
Dep. Var. Count Cni,t
Religion1 CSL2 AP index3
(1-50 pct) (51-100 pct) (1-50 pct) (51-100 pct) (1-50 pct) (51-100 pct)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnCultIMPni,t 0.00639 -0.000994 0.00920 -0.0151 -0.00908 -0.0434
(0.53) (-0.07) (0.82) (-1.03) (-0.57) (-0.92)
lnCultEXPni,t 0.0554*** 0.0122 0.0604*** 0.00995 0.0713*** -0-0779
(3.34) (0.75) (3.59) (0.66) (3.51) (-1.26)
FTAni,t 0.136* -0.0640 0.0315 -0.0336 0.0130 -0.0475
(2.06) (-1.09) (0.50) (-0.66) (0.14) (-0.55)
BITni,t 0.0273 0.0754 0.223* 0.0187 0.0859 0.289
(0.27) (0.65) (2.32) (0.19) (0.64) (0.77)
Imp×Year FE √ √ √ √ √ √
Exp×year FE √ √ √ √ √ √
Country Pair FE
√ √ √ √ √ √
Obs 23209 23916 22657 23465 12487 23465
% Zeros 59.78% 55.25% 64.04% 51.00% 45.77% 4.47%
R2 0.9687 0.9770 0.9721 0.9791 0.9730 0.9895
Test 1 11.52 0.56 14.59 1.3905609 12.43 2.46
Test 2 5.53 0.35 5.71 1.31 9.09 0.19
Estimator PPML PPML PPML PPML PPML PPML
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by trading-
pair. The dependent variable Count Cni,t is the number of the aggregated bilateral ﬂow of greenﬁeld investments
from country i to country n, including null ﬂows. The estimates are obtained with PPML using the PPML panel
sg command written by Thomas Zylkin which simultaneously allows to absorb pair-wise as well as origin-by-time and
destination-by-time FEs.
1Division along the median of the distribution of religious proximity between country i and country n.
2Division along the median of the distribution of Common Spoken Language as in Melitz and Toubal (2014) between
country i and country n.
3Division along the Composite Index of Linguistic Proximity as in Adsera and Pytlikova (2015) between country i and
country n.
TESTS: Test 1 refers to the joint signiﬁcance χ2 test over the two coeﬃcients for explicit preferences (H0 ∶
lnCultIMPni,t = lnCultIMPni,t = 0. Test 2 reports instead the χ ∗ 2 test inherent to the statistical diﬀerence between
lnCultIMPni,t and lnCultIMPni,t (H0 ∶ lnCultIMPni,t − lnCultIMPni,t = 0.
1.6 Conclusions
Many countries are pursuing policies to attract foreign direct investments because they reckon
FDI will contribute to their economic growth by creating a more competitive business environ-
ment, triggering technology spillovers, increasing capital accumulation and generating more job
opportunities. The growth-enhancing role of FDI is well documented in the literature and is
particularly evident for developing countries. Over the last 15 years the share of FDI originating
from developing countries over total ﬂows has increased from 8% to 26% while recent research
has showed that much of this investment takes place between developing economies (Gold et al.,
2017)
The overall economic beneﬁts of FDI have motivated a thorough investigation of its determinants
and CP has been established as an important driver of the ﬁrm's decision to invest abroad.
However, the deﬁnition of CP used assumed that it was symmetric and stable over time. The
resulting standard measures of CP - including the composite indexes (as the one proposed by
Kogut and Singh, 1988, based on Hofstede, 2003's cultural dimensions) - employed in the existing
empirical studies are therefore inadequate to capture a broader and more reﬁned notion of CP.
47
Asymmetric Cultural Preferences and Greenfield FDI
In this paper we have assessed the eﬀect of CP on greenﬁeld FDI explicitly accounting for
its asymmetric and time-dependent dimensions. In line with Disdier et al. (2010), we used
bilateral trade in cultural goods as a proxy for asymmetric and time-dependent CP. The exercise
contributes to the literature as the eﬀects of asymmetric bilateral cultural measures remain
largely understudied and the few papers that include FDI as outcome variable as well as an
asymmetric measure of bilateral cultural relationship have been conﬁned mainly to samples of
OECD economies. The use of two comprehensive datasets on trade and greenﬁeld FDI - namely
BACI (CEPII) and Financial Times FDI Market dataset, respectively - allows the present study
to feature a very extended country coverage which also includes South-South FDI, for which CP
may be particularly relevant.
Relying on the PPML estimation technique with high-dimensional ﬁxed eﬀects our results have
shown that asymmetry in cross-country cultural proximity matters for FDI ﬂows: more precisely,
investment projects from a source to a destination country tend to increase more with cultural
exports from source to destination rather than with imports. In other words, the evidence points
to a stronger role of the cultural attractiveness of the country where the investment is coming
from for individuals in the destination economy. This result suggests that higher relevance in
explaining patterns of FDI should be attributed to the cultural preferences of the individuals
in the destination country, both as consumers potentially buying the outcome produced by
the subsidiary as well as voters, aﬀecting the allocation of political pressures across competing
investment projects.
Our analysis leaves at least two interesting questions open to future research. First, while the
study of asymmetry in CP is limited in the context of the present paper to a descriptive as-
sessment, it undoubtedly proves that such phenomenon exists in the data, namely that cultural
relationships are indeed asymmetric. More can be done to identify a statistically robust and
convincing measure of the degree of asymmetry in cultural relationships and to study its deter-
minants and eﬀects in the realm of economic phenomena. Second, our ﬁndings shed new light on
the role played by individuals in the destination country to trigger inward FDI. While this paper
focuses on the cultural dimension of these preferences, further theoretical investigation can be
conducted to broadly assess their contribution within a fully micro-founded general equilibrium
model of bilateral FDI.
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Appendix
1.A Data: sources and general features
The data used throughout both the descriptive and the analytical parts of the paper come from
a variety of sources. Table A-1 displays the major sources and related links where additional
information on the diﬀerent databases used to create our ﬁnal dataset: most of the other data
come from sources that are well known in empirical gravity literature.
The focus of the analysis is on testing the role and the extent of the non-reciprocal component
of CP on international economic ﬂows, with the speciﬁc focus on greenﬁeld FDI. For this reason
we aggregate the projects according to the country of origin, destination and year in which the
investment has been made. Then, we label missing dyadic ﬂows at this stage as null investment
channels, to obtain a square bilateral FDI matrix accounting for 184×185 countries of origin and
destination. Cultural Trade data are then merged accordingly. Given that some territorial units
in fDIMarket are not matched in BACI, some countries are dropped throughout the empirical
analysis (see Table G-1 in Appendix 1.B with the complete list of unmatched and excluded
countries). In this respect, our strategy is similar to the one adopted by Aubry et al. (2014),
Desbordes and Wei (2017), and Lee and Ries (2016) among the others. As a consequence, our
FDI data reveals a pattern that is consistent with the ﬁndings from the recent theoretical and
empirical literature in international economics (see for instance Mayer and Ottaviano, 2008), i.e.
that only few ﬁrms are able to undertake FDI as a form of internationalization. 29
However, the databases related to our variables of interest, cultural trade and greenﬁeld FDI
respectively, present some peculiarities that demand for some crucial choices in terms of data
aggregation and classiﬁcation, in order to obtain the least distortionary measures possible. In
the remaining of this section, we explore the main issues related to cultural trade (that constitute
our main variable of interest) and greenﬁeld FDI respectively.
Data on trade in cultural goods Trade data come from the BACI dataset by CEPII30, a
proper workhorse in empirical gravity analysis in international trade. It is not the purpose of
this appendix to describe the features of the BACI dataset as it is, for which we suggest the
interested reader to check directly on the web link provided in Table A-1 above. Much more
interesting for the purpose of this paper is to deﬁne what can be labelled as Cultural Good and
what classiﬁcation scheme is batter able to ﬁt to the purpose of this paper that is, to investigate
the role of imperfect reciprocity in cultural proximity in international economic ﬂows.
Many countries and international organizations developed their own classiﬁcation scheme, based
29As this is particularly true for greenﬁeld FDI, the result is that null bilateral ﬂows account for more than
94% of the possible bilateral channels in our dataset. See Table A-2 below for a detailed report concerning the
incidence of null ﬂows in our dataset.
30http://www.cepii.fr/cepii/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=1
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Table A-1: Main Sources of Data used in the Empirical Section
Variables Dataset / Source / Website / Reference and Accessibility
FDI Variables FDIMarket / FDI Intelligence Unit, The Financial Times / http://www.fdiintelligence.com/ /
FDI Market License
Trade Variables BACI / CEPII / http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=1 / UN
COMTRADE access required
Gravity Variables Gravdata / CEPII / http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=8 / Free
Bilateral Distance Geodist / CEPII / http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=6 / Free
Migrant Stock WB Global Bilateral Migration Dataset / The World Bank / http://data.worldbank.org/
data-catalog/global-bilateral-migration-database / Artuç et al. (2015) / Free
Language I Lingweb / CEPII / http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=19 /
Melitz and Toubal (2014) / Free
Language II Data S1 / The Economic Journal / http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecoj.12231/
abstract / Adsera and Pytlikova (2015) / Free
Cultural Distance Hofstede Index / The Journal of Population Economics / https://link.springer.com/article/
10.1007/s00148-011-0356-x / Belot and Ederveen (2012) / Free
BITs UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub / http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA / Free
CPIA Country Policy and Institutional Assessment / The World Bank / https://data.worldbank.org/
data-catalog/CPIA / Free
Notes: This table lists the main sources in the data used throughout the dataset. Additional information are available upon
request to the corresponding author. Concerning the sources of the single variables referring to a particular dataset used in
this paper, the authors encourage to search directly in the websites provided.
on precise principles and content of the single class of product: for this reason, identifying the
most suitable scheme for the sample considered in this paper is not an easy task. Yet, the
choice of the classiﬁcation is particularly sensible. Given the world coverage of our analysis, we
restricted our search to two alternative classiﬁcations for cultural goods promoted by United
Nations agencies, the UNESCO and the UNCTAD, 31 each of them based on diﬀerent criteria
and diﬀerent categories of goods to be included in the count. Disdier et al. (2010) classiﬁed
cultural goods using the deﬁnition proposed by UNESCO. Despite we build upon their seminal
work, we depart from that approach and adopt the scheme proposed by UNCTAD (2010). There
exist two main reasons for this choice: (i) a technicality related to the time coverage of the data,
and (ii) a more substantial issue concerning the sample selection.
As for time coverage, the decision to prefer the UNCTAD classiﬁcation leans on the diﬀerent
coding system adopted by the two diﬀerent classiﬁcations. With respect to this point, UNESCO
adopts the 2007 Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS 2007), that would
call for the adoption of a conversion table to arrange the data along our time period. Conversely,
UNCTAD (2010) adopts the HS 2002 coding system, that is more suitable for the time period at
stake, as it allows not to convert the trade ﬂows prior of 2007.32 The conversion may distort the
data, since the way they are collected is not always consistent across diﬀerent coding systems:
for this reason, the adoption of the UNCTAD (2010) classiﬁcation could turn out to be not only
less burdensome from a computational point of view, but also less prone to distortions.
Much more relevant for the choice of the classiﬁcation scheme is the the sample coverage issue.
The dataset used throughout this paper has global coverage,33 with a large number of developing
and transition economies in addition to developed ones. Conversely, Disdier et al. (2010) conﬁne
31Other criteria can be found in the classiﬁcation schemes developed by national and smaller international
institutions (see UNCTAD, 2010, for a review).
32Nonetheless, as we adopted lag values of cultural trade as instruments in our IV analysis, we could not
eventually avoid the burden of converting trade data prior to 2002. See Section 1.4.2.
33See Appendix 1.G for the list of excluded countries.
53
Appendices - Asymmetric Cultural Preferences and Greenfield FDI
their analysis to a much more homogeneous group of OECD countries. This could not seem a
major concern, but it is important to acknowledge that cultural goods are neither homogeneous
nor equally produced worldwide. Both UNESCO and UNCTAD classiﬁcations uphold this fact
by splitting cultural goods into core and optional cultural goods, with the former generally
dominated by developed economies. By construction, in both classiﬁcations optional cultural
goods encompass a wide range of products that are more likely to be produced in, and traded
by developing countries too.34
A potential drawback of the wider conception of what can be considered as cultural good is
that the UNCTAD classiﬁcation has a much more diluted cultural content when compared to
the UNESCO's. In fact, despite the latter encompasses a narrower set of traded goods, they
are the ones with the larger cultural content. Nonetheless, given the world coverage of our
sample, developed countries account for less than 30% of the whole set of countries included.
For this reason, in order to balance the cultural composition of trade ﬂows, and to construct
a comparable measure of cultural trade across diﬀerent development stages, the classiﬁcation
that is able to guarantee a relatively higher weight to those goods more evenly distributed
across developed, developing and least developed economies should be preferred. This problem
was not relevant in Disdier et al. (2010) because of the relative homogeneity of the sampled
countries. Comparing the two classiﬁcations suggests that core goods account for 60% of total
cultural goods in UNESCO's classiﬁcation; barely 20% in UNCTAD's. For this reason, [...]the
UNESCO classiﬁcation is better at capturing the experience of countries in the global North,
while UNCTAD's better reﬂects opportunities for countries in the South.[...] (UNCTAD, 2010,
p. 111). This issue is more explicitly tackled in Section 1.4.2, where separate regressions on
core and optional trade are run separately and compared to the results of our benchmark
speciﬁcation, where cultural goods encompasses both groups of goods.
Greenﬁeld FDI data Data on FDI (that constitute the dependent variable in our empirical
analysis) come from the fDIMarket database, that includes a detailed collection of all (and only)
greenﬁeld investments occurred worldwide in the period 2003-2014 (the ﬁrst available year for
greenﬁeld FDI and the last year available for cultural trade data - our variable of interest -
respectively). In ﬁgures, fDIMarket contains more than 169,000 investment projects, carried on
by roughly 67700 diﬀerent companies worldwide in the period considered. The dataset include a
large amount of information related to each recorded investment, included the the declared capital
expenditure and the estimated number of jobs created at the moment the investment is carried
out. Beyond the quantitative information, the dataset includes several additional investment-
level entries such as location (up to NUTS 3 level of disaggregation), economic activity of the
parent company as well as the (broad) sector in which such activity can be associated to in the
host country. The high level of detail would ideally allow a much ﬁner aggregation than the
broad national-sectoral unit most of the more common datasets allow, but this type of analysis
goes beyond the scope of the current research.
However, despite the exceptionally wide coverage of the dataset and its reliability in terms of
missing records,35 fDIMarket data present some important issues that worth to be introduced.
34The deﬁnition of core goods made in UN agencies' and sovra-national organizations' classiﬁcations in general
derive from this consideration, since most of the minor classiﬁcation tend to include those high cultural content
goods in their schemes. Conversely, optional goods refers to those goods that are included by certain countries
or agencies' classiﬁcation, but not by others (the inclusion of a class of goods depends on the productive system
of the country that develop the classiﬁcation). However, since all those schemes refer to developed countries,
they tend to mirror goods prevalently traded by advanced economies, leaving apart those goods that may have a
diluted cultural content.
35UNCTAD itself bases part of its investments' reports on fDIMarket 's ﬁgures. Not only, the database consti-
tutes one of the sources of the UNCTADSTAT's FDI dedicated section.
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The ﬁrst issue relates to the cross sectional dimension: Table A-2 shows the incidence of null ﬂows
over the full set of potential country pairs in the dataset, at a yearly break down. The estimation
via OLS is therefore excluded by the zero-inﬂated structure of the full dataset, that would distort
the estimates downward (see for instance Head and Mayer, 2014, for a thorough discussion on the
choice of the correct estimator for gravity analysis in the context of zero-inﬂation). To the best
of our knowledge, the incidence of null ﬂows in the full dataset is larger than any other previous
study: nonetheless, in the empirical section the sample is reduced by the estimation routines
to those observations for which the FDI ﬂow is non-zero in at least one year out of 12. This
reﬁnement substantially reduces the amount of zeroes to slightly less than 70%, allowing us to
obtain consistent estimates via PPML (See Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2011, for a comprehensive
proof of the consistency of PPML estimator in presence of both over-dispersion of the data and
over-inﬂation of null values in the dependent variable.).
Table A-2: Percentage of Zeroes by Year
Year Null Non-Null Total Incidence
2003 32,453 1,587 34,040 95.34%
2004 32,442 1,598 34,040 95.31%
2005 32,405 1,635 34,040 95.20%
2006 32,289 1,751 34,040 94.86%
2007 32,151 1,889 34,040 94.45%
2008 31,751 2,289 34,040 93.28%
2009 31,960 2,080 34,040 93.89%
2010 31,931 2,109 34,040 93.80%
2011 31,833 2,207 34,040 93.52%
2012 31,916 2,124 34,040 93.76%
2013 31,756 2,284 34,040 93.29%
2014 31,901 2,139 34,040 93.72%
Total 384,788 23,692 408,480 94.20%
Notes: This table breaks down the incidence of null ﬂows by year. It becomes apparent that the issue of null ﬂows is
pervasive in the FDIMarket dataset as we constructed it. The high incidence of zeroes and the data over-dispersion in
the sample prevent us from using OLS. We resort to use a PPML estimation technique as suggested by citetSilvaTen-
reyro, and raised to workhorse strategy by authors (see for instance Head and Mayer (2014), Yotov et al. (2016) among
the others.
The second issue concerns the reliability of the quantitative information available, namely
the Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) and Job Creation entries. Section 1.3.1 provides a theoret-
ical justiﬁcation for the use of count instead of the value of FDI ﬂows as dependent variable:
nonetheless, being able to test the theoretical prediction about the role of asymmetry in CP
would call for a comparison across diﬀerent measures of bilateral FDI. fDIMarket database is
one of the few existing datasets that could potentially allow for this issue. Nonetheless, such an
exercise calls for additional prudence: as stressed by both Desbordes and Wei (2017) and Lee
and Ries (2016), fDIMarket collects information on all existing greenﬁeld FDI projects as they
are oﬃcially released by the respective investing companies. Unfortunately, in most of the cases
no communication is made about the true CAPEX value. In all those cases, CAPEX is imputed
according to an algorithm summarily described on the DIMarket 's website. Such imputation
is likely to introduce non-trivial distortions in the data, the more relevant (a) the higher is the
percentage of estimated projects over the total number of projects in a given bilateral corridor;
(b) the lower the number of projects from the country of origin. Table A-3 below provides the
tabulation of the projects for which only the imputed CAPEX was available, broken down by
year. Given the incidence of estimated observations, we suggest a particular care when handling
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estimates obtained using value related dimensions as dependent variables, though the picture
they provide may be particularly interesting. In Section 1.4.2, those results are presented and
commented in light of our measure of CP.
Table A-3: Percentage of Imputed Values by Year
Year Imputed Real Value Observations Incidence
2003 6,325 3,182 9,507 67%
2004 7,270 3,143 10,413 70%
2005 7,849 2,883 10,732 73%
2006 9,534 3,301 12,835 74%
2007 8,968 4,006 12,974 69%
2008 13,416 3,794 17,210 78%
2009 12,063 2,723 14,786 82%
2010 12,843 2,629 15,472 83%
2011 14,101 2,757 16,858 84%
2012 13,088 2,181 15,269 86%
2013 14,319 2,399 16,718 86%
2014 13,044 2,344 15,388 85%
Total 132,820 35,342 168,162 79%
Notes: The table report the percentage of estimated capital investment. The number of observations refers to the num-
ber of single projects collected by FDIMarket for the period 2003-2014. The large incidence of estimated values makes
the estimates obtained using values as dependent variables not fully reliable: as a matter of facts, in addition to the lack
of clarity in the imputation technique, imputation brings in a component of uncertainty per se.
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1.B Cultural trade as a proxy of the symmetric component of CP
Building upon Disdier et al. (2010), we identiﬁed the exchange of cultural goods as classiﬁed by
UNCTAD (2010) as a good proxy of CP. In this Appendix we show how trade in cultural goods
strongly relates to the symmetric component of CP as deﬁned in Section 1.2. In other words, we
provide a rough indication of the dependency of cultural attractiveness on cultural similarities. To
that end we regress cultural trade on various conventional symmetric (and time invariant) proxies
for cultural distance such as a dummy for common border contigni, the log of weighted distance
lndistni, a measure of religious proximity religni, a dummy rtani, which takes the value of 1 if
both countries belong to a regional trade agreement, 0 otherwise, a binary variables for common
legal origin comlegni, and ﬁnally a binary variable for past colonial relationship colonyni which
takes the value of 1 if the two countries have ever been in a colonial relationship, 0 otherwise.
All these variables are sourced from CEPII databases. Among the covariates the regression also
includes a time varying component (lnmigni,t), namely the stock of bilateral immigrants resident
in the exporting country (Source: World Bank). Because data are available every 10 years (with
the notable exception of the year 2013), our empirical exercise is a Pooled regression for the years
2010 and 2013 only, which nonetheless guarantees a still reasonably high number of observations.
Furthermore, as in Felbermayr and Toubal (2010) we enrich the number of proxies by adding
more reﬁned measures of linguistic proximity obtained from Melitz and Toubal (2014): along
with the standard dummy that equals 1 if a two countries share the same oﬃcial language and 0
otherwise (COLni common oﬃcial language), we include CSLni common spoken language as
the probability that a pair of people at random from two countries understands one another in
some language and CNLni common native language as the probability that a random pair from
two countries speak the same native language. Lastly, we employ a comprehensive measure of
cultural distance widely used in the literature, namely the Hofstede Index Hofstedeni (Hofstede,
1991). This composite Index has been one of the main workhorses for the empirical of test the
impact of cultural proximity on economic exchanges such as trade and FDI (see for instance Du
et al. (2012)), but other than being at the same time pre-determined and symmetric, has the
drawback of covering a fairly limited sample (see for a discussion Shenkar (2001)). The data are
from Belot and Ederveen (2012).36 Results for this exercise are reported in Table B-1.
The estimates in Table B-1 indicate that trade of cultural goods relates to almost all the proxies
of CP we included, whose impacts have the expected sign. The ﬁrst column reports the OLS
results with log of imports of cultural goods as dependent variable. The coeﬃcients are all
statistically signiﬁcant with the exception of CNLni: this is likely to be imputed to an high
degree of collinearity between linguistic distance measures. The loss of information of zero
bilateral trade due to the logarithmic speciﬁcation could be a serious concern in our case, as the
zeros in trade of cultural goods stand for a large share of the total available information. The
main issue with the elimination of the zeros is a possible selection bias. Indeed, it might be that
proxies for cultural proximity are associated with the intensity of trade in cultural goods only in
the instances of positive trade and have no role in explaining the cases of the zeros. To address
this issue we report the PPML results in Column 2. Despite the change in the sample size,
almost all the eﬀects retain the expected sign. The only exceptions are the measures of language
proximity and the RTA dummy that, in any case, maintain a pairwise correlation coeﬃcient that
is positive and statistically diﬀerent from zero (see Table B-2 below). Lastly, the inclusion of
the Hofstede Index in the third column causes a considerable loss of information as the sample
reduces to 19 OECD countries. The Index seems to be capturing most of the eﬀect of religious
and linguistic proximity and - most importantly for our purposes - is negatively related to the
36See Belot and Ederveen (2012) for the details related to the construction of the Hofstede Index. See Sec-
tion 1.A for a more thorough description of the data and the complete list of sources and data accessibility.
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Table B-1: Testing the Validity of Cultural Trade as a Proxy of CP
Dep. Var. lnCultIMPni,t lnCultIMPni,t lnCultIMPni,t
(1) (2) (3)
lnmigni,t 0.115*** 0.0761*** 0.0880**
(20.83) (4.30) (2.89)
lndistni -1.225*** -0.695*** -0.921***
(-49.15) (-10.61) (-6.77)
contigni 0.317*** 0.260** 0.440*
(3.74) (2.86) (2.34)
FTAni,t 0.266*** 0.0807 0.683**
(6.24) (0.77) (2.96)
comreligni 0.236*** 0.440* 0.235
(3.55) (2.28) (1.26)
comlegni 0.281*** 0.303*** 0.411**
(8.66) (4.43) (2.68)
colonyni 0.500*** 0.383*** 0.763***
(5.67) (3.65) (3.45)
COLni 0.374*** 0.0786 -0.0000199
(6.13) (0.55) (-0.00)
CSLni 0.683*** -0.350 -0.394
(6.52) (-1.45) (-0.74)
CNLni 0.0691 0.209 -0.402
(0.48) (0.71) (-0.92)
Hofstedeni -1.034***
(-4.01)
Imp×Year FE √ √ √
Exp×year FE √ √ √
Sample Full Full Reduced
Obs 24620 54525 684
% Zeros - 0.5485 -
R2 0.7476 0.8993 0.9118
Estimator OLS PPML OLS
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. t (z) -statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by trading-
pair. The model includes importer×time and exporter×time FEs. The ﬁrst and third columns' estimates are estimated
with OLS. The sample size in this table reﬂect the way the diﬀerent estimators deal with null ﬂows as well as the sample
size. The information which belong to groups with all zeros or missing values are automatically dropped by the esti-
mator as FEs cannot be computed. The sample in the third column is reduced due to those countries for which the
Hofstede Index of Cultural Proximity is available (see Belot and Ederveen, 2012).
imports of cultural goods.
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Table B-2: Testing Validity of Cultural Trade as a Proxy of CP - Correlations
Correlation with: cult.trade Tni,t
Baseline Covariates Set Linguistic and CP proxies
(1) (2)
lnmigni 0.0955* 0.0955*
(0.0000) (0.0000)
lndistni -0.0218* -0.0218*
(0.0000) (0.0000)
contigni 0.0771* 0.0771*
(0.0000) (0.0000)
FTAni,t 0.0363* 0.0363*
(0.0000) (0.0000)
comreligni -0.0049 -0.0049
(0.2433) (0.2433)
comlegni -0.0037 -0.0037
(0.3691) (0.3691)
colonyni 0.0265* 0.0265*
(0.0000) (0.0000)
langni 0.0130*
(0.0018)
COLni 0.0101*
(0.015)
CSLni 0.0359*
(0.0000)
CNLni 0.0275*
(0.0000)
Hofstedeni -0.2507*
(0.0000)
Obs 57672 703
Notes: * p < 0.01. SE in parentheses are clustered by trading-pair. The table show pairwise correlation coeﬃcients
between trade in cultural goods and all standard coeﬃcients of proximity. Coeﬃcients in the ﬁrst column refers to
the whole sample for which all variables are available. This means that it is limited to just year 2010 and year 2013
because of bilateral stock of migrants availability. Coeﬃcients in the second column refers instead to the reduced sample
for which the Hofstede index is available.
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1.C Extensions to the detour on asymmetry
Asymmetry in CP and export capacity This Appendix investigates the correlation be-
tween the degree of asymmetry in CP and the relative cultural export capacity between trading
partners. This is done by dividing the set of countries which appear in at least one pair for which
a value of asymmetry is available into four classes, depending on the value of their exports of
cultural good with respect to the 3 quartiles of the distribution of cultural exports. The ﬁrst
class consists of countries below the ﬁrst quartile of cultural exports, the second class of those
between the ﬁrst and the second quartile, the third class of those between the second and third
quartile, and ﬁnally the fourth class of those countries above the third quartile of the distribu-
tion. The set of country pairs are then partitioned according to all possible combinations of two
elements with repetitions from the four classes deﬁned above. One pair could be classiﬁed either
as containing two ﬁrst class countries (both at the bottom of the cultural export distribution),
one ﬁrst and one fourth class country (the former at the bottom and the latter at the top of the
cultural trade distribution) and so on and so forth for all 10 possible combinations. Finally, the
value of asymmetry is regressed on the ten dummies identifying the elements of this partition
(First-First, Second-Second, . . . , First-Second, . . . ), taking those pairs with two bottom cultural
exporters (First-First) as the base group. Results are reported in Table C-1.
Looking at the ﬁrst column of Table C-1, we notice that on average across all pairs including
two bottom cultural exporters the value of asymmetry is equal to 2.078, below both the mean
and median values of asymmetry, equal to 2.932 and 2.614 respectively. Less asymmetry appears
to be present in the CP between countries with a similar but higher value of cultural exports,
and also between a country in the fourth class (top cultural exporter) and one in the third
(quasi-top cultural exporter). Higher levels of asymmetry in CP instead are expected among
countries which are relatively more heterogeneous in terms on cultural export capacity. Higher
asymmetry in bilateral CP is associated with wider heterogeneity in export capacity and, to a
lesser extent, with average export capacity within the pair. These patters are generally conﬁrmed
when restricting the analysis to bilateral cultural relationships characterized by attractiveness
premia with the same sign (both positive and negative) as well as with diﬀerent sign. These
results are presented in the second, third and fourth columns of Table C-1.
Asymmetry across diﬀerent samples The motivation of this extension is to show how
the width and degree of homogeneity within the sample of countries may be crucial when the
impact of CP on the economy is investigated. We argue that the empirical assessment of the
role of asymmetric CP for economic transactions needs to be conducted with the widest possible
country coverage. A empirical analysis conducted on a narrow and homogeneous set of countries
could potentially overestimate the degree of asymmetry embedded in cultural relationship and
therefore undermine the assessment of the role of such asymmetric component in determining
economic outcomes. In order to show this we replicate the construction of our empirical measure
of asymmetry in CP starting from a sample with the same country coverage of the database
used by Felbermayr and Toubal (2010) to construct their asymmetric measure of CP based
on Eurovision Song Contest scores.37 This subsample includes only European countries, that
can be considered as a relatively homogeneous group under many respects, and especially when
compared with the rest of the World. We denote by ∣γˆfullni − γˆin∣FT the resulting measure of
asymmetry. ∣γˆni−γˆin∣full indicates instead the asymmetry whose components have been estimated
on the whole sample. Table C-2 reports both measures of asymmetry and their diﬀerence for
a number of selected country pairs. The + and − signs below the ﬁrst two columns reﬂect the
sign of the attractiveness premium exerted by country i and country n on each other. Take
37The country coverage is identical with the exception of Yugoslavia due to availability of cultural trade data.
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Table C-1: Asymmetry Across Diﬀerent Types of Cultural Traders
Dep. Var. Asymmetry ∣γˆni − γˆin∣
Attractiveness premia All types Both positive Both negative Opposite sign
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Second-Second -0.400** -0.279 -0.0767 -0.561**
(-3.13) (-1.35) (-0.54) (-2.75)
Third-Third -0.610*** -0.143 -0.946*** -0.399
(-4.90) (-0.74) (-5.45) (-1.60)
Fourth-Fourth -0.828*** -0.172 - -
(-5.59) (-0.82) - -
First-Second 1.048*** 1.104*** 0.299* 1.532***
(6.77) (3.96) (2.10) (7.12)
Second-Third 0.188 0.00573 0.110 -0.00420
(1.56) (0.03) (0.79) (-0.02)
Third-Fourth -0.586*** 0.0328 - 0.973
(-4.75) (0.17) - (1.18)
First-Third 1.682*** 1.380*** 0.889*** 1.721***
(12.21) (4.79) (6.50) (9.06)
Second-Fourth 0.779*** 0.607** 1.093 0.889***
(5.97) (3.07) (1.12) (4.61)
First-Fourth 2.690*** 1.270*** 1.651*** 2.043***
(21.84) (5.07) (10.23) (11.96)
Constant (First-First) 2.078*** 1.423*** 1.392*** 3.194***
(19.70) (7.76) (12.86) (20.20)
Obs 4137 1486 793 1858
R2 0.3424 0.1274 0.2285 0.2421
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by trading-pair.
In this table the proxy for asymmetry (∣γˆni − γˆin∣) is regressed on a constant and 9 dummies. As an illustration, the
dummy Fourth-Fourth takes value one for those country pairs where both countries have a value of cultural exports
above the third quartile of the distribution of cultural exports. As a further illustration the dummy First-Fourth takes
value one for those country pairs where one country is a bottom exporter of cultural goods (below the ﬁrst quartile of
the cultural exports distribution) and the other is a top cultural exporter (above the third quartile). When point esti-
mates and t statistics are not reported it is because the respective dummy coeﬃcient has no variability (always equal to
0) in the corresponding estimation sample. The case in which both countries in the pair are bottom exporters (below
the ﬁrst quartile of the cultural exports distribution) is set as base level and the related dummy variable is omitted from
the regression.
for instance the UK and France. The asymmetry computed from the whole sample is very low
and equal to 0.17. The ﬁrst + sign below the asymmetry score indicates that the attractiveness
premium that France exerts on the UK with respect to the average country is positive. The same
is true the other way round, as indicated by the second + sign. When computed on a smaller
sample featuring only European countries, the value of asymmetry increases by more than 180%
and becomes equal to 0.48 (still relatively small compared to the average asymmetry over the
whole sample).
The last column of the table shows the extent of the bias induced by considering only a subsample
of (relatively) homogenous countries: a negative sign in the diﬀerence between ∣γˆni − γˆin∣full
and ∣γˆni − γˆin∣FT means that the degree of asymmetry in the country pair under consideration
decreases when other, more heterogeneous countries are considered. Failing to consider the role
of the rest of the world within the system of cultural aﬃnity could result in a sever bias in
cultural relationship between countries.
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Table C-2: Asymmetry Across Diﬀerent Samples
Country n Country i
Asymmetry - full Asymmetry - FT Diﬀerential∣γˆni − γˆin∣full ∣γˆni − γˆin∣FT ∣γˆni − γˆin∣full − ∣γˆni − γˆin∣FT
Finland Italy 1.16 2.35 -1.19
+ + + +
United Kingdom France 0.17 0.48 -0.31
+ + + +
Russian United Kingdom 0.95 1.60 -0.65
+ + + +
Germany Turkey 0.33 1.46 -1.13
+ + + +
Spain Russian 2.19 2.20 -0.01
+ + - +
Norway Sweden 1.49 1.95 -0.46
+ + + +
Croatia Sweden 0.31 1.89 -1.58
+ + + -
Belgium Malta 2.88 5.02 -2.14
+ + + -
Ireland United Kingdom 2.70 3.32 -0.62
+ + + +
Ukraine Ireland 3.04 3.45 -0.41
+ - - -
Notes: The table lists a selection of country pairs and shows the extent of the bias in the empirical assessment of asymmetry due to
adopting a sample of relatively homogeneous countries. A positive (negative) value of the diﬀerential across the full sample and the
restricted one implies that the restriction is actually over-(under-) estimating the true extent of CP. The sample of countries used in
Felbermayr and Toubal (2010), which only includes European countries is taken as the restricted set of relatively homogeneous coun-
tries. The + and − signs below the two columns of symmetry report the sign of the attractiveness premium exerted by country i and
country n on each other.
Beyond the few examples reported in Table C-2, Figure gives a sense of the sign of the bias on
all the country pairs generated from the restricted sample for which both measures of asymmetry
are estimated. This is done by plotting, for each pair the value of asymmetry coming from the full
sample (on the vertical axis) against the value of the asymmetry generated from the restricted
sample (on the horizontal axis). With the bulk of the observations below the 45 degree line,
especially moving away from the origin, we conclude that the overestimation of asymmetry in
CP implied by an empirical framework with limited country coverage can be highly widespread.
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Figure C-1: Asymmetry Full Sample VS Asymmetry Felbermayr and Toubal (2010) Sample
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1.D Further addressing the omitted variable bias
An important econometric issue in our regressions is the potential endogeneity of our proxy for
CP which mainly arises because of the potential omission of unobserved factors that might be
correlated both with the error term (and thus FDI) and with trade in cultural goods. Both the
proposed IV analysis and the inclusion of dyadic FEs in Section add robustness to our estimates
and conﬁrm our main conclusions. Here we further test the consistency of our benchmark results
by augmenting the speciﬁcation with the inclusion of observable variables of dimension nit that
might capture (part) of these unobserved time-varying dyadic factors.
A variable which potentially shapes both cultural trade as well as FDI is represented by the
migrants' networks. Migrants are able to form important linkages between the country of origin
and the one of destination. To this regard, the literature identiﬁed a positive impact of migrants'
networks on both FDI and international trade (see for instance Javorcik et al., 2011; Gould, 1994;
Giovannetti and Lanati, 2016), which is predominantly imputed to the insider knowledge that
migrants provide to reduce information costs in international transactions. The time varying
impact of migrants' networks on FDI cannot be entirely absorbed through our comprehensive
set of ﬁxed eﬀects and its exclusion from the list of regressors may introduce an omitted variable
bias.38 The results are reported in Table D-1 below, that replicates the speciﬁcations of Table 1.4,
but comprises the bilateral stocks of immigrants from both n to i and i to n as additional
regressors.
Including the stocks of immigrants does not alter our overall conclusions. In particular, the posi-
tive impact of exports in cultural goods which proxy for the destination side mechanisms driving
the ﬁrm's decision to invest is always statistically signiﬁcant and does not vary in magnitude as
we control for the network eﬀect (column 1-3). In a nutshell, the destination side mechanisms
driving FDI seem to be independent from the network channel. This points to the goodness of
our proxy in capturing the role of cultural proximity and score in favor of its robustness to the
inclusion of alternative measures of time varying CP.
Finally, in Table D-2 we augment our baseline speciﬁcation with the total volume of bilateral
non cultural trade. In particular, lnbil_trade_NC captures the eﬀect of the sum of bilateral
non cultural imports and exports between origin and destination at time t on FDI. The evidence
from Disdier et al. (2010) shows that bilateral ﬂows of cultural products can be highly related to
the overall ﬂows of bilateral trade, while at the same time bilateral economic exchanges such as
aggregate trade are likely to be positively associated with FDI. The statistics indicate that the
volume of bilateral non-cultural trade does not impact FDI and its inclusion substantially leaves
our results unaﬀected, which we ﬁnd as reassuring.
38Their inclusion, however, reduces the explanatory power of our econometric exercise, as data on bilateral
migrants' stocks with a global country coverage are generally only available with a 10 year interval between
observation (Source: The World Bank). Therefore, we only include the migrants' stock as a robustness check.
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Table D-1: Addressing Omitted Variable Bias: Including Migration
Dep. Var. Count Cni,t
(1) (2) (3)
lnmigstockni,t 0.0810*** 0.0579**
(5.13) (2.63)
lnmigstockin,t 0.0788*** 0.0293
(4.29) (1.33)
lnCultIMPni,t 0.0507** 0.0368 0.0204
(3.27) (1.90) (0.93)
lnCultEXPni,t 0.290*** 0.296*** 0.290***
(15.12) (12.94) (11.37)
lndistni -0.0566 -0.0693 -0.0574
(-1.25) (-1.46) (-1.13)
colonyni 0.283*** 0.308*** 0.292***
(4.26) (4.41) (3.87)
langni 0.117* 0.0704 0.0725
(2.01) (1.11) (1.08)
comreligni 0.930*** 0.910*** 0.960***
(7.48) (7.04) (6.82)
contigni -0.0391 -0.0447 -0.0140
(-0.55) (-0.60) (-0-18)
comlegni 0.156*** 0.189*** 0.187***
(3.45) (3.84) (3.61)
FTAni,t 0.129 0.144* 0.138
(1.94) (2.10) (1.84)
BITni,t 0.0277 -0.0154 -0.0315
(0.51) (-0.26) (-0.93)
Imp×Year FE √ √ √
Exp×year FE √ √ √
Obs 9619 8756 5853
% Zeros 67% 67% 60%
R2 0.91 0.92 0.92
Test 1 278.59 179.89 140.92
Test 2 76.53 66.75 53.26
Estimator PPML PPML PPML
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by trading-pair.
The dependent variable Count Cni,t is the bilateral number of Greenﬁeld FDI projects from country i to country n.
It includes the zero ﬂows. This table replicates the baseline speciﬁcation adding the bilateral stock of migrants from
n to i as additional regressors. The reduced number of observations is due to the availability of the migration data, that
allow to use only two points in time (2010 and 2013) for the period covered in the analysis (Source: The World Bank).
TESTS: Test 1 refers to the joint signiﬁcance χ2 test over the two coeﬃcients for explicit preferences (H0 ∶
lnCultIMPni,t = lnCultIMPni,t = 0. Test 2 reports instead the χ ∗ 2 test inherent to the statistical diﬀerence between
lnCultIMPni,t and lnCultIMPni,t (H0 ∶ lnCultIMPni,t − lnCultIMPni,t = 0.
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Table D-2: Addressing Omitted Variable Bias: Including Non-Cultural Trade
Dep. Var. Count Cni,t
(1) (2)
lnCultIMPni,t 0.0690*** 0.0838***
(5.90) (6.01)
lnCultEXPni,t 0.305*** 0.324***
(21.91) (14.64)
lnbil_trade_NCni,t -0.0352
(-1.24)
lndistni -0.179*** -0.176***
(-5.13) (-5.08)
colonyni 0.366*** 0.367***
(6.85) (6.90)
langni 0.181*** 0.176***
(3.53) (3.50)
comreligni 0.883*** 0.876***
(9.21) (9.21)
contigni -0.0977 -0.0947
(-1.61) (-1.56)
comlegni 0.153*** 0.154***
(4.06) (4.08)
FTAni,t 0.118* 0.117*
(2.19) (2.17)
BITni,t 0.0115 0.00749
(0.29) (0.19)
Imp×Year FE √ √
Exp×year FE √ √
Obs 87448 87448
% Zeros 0.749 0.749
R2 0.9221 0.9221
Test 1 585.19 214.46
Test 2 141.81 130.19
Estimator PPML PPML
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by trading-pair.
The dependent variable Count Cni,t is the bilateral number of Greenﬁeld FDI projects from country i to country n.
It includes the zero ﬂows. The estimates in column (1) replicates column (3) in our baseline results in Table 1.4; col-
umn (2) provides the result of the same equation, augmented to include total bilateral trade of non-cultural goods.
TESTS: Test 1 refers to the joint signiﬁcance χ2 test over the two coeﬃcients for explicit preferences (H0 ∶
lnCultIMPni,t = lnCultIMPni,t = 0. Test 2 reports instead the χ ∗ 2 test inherent to the statistical diﬀerence between
lnCultIMPni,t and lnCultIMPni,t (H0 ∶ lnCultIMPni,t − lnCultIMPni,t = 0.
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1.E Relevance of the instruments
Table E-1 below mimics a ﬁrst stage regression for the IV analysis, by showing the relevance
of the instruments in explaining the endogenous variables to our analysis. Since the IVPPML
command does not compute ﬁrst stage regression, we regressed the endogenous variables on all
the instruments as well as on the covariates of the second stage.
Table E-1: Relevance of the Instrument: First Stage Endogenous Variables on Instruments
Dep. Var. Cult.Importni,t Cult.Exportni,t
(1) (2)
lnCultIMPni,t−8 0.560***
(14.73)
lnCultEXPni,8 0.560***
(14.74)
lndistni -0.664*** -0.663***
(-9.15) (-9.14)
colonyni -0.116 -0.116
(-1.37) (-1.37)
langni 0.123 0.124
(0.90) (0.91)
comreligni 0.0534 0.0539
(0.44) (0.44)
contigni 0.0773 0.0776
(1.13) (1.14)
comlegni 0.0481 0.0479
(0.78) (0.78)
FTAni,t 0.324** 0.325**
(2.94) (2.95)
BITni,t 0.0485 0.0484
(0.59) (0.58)
Imp×Year FE √ √
Exp×Year FE √ √
Obs 11117 11117
% Zeros 12.2% 12.2%
R2 0.9502 0.9502
Estimator PPML PPML
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by trading-pair.
This table shows the relevance of the selected instruments on the endogenous variables. The decision to adopt lagged
values of the endogenous variables builds on Card (2001).
The estimates are obtained with PPML using the PPML command by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and Santos
Silva and Tenreyro (2011) which perfectly deals with the reduced set of FE we are going to include in the instrumental
analysis. Column (1) shows the correlation of the lagged value of import in cultural goods on current imports. Column
(2) performs the same exercise on export. The sample is reduced in this speciﬁcation, because of data availability for
the lagged instruments. Time coverage: 2007-2014
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1.F Further Robustness Tests
In this section, some additional robustness tests are presented. The ﬁrst set of results replicates
our baseline speciﬁcation reported in Table 1.4, by considering cultural trade in terms of share
with respect to aggregate trade. Considering shares instead of absolute values allows to clean
the coeﬃcients from potential shocks aﬀecting an economy as a whole, that might aﬀect a
country's total trade. Considering cultural trade in absolute terms might hide the impact of
such shocks. Coeﬃcients in table F-1 come from a transformation of the coeﬃcients of interest
in Table 1.4, where CultIMPshni,t = CultIMPni,t/∑nn=1AggrIMPni. Despite the coeﬃcients for the
investing side appreciation channels turn insigniﬁcant in column (3), the results further conﬁrm
the conclusions of the empirical analysis conducted in this chapter: the cultural preference
awarded by a destination to a potential investor proves to dominate the origin-side one.
The second set of results, presented in table F-2 analogously replicates our benchmark estimations
on two distinct reduced samples. as mentioned in appendix 1.A, using trade in cultural goods
does not guarantee that all goods containing cultural content of a certain country to be actually
attributed to that country alone. Think for instance to a Canadian singer whose record company
is actually located in the US: in this case, the cultural content would be Canadian, while the
cultural trade would accrue to the US. Analogously, many cultural goods include intermediate
imputs which are likely to be produced in some part of the world other than the country which
assemble and ﬁnally trade those goods. The trade of intermediate cultural products is partly
recorded as cultural trade on its own, even though it has keeps no track of a cultural content on
its own. For this reason, panel A of table F-2 reports the estimates after excluding China and the
USA, while panel B perform a similar exercise excluding China and the rest of the Manufacturing
Asia. The results hold across samples, conﬁrming the validity of the conclusions discussed in
section 1.4.
Table F-1: Impact of CP on Greenﬁeld FDI - Shares of Cultural Trade
Dep. Var. Count Cni,t
(1) (2) (3)
lnCultIMPshni,t 0.0286* 0.00793
(2.32) (0.68)
lnCultEXPshni,t 0.159*** 0.157***
(10.78) (10.88)
Imp×Year FE √ √ √
Exp×Year FE √ √ √
Obs. 87448 87448 87448
% Zeros 0.749 0.749 0.749
R2 .9 .9 .9
Test 1 - - 118.4
Test 2 - - 67.78
Estimator PPML PPML PPML
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by trading-pair.
The dependent variable Count Cni,t is the bilateral number of Greenﬁeld FDI projects from country i to country n. It
includes the zero ﬂows.
TESTS: Test 1 refers to the joint signiﬁcance χ2 test over the two coeﬃcients for explicit preferences (H0 ∶
lnCultIMPni,t = lnCultIMPni,t = 0 ). Test 2 reports instead the χ2 test inherent to the statistical diﬀerence between
lnCultIMPni,t and lnCultIMPni,t (H0 ∶ lnCultIMPni,t − lnCultIMPni,t = 0).
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Table F-2: Impact of CP on Greenﬁeld FDI - Removing Big Traders
Dep. Var. Count Cni,t
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: excluding US and China
lnCultIMPni,t 0.184*** 0.0973***
(14.63) (8.92)
lnCultEXPni,t 0.316*** 0.283***
(23.13) (20.56)
Imp×Year FE √ √ √
Exp×Year FE √ √ √
Obs. 80641 80641 80641
% Zeros .77 .77 .77
R2 0.810 0.820 0.830
Test 1 - - 633.8
Test 2 - - 89.64
Panel B: excluding China and Manufacturing Asia
lnCultIMPni,t 0.179*** 0.0733***
(13.29) (5.98)
lnCultIMPni,t 0.351*** 0.322***
(23.28) (20.48)
Imp×Year FE √ √ √
Exp×Year FE √ √ √
Obs. 69533 69533 69533
% Zeros .75 .75 .75
R2 0.900 0.920 0.920
Test 1 - - 591.8
Test 2 - - 119.4
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by trading-pair.
Panel A replicates baseline speciﬁcation of table 1.4 excluding the USA and China. Panel B excludes all Manufacturing
Asia and China.
The dependent variable Count Cni,t is the bilateral number of Greenﬁeld FDI projects from country i to country n. It
includes the zero ﬂows.
TESTS: Test 1 refers to the joint signiﬁcance χ2 test over the two coeﬃcients for explicit preferences (H0 ∶
lnCultIMPni,t = lnCultIMPni,t = 0 ). Test 2 reports instead the χ2 test inherent to the statistical diﬀerence between
lnCultIMPni,t and lnCultIMPni,t (H0 ∶ lnCultIMPni,t − lnCultIMPni,t = 0).
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1.G Country excluded from the dataset
Table G-1: List of Countries Excluded from the Analysis
In both direction: no ﬂows of greenﬁeld FDI (in or out) over the entire period
Anguilla, Netherland Antilles, Cocos and Keeling Islands, Cook Islands, Christmas Islands, West-
ern Sahara, Falkland Islands, Faeroe Islands, Gibraltar, French Guiana, Kiribati, Marshall Is-
lands, Northern Mariana Islands, Montserrat, Norfolk Islands, Niue, Nauru, Pitcairn, Palau,
Saint Helena and Tristan da Cunha, San Marino, Saint Pierre et Miquelon, Tokelau, Tonga,
Tuvalu, British Virgin Islands, Vanuatu, Wallis and Futuna
No outward ﬂows over the whole period (excluded as source countries)
Aruba, Benin, Bhutan, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Republic of the
Congo, Dominica, Eritrea, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, PRD Korea, Liberia, Maldives,
Mauritania, New Caledonia, Niger, Paraguay, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sain Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Timor
Leste, Turkmenistan
Countries excluded or aggregated for inconsistencies between CEPII and fDIMarket
Serbia and Montenegro (both excluded)
Belgium and Luxembourg (both excluded)
Sudan and Sud Sudan (South Sudan is Excluded)
Switzerland and Liechtenstein (Aggregated)
France and Monaco (Aggregated)
Notes: The result of the exclusion of these countries is a rectangular dataset of n×m countries. In addition to these coun-
tries - excluded for data inconsistencies - other dyadic ﬂows are excluded when no investment occurs between two countries
during the period analyzed. This explains the discrepancy between the size of the dataset and the number of observations
used in the estimation
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Chapter 2
A network analysis of the
migration-Investment nexus
In an increasingly interconnected world, the extent to which the complex web of rela-
tionship a country entertains with the rest of the world is still far from being fully un-
derstood. This chapter asks whether and to what extent the progressive integration and
expansion of the Global Migration Network can be accounted for explaining the patterns
of Greenﬁeld Foreign Direct Investment exchanges at bilateral level. After constructing
and comparing the two networks, I econometrically test the relationship between bilateral
migration ﬂows and FDI, controlling for the embeddedness of both the investing and the
recipient country in the global migrants' network. To exploit the complex structure of
the dataset to its full extent, I estimate a gravity-like equation of bilateral FDI depart-
ing from the usual ﬁxed eﬀect estimation to embrace a more ﬂexible multilevel mixed
estimator, that I maintain to be better deal with the potential hidden hierarchical struc-
ture of the dataset. Results conﬁrm the positive direct relationship between migrants
diaspora and FDI at bilateral level: the inclusion of network level statistics allows to
spot a much larger degree of complexity in the migration-investment relationship. The
emergence of third-party network eﬀects constitute the most interesting ﬁnding of all,
and might help to better understand the mechanisms triggered by migration ﬂows beyond
the pure bilateral perspective. Such interesting insight would not have been detected with
a non-network approach.
Keywords: Greenﬁeld FDI, Multilevel, Networks, Migration.
2.1 Introduction
During the last decades, the share of migrant population worldwide grew remarkably in absolute
terms, in spite of a global trend of imposing limitations to human mobility, especially along the
South-to-North trajectory (McKenzie, 2007). Nonetheless, not considering forced displacements,
cross border movements only account for slightly more than 3% of total world population (Öz-
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den et al., 2011; UNDESA, 2015). At the same time, the number of countries involved in the
International Migration Network (Fagiolo and Mastrorillo, 2013, IMN) grew remarkably in the
last decades. Despite this fact might be partially related to the better data coverage available in
recent years, in motivates the eﬀorts spent to understand the economic impacts of international
migration at world level. Nothwithstanding the simultaneous growth recorded in the circula-
tion of goods, people, and capital, most of the literature studying the impact of migration on
economic exchanges focuses trade. Not much attention has been dedicated to the relationship
between investments and migration, despite the relevance of people movements as a conveyor of
information, able to mitigate uncertainty and to reduce the transaction costs that limit invest-
ments more than other types of ﬂows.
This chapter explores the role played by migrants' networks as determinants of bilateral FDI,
considering the two ﬂows as overlapping layers of the same global macroeconomic network. Ap-
proaching international migration data as a network oﬀers the advantage of taking the complexity
of the world system into account, beyond the direct bilateral relationship between two countries.
This study explores the relationship between the migrants' network and two countries' bilateral
investment position, using a sample of 20 OECD countries as reference. Since highly educated
and skilled migrants are more likely than their less educated counterpart to dispose of the social
capital (Burchardi et al., 2018) or of the informative capacity (White, 2007) needed to trigger
FDI (Flisi and Murat, 2011), the choice of the sample is led by the availability of education-based
bilateral migration ﬂows (Brucker et al., 2013). Following Fagiolo and Mastrorillo (2014); Sgrig-
noli et al. (2015), and Garas et al. (2106), I explore the correlation between the international
migrants network (IMN) and the global Greenﬁeld FDI network (GFDIN) under a complex
network perspective. After describing and comparing the structure of the two networks, and
their topological characteristics in order to identify potential co-evolution patterns, I economet-
rically test the relationship between the two, applying a multilevel mixed regression modeling
(Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012).
The original contribution of this chapter is essentially threefold. First, no study so far has ana-
lyzed the impacts of a country's position in the migrants network on its bilateral FDI strategy:
thus, the complexity of the relationship between migration and FDI ﬂows remains largely unex-
plored. Existing evidence is conﬁned to basic measures of connectivity and does not explore how
the structure of a network ultimately aﬀects nodes connectivity on a diﬀerent type of ﬂow.
Second, even if I do investigate bilateral ﬂows, I depart from the typical ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) gravity
estimation. In fact, the complex structure of the data, which are characterized by diﬀerent
levels of information (coutry's network speciﬁc, dyad speciﬁc, and contextual), is likely to imply
a hidden hierarchical structure. For this reason, Multilevel Mixed Regression analysis might
represent an appropriate alternative to the analysis of bilateral (network) data.1
Third, conversely from the earlier literature, I explicitly address the attribution problem which
aﬀects most of the existing related studies.Such attribution problem make impossible to distin-
1In Appendix 2.B I also report the estimates obtained from a two-step ﬁxed-eﬀects etimation as a benchmark
for my studies.
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guish the network position of observations characterized by very diﬀerent attributes. I solve this
issue by retaining the direct structure of both networks.2
The ﬁndings are consistent with the existing evidence on the migrants-FDI relationship: tradi-
tional socioeconomic measures are conﬁrmed as crucial drivers of bilateral greenﬁeld FDI ﬂows,
which are also boosted by the presence of highly educated migrants.3 Also, consistently with
the literature on complex network and macroeconomic ﬂows, bilateral FDI are both directly and
indirectly aﬀected by migrants' network topological features. Thus, as the presence of an estab-
lished bilateral migration corridor directly aﬀects the economic exchanges between two countries,
bilateral FDI are also positively related to both the size of a country's speciﬁc migration network
and the quality of the position of such country in that network, which capture the indirect eﬀect
of the IMN.4
The remainder of the chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 presents a brief review of the related
literature, divided between traditional studies on migrants ﬂows/stocks and the new stream of
evidence based on complex networks. Section 2.3 introduces to the methodological tools used to
describe the network topology and the interconnection between ﬂows, which are ﬁrst described
and then analyzed by means of a multilevel gravity-like model in Sections 2.4 and 2.5 respectively.
Section 2.6 ﬁnally concludes and set the stage for future research.
2.2 Literature Review
It is worth to begin with a little notation. Throughout this chapter, I generically refer to
migration ﬂows in terms of network. Such deﬁnition may be open to some misinterpretation, since
the idea of migrants networks has evolved in the recent years. The earlier deﬁnition of migrants'
network indicate the set of connections that a migrant community may activate both at home and
at destination, able to trigger a certain economic outcome (be it to facilitate job search and hiring,
or to facilitate trade, capital movements, etc.): in other words, the social capital that is mobilized
in the migration process (Munshi, 2003). The most important contributions in this approach
are reviewed in section 2.2.1. More recently, economists began to question the pure bilateral
domain of migration. Complementary to this, the research turned with increasing interest to the
2An example of attribution problem is the following. Suppose two dyads, composed on the one hand of a
country experiencing small immigration ﬂows at front of massive capital outﬂows and on the other hand, by a
country characterized by the opposite features, ususally result equal to dyads in which both countries experience
average inﬂows of migrants and average outﬂows of capital. Summed together, the two types of dyads cannot be
distinguished. Such attribution problem allows to identify only the existence of correlation patterns between the
ﬂows considered, while it does not allow drawing any conclusion concerning the direction of the IMN-Investment
nexus.
3To be more precise, they are positively related to the presence of migrants in general. Yet, the role of the
highly educated diaspora conﬁrms the claims of Flisi and Murat (2011) concerning a larger impact of the better
educated migrants with respect to the total migration ﬂow.
4With size I intend the number of contacts centered on a country in the IMN, measured in terms of the
number of partners a country links to (outward connectivity), or it is linked by (inward connectivity), both in
extensive (existance of a link) and in intensive (strength of that link) terms. With quality, I refer instead to
the importance of a country's individual network in terms of size (extensive or intensive) of the partners it is
connected to.
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complex web of relationships that migrants' ﬂows trigger among countries worldwide. The focus
shifted from the mechanisms dominating a dyadic relationship between two countries to how the
set of global interconnections aﬀects those same mechanisms. Section 2.2.2 reviews these latter
contributions.
2.2.1 Migrants Networks and FDI: the Bilateral approach
The eﬀect of migrants' networks as informal institutions, which aﬀect individual as much as
collective outcomes has been thoroughly explored in the last decades. For instance, they proved
to be foundamental in job seeking (Montgomery, 1991) and in driving both working and loca-
tion choices (Massey et al., 1993; Munshi, 2003). But migrants network are highly eﬀective in
favouring international economic exchanges too. Gould (1994) ﬁrst explored the relationship
between the presence of immigrants communities in the US and trade ﬂows with their country
of origin. Interestingly, migrants' ﬂows aﬀect economic exchanges both from the supply and
the demand side. Concerning the former, two main factors help explaining the ususally positive
eﬀect of migration on trade. On the one hand, migrants' communities can exploit alternative
informative channels, which favor in turn the establishment of privileged forms of information
exchanges. (Leblang, 2010, refers to this in terms of the information potential). On the other
hand, migrants dispose of the social capital that helps reducing the cost of contract enforcement
(which heavily aﬀect the transaction costs).5 According to Rauch (2001) these two mechanisms
deﬁnes migrants' ﬂows' Business and Social Network eﬀect.
On the demand side, migrants networks can encourage trade by increasing the demand for goods
produced back home (White, 2007, referred to this eﬀect in terms of transplanted home bias),
and may change the consumption pattern of their home country via tastes contamination.
Many diﬀerent theoretical frameworks have been developed concerning the way these two eﬀects
operate and how they participate in shaping trade patterns in the real world (Giovannetti and
Lanati, 2016).
In the last 10-to-15 years, the study of the impacts of migrants networks on bilateral economic
exchanges widened to encompass cross-border ﬁnancial ﬂows, and particularly FDI (Gheasi and
Nijkamp, 2017). However, while the same mechanisms facilitating trade seem to be much more
relevant for cross border investments, the empirical and theoretical evidence is much less clear
cut. Kugler and Rapoport (2007) investigates the causes of this lack of clarity, highlighting two
main opposite theoretical mechanisms linking migration to investments. On the one hand, FDI
and migrants outﬂows may be substitutes: outmigration, especially of the better educated, could
reduce the incentives to invest in the country of origin because of the lower labor productivity
(which is often the main driver of vertical FDI). This may be the case for countries that are subject
to brain drain (Beine et al., 2008), which is often favored by the existence of selective immigration
policies and cherry-picking strategies in developed countries. Thus, emigration could negatively
aﬀect the economic performance of a country (Checchi et al., 2007), and could explain why some
5Interestingly, both mechanisms appear to be stronger for highly educated migrants ﬂows.(Barro and Lee,
2013)
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studies found migration and FDI to be substitutable. For instance, Aroca and Mohoney (2005)
detect a negative correlation between FDI and Emigration from Mexico to the US, concluding
that the two ﬂows could be considered as substitute. On the other hand, FDI and migrants
might be characterized by a complementarity relationship à la Docquier and Lodigiani (2010).
This is closely related to the idea of business and social network eﬀect, introduced by Rauch
and Trindade (2002) and further expanded by White (2007) and Simone and Manchin (2012).6
Accordingly, migrants networks may act as a bridge across countries, favoring investments by
lifting informational barriers, as well as signaling opportunities to potential economic partners
in both their home and host countries (Cuadros et al., 2016). This mechanism seems to be also
related to the idea that investments are aﬀected by the skill composition of a country, whose eﬀect
is arguably stronger for investment that for trade. In short, migration might aﬀect FDI ﬂows by
determining the factor endowment of a country. This drives in turn the type of investments that
can be attracted (see Feenstra and Hanson, 2008; Zhu and Treﬂer, 2005; Khalifa and Mengova,
2015). Thus, countries with higher human capital should be able to attract more skill-intensive
investments from abroad. The larger opportunities oﬀered by better paid jobs should favor
additional human capital accumulation, by making more proﬁtable to invest in education and
providing at the same time an incentive not to migrate abroad (to work in the better paid industry
back home). This argument extends the Brain Gain theory, ﬁrst proposed by Stark et al., 1997
for migration, but remains mostly a theoretical mechanism that only holds in the long run.7
The empirical evidence too is still scarce and divided in two streams. The ﬁrst one focuses on
the dichotomy substitutability vs complementarity, while the second (and to some extent more
recent one) studies the circumstances which determines which of the two eﬀects (complementarity
or substitutability) prevails. Taking explicitly into account the skill composition of the migrants
network, Kugler and Rapoport (2005) conclude that future FDI inﬂows depend positively on the
stock of expected future highly educated migrants, but that a substitution eﬀect is also at play
when secondary school educated migrants outﬂows are considered. Similarly, Flisi and Murat
(2011) detect a positive correlation between bilateral immigration ﬂows on investment outﬂows,
suggesting that the information channel triggered by the presence of ethnic ties between the
migrant community and their homeland might be beneﬁcial to those companies wishing to invest
there. Checchi et al. (2007) too detect a virtuous relationship between skilled migration and
FDI, despite the evidence of a negative impact on overall human capital accumulation. Instead,
Kugler and Rapoport (2007) analyze the FDI-migration nexus taking the US alone as destination
country and analyzing the ﬂows of FDI toward a large set of migrants' origin countries: by
diﬀerentiating between a static and a dynamic perspective, they conclude that there is evidence
of substitution eﬀect when data are analyzed statically, but that the relationship reverses in favor
of complementarity when a dynamic approach is preferred.
6To be more precise, Rauch talks about Business Network externality, whilst de Simone and coauthors refers
to it as Diaspora Externality.
7The same mechanism applied to the domain of migration implies that having the chance to migrate may
encourage human capital accumulation. Since not all the better educated workers are actually able to migrate,
they nurture the stock of nationally available skilled workforce that in turn attracts investments: in the end, the
incentives to migrate shrinks due to the availability of better jobs back home, encouraging further FDI inﬂows
and possibly an upgrade along the value chain. For instance, this is what happened in certain provinces of Mexico
following the set up of aircraft plants by Bombardier after the 1990s (Baldwin, 2016).
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Acknowledging the presence of some inconsistencies in the existing evidence, Federici and Gi-
annetti (2010) develop a theoretical model to take into account both substitutability and com-
plementarity in the FDI-Migration relationship. Their target is to model what they deﬁne as
the Information-revealing eﬀect of migration (Leblang, 2010), i.e. the role of the information
channeled by migrants which is able to trigger complementarity. Javorcik et al. (2011) study
the impact of US immigrants networks on the destination of US outward investments, ﬁnding
evidence of complementarity.8 D'Agosto et al. (2013) explore the FDI-Migration nexus across
the north-south trajectories, ﬁnding evidence of both substitution and complementarity eﬀect,
with the latter prevailing in magnitude. Kugler et al. (2017) study the relationship between
migrants networks and ﬁnancial ﬂows other than investments, starting from the idea that the
diaspora from a country reduces the eﬀect of the informational frictions, stimulating those ﬂows
that are more sensitive to the availability of reliable information. Their ﬁndings reinforce the
previous results by Kugler and Rapoport (2007): migrants' ﬂows positively aﬀect international
capital ﬂows, especially when the informational frictions are more acute, i.e. when there is very
low cultural proximity between countries. Not surprisingly, the impact of the highly educated
diaspora is stronger than the impact of the rest of the migrants' stock. Burchardi et al. (2018),
by focusing more speciﬁcally on the historical migrant communities and their distribution within
the US, reach similar conclusions. Despite the debate on which eﬀect between complementarity
and substitutability dominates theoretically, the former does prevail empirically, as diaspora ap-
pears to be highly eﬀective in reducing those informational asymmetries aﬀecting bilateral FDI
(much more than trade and bilateral equity ﬂows, according to Portes and Rey, 2005; Wang,
2017). Evidence of complementarity also comes from the research of Cuadros et al. (2016), which
explicitly explores the possibility for migrants communities to be particularly eﬀective in driving
FDI when the diﬀerences in terms of ﬁnancial development between two countries are large: the
so-called bridge eﬀect of bilateral diaspora over bilateral FDI proved to be at work, though only
at low levels of cross country interaction (in terms of bilateral reciprocal FDI).
2.2.2 Migrants (proper) Networks and FDI: the complex approach
The major limitation in the works reviewed so far is that they limit the analysis to the pure
bilateral perspective. However, as much as a country cannot be considered independent from
the set of partners it interacts with, the same is true when the focus shifts to a bilateral level.
The decision to interact and the way two countries eventually do so should be considered as
a response to the overall set of stimuli generated by all the existing and potential connections
in which these two countries engage. In fact, economic exchanges are rarely the result of pure
bilateral dynamics: often, they can be interpreted as a form of relational data, resulting from
the complex patterns in which two actors/countries are embedded. (Social) Network Analysis
represents a crucial tool to understand both global and local dynamics, and has been applied
8This last work is particularly interesting as it is one of the ﬁrst to explicitly tackle the issue of the heteroge-
neous impacts of skilled bilateral migration on investments, detecting a much stronger role of the highly skilled
migration as opposed to the less educated one, addressing at the same time the potential endogeneity of migration
ﬂows and FDI.
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to a wide set of relational data in many ﬁelds: from criminology, to ﬁnance (to understand
contagion and heard behavior), election patterns, business intelligence, industrial clusters, and
economics (Jackson, 2010). In international economics and ﬁnance, SNA focuses on the study of
Complex Networks, and on the way their structure aﬀects their evolution over time.9 Most of the
related international economic literature either focuses on, or is related to, trade networks(see for
instance Li et al., 2003; Fagiolo et al., 2008, 2009; De Benedictis and Tajoli, 2011). Currently, the
world trade web is the only extensively investigated large network. The only attempts to map in
a similar fashion other international ﬂows at the global level focused on international migration
ﬂows (Fagiolo and Mastrorillo, 2013; Abel and Sander, 2014; Sciabolazza, 2018; Garas et al.,
2106, the latter limited to OECD destinations only). Conversely, a comprehensive mapping
of the international investments network is stll missing, and the few related analyses in this
sense are limited to a few geographically circumscribed studies. De Masi et al. (2013) map the
internationalization strategy of Italian ﬁrms, while Joyez (2017) proposes a similar application to
French multinationals; De Masi and Ricchiuti (2018) investigate the structure of the EU outward
FDI network. Only recently, Metulini et al. (2017) mapped the network of corporate control.
More recently, econo-physicists began to study the economic relationship between countries in
terms of complex networks, by overlapping diﬀerent ﬂows as layers (or levels) of a wider, global
macroeconomic network. Fagiolo and Mastrorillo (2014) investigate the presence of a potential
common structure between the world trade web (ITN) and the International Migration Network
(IMN), ﬁnding evidence of important interconnections between the two ﬂows. Sgrignoli et al.
(2015) performed a similar exercise, extending the analysis of (Rauch, 2001) on the impact of mi-
grants networks on diﬀerent trading sectors, while Metulini et al. (2017) studied the interrelation
between trade and capital ﬂows. These studies represent just a part of the literature that devel-
oped in the last few years, which focused on the juxtaposition between diﬀerent macroeconomic
networks in order to better understand how countries ultimately connect to each other, and the
degree of permeability across the diﬀerent types of ﬂow. While the network analysis of migration
and trade is a well established application, disregarding of the network approach (see Docquier
and Lodigiani, 2010; Peri and Requena-Silvente, 2010; Giovannetti and Lanati, 2016; Sgrignoli
et al., 2015, among the others), nothing similar has been done to exploit the potentialities of
network analysis in the analysis of the migration-investment nexus. The only attempt in this
sense is represented by the analysis of Garas et al. (2106). However, they limited their analysis
to the search of a causal link between the connectivity of a country in the IMN, and the amount
of bilateral investments. Understanding what node-level characteristics prove to be relevant in
driving bilateral FDI remained outside the scope of their analysis. To current date, no further
study succeeded in mapping the global investment network at world level, and in analyzing it in
a multilayer framework as it has been done for trade.
9Complex Networks refer to graphs with non-trivial topological features (as summarized by Lü et al., 2013).
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2.3 Methodolological Note
In this section I introduce a few deﬁnitions to get acquainted with SNA tools, and the diﬀerences
across the various elements that deﬁne the structure of a network. I also introduce some measures
of network centrality. These measures relate to the position of a country within the network.
Despite all of them describe the importance of an economic actor with respect to a type of
relationship, they also convey diﬀerent information. It is therefore necessary to explain how
they are built, and the interpretation when applied to both the International Migration Network
(IMN) and the GFDIN (Greenﬁeld Investment Network). For reason of generalizability, in the
following pages I denote the nodes of the network (i.e. the subjects whose relationships constitute
the network itself) as actors or vertices rather than as countries.10
2.3.1 What is a network? Basic terminology and representation
Networks represent perhaps the most natural way to represent relational data (such as interna-
tional economic ﬂows) retaining the systemic perspective. In Social Network Analysis (SNA),
a network (or graph) is represented by a set of (un)ordered dyads G = (N ,E). The number of
actors N (also called nodes or vertices) and the number of links E deﬁne the size and the density
of the network. Two nodes are said to be connected if it is possible to ﬁnd a path between
them, walking through thier connections. This point is particularly interesting and describe
in a single sentence how working with networks oﬀers the possibility to focus on the way an
actor (country) interacts with its partners keeping in sight the global structure in which such
relationship is embedded.
Analytically, a network is usually represented in matrix form as an adjacency matrix An, a N ×
square matrix with rows and column containing the whole ordered list of vertices in G: all entries
ai,j ≠ 0 indicate the existence of a direct link between node i and node j.11 Graphically, vertices
are represented as dots, linked together with lines connecting the diﬀerent actors according to
the structure of the adjacency matrix.12
Graphs can be either directed or undirected : such diﬀerence is crucial to deﬁne the way actors
connects with each other. Undirected means that no direction is associated to the edges link-
ing the vertices: for instance, free trade agreements can be modeled as an undirected graph
(Sopranzetti, 2017) where a treaty is considered as binding for both sides reciprocally. On the
10Also, I may refer to a network as graph, borrowing from the branch of mathematics known as graph theory.
Since the use of graph in place of network helps to ﬁgure out the set of relationships in a graphical way, I
refer to graphs whenever this mental representation can be helpful, or when I explicitly talk about the graphical
representation of the network.
11A network can also be represented as an edgelist En,e, where n represents the number of vertices, and e the
number of active links between them. Edgelists are usually more tractable when the size of the network is very
large, as they only contain information about the existing links, not about all the potential connections, generally
marked with a 0 in the standard adjacency matrix.
12The representation in graph form is particularly eﬀective when dealing with small graphs. However, larger
networks might result confusing, and might be better represented by diﬀerent forms of plot, such as circular plots,
dendograms, and so on.
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contrary, economic ﬂows cannot be considered symmetric: trade ﬂows (Fagiolo et al., 2008, 2009;
Schiavo et al., 2010; De Benedictis and Tajoli, 2011), FDI (Vitali et al., 2011; De Masi et al.,
2013; Joyez, 2017), portfolio investments (Chuluun, 2017), and migration (Fagiolo and Mastro-
rillo, 2013; Abel and Sander, 2014; Sciabolazza, 2018) are all characterized by an asymmetric
component and by non-reciprocity. In all these cases, the presence of a positive ﬂow from an
node to another neither implies the presence of a counter ﬂow in the other direction, nor that (if
existing) such counter ﬂow equals the former: there may be an actor that links to another one
which does not links back to the former. When this happens, a network is said to be directed.13
In addition, a network can be weighted or binary, depending on whether the size of a certain
ﬂow is taken into consideration. Back to the example of FTA, their network is both undirected
and binary, where each edge can be seen as a logical operator such as
aij = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if i directly connects to j
0 if i does not directly connects to j
(2.1)
While the binary dimension gives the idea of the extension of a network (similar to the extensive
margin in economics), international economists are often interested in the intensive margin of a
bilateral relationship.14 Thus, the intensity of the ﬂow may be included into the analysis, turning
equation (2.1) into
aij = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
vij if i directly connects to j
0 if i does not directly connects to j
(2.2)
, where vij represents the value of the bilateral exchange between country i to country j. Graph-
ically, weights are included by changing the thickness of the edges/arcs, or by changing the
intensity of the colors. For completeness, a network that is directed or weighted (or both) can
be represented also in its undirected and binary structure.15
Finally a network may be simple or multiplex. The ﬁrst one takes into consideration a single
environment or socio-economic context, and analyzes the relationships occurring between
actors on that level: the only structure that counts is the one of interest, and all other dimensions
are excluded. The second one instead represents one of the most promising developments in SNA
(and in network science in general) as it takes into consideration several levels of relationsips
(≥ 2) or layers of the potential interactions between actors. Thus, the development of a link or
its intensity is analyzed both in function of the speciﬁc referring context and in light of the other
potential relationships that may occur across layers. (See for instance Kivelä et al., 2013, for an
introduction to multilevel and multiplex network analysis).
13The terminology also changes a bit: edges become arcs and are graphically represented by an arrow.
14The FTA network might turn to be weighte if the number ob traties in which two countries are simultanously
involved is considered.
15The opposite is not feasible.
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This chapter analyzes the impacts of migrants networks on bilateral (greenﬁeld) FDI. Given
the nature of migration ﬂows, their network is better characterized as weighted and directed.
Also the time dimension is interesting: observing both the international migration and the FDI
network over time oﬀers an interesting perspective of their evolution (Fagiolo and Mastrorillo,
2014; Sgrignoli et al., 2015; Garas et al., 2106). By explicitly linking the migrants network to
bilateral FDI, this chapter joins the small but growing literature on the interrelation between
diﬀerent networks. Even though it does not refer to a proper multilayer network, it constitutes
a substantial improvement of the existing FDI literature.16
2.3.2 From local to structural properties of nodes: using networks to analyze
actors
A graph provides a huge load of information, in terms of its global structure as well as in terms of
the behavior of its actors, which aﬀected by it. Indeed, the decision of two vertices to link (and
the way they do so) is unlikely to be taken irrespectively from the overall context in which those
agents operate. For instance, there may be some node that link to many others: newcomers may
ﬁnd convenient to establish a connection with those highly inﬂuential nodes, in order to take ad-
vantage of the channels they may oﬀer toward the rest of the network. This phenomenon, known
as Preferential Attachment (Barabási and Albert, 1999), characterizes many real world interna-
tional networks, from the FTA (Sopranzetti, 2017) to trade (Fagiolo et al., 2008), investments
(Garas et al., 2106), and migration (Fagiolo and Mastrorillo, 2013; Sciabolazza, 2018) networks
(as well as the Internet - see for instance Brin and Page, 1998; Kleinberg, 1999). Understanding
the eﬀect of actors' position with respect to the overall network may be very informative about
their economic potential and the inﬂuence that a single actor may exert on the system as a whole.
Since the position of an actor can be deﬁned in several ways, it is important to understand what
is the meaning of the diﬀerent alternatives. According to Borgatti (2005), each measure of cen-
trality conveys a speciﬁc set of information about the role of a node within the network. In the
empirical section, I include and discuss several measures of network position. I introduce them
in this section, to give an idea of the type of information they add to the analysis, their relative
advantage and their shortcomings.17
1. (Weighted) Degree Centrality. It is the most immediate measure of network centrality.
In its binary formulation, degree centrality counts the number of connections of a node
ki = n∑
j=1aij , ∀i ∈ G (2.3)
where aij represents the ijth entry of the binary adjacency matrix. Intuitively, it is asso-
ciated to the extensive margin of network, i.e. to the number of (new) connections that
16This brief introduction is not complete: for instance, the distinction between uni- and bi(multi)-modal
networks (where actors are connected to each other indirectly, by sharing the same set of occurrences) remains
untackled, as well as the possibility of complex structures generated, for instance, by self-loop edges (typical in
expectation and contagion network models).
17Additional terminology can be found in appendix 2.A
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an actor establishes.18. For the purpose of this chapter, I am also interested in the anal-
ysis of the intensive margin of a network. Weighted degree centrality (often referred to
as Strength Centrality), analogously to degree centrality, sums all entries of the weighted
adjacency matrix referring to a certain node i. The diﬀerence is that it takes the size of
the ﬂow into consideration, not just the presence of a link.
si = n∑
j=1 vij , ∀i ∈ G. (2.4)
Both Degree and Strength can be normalized in order to obtain a measure ranging between
0 and 1. Interestingly, despite both measures are based on a very similar type of infor-
mation, they may not perfectly coincide in complex networks (even if their correlation is
usually very large). For instance, actors with a lot of small connections may coexist with
nodes with a small number of extremely large links. Measures of purely local connectivity
fail to capture this possibility.19
2. Average Nearest Neighbour (ANN) Centrality (Barrat et al., 2007). Measures of
local network connectivity may be informative about the size (and possibly, the intensity) of
a node's relational web. Taken alone, such measures oﬀer a very limited perspective about
the context an actor operates in. A perhaps related concept, though slightly wider, consists
in the average size and intensity of a node's neighbors connectivity, which represents a form
of indirect measure of centrality. ANN Degree (ANND) counts the average number of
links accruing to/from the whole direct neighborhood of a node; analogously, ANN Strength
(ANNS) measures the average intensity that characterizes its proximate countries. ANN
centrality (Barrat et al., 2007) is deﬁned as
ANNC = 1
si
∑ j=1n(aijwijkj) (2.5)
, where si represents the strength of node i and constitutes the normalizing factor (in the
binary version, si is replaced by ki). aij represents the ijth entry of the adjacency matrixA, and wij the weight of the link (that is conveniently set to 1 in the binary case); kj
indicates node j's degree centrality. Comparing Degree (strength) and ANNC measures is
particularly interesting under a topological perspective, as it allows identifying whether a
network presents an assortative (nodes connect to others with similar connectivity score)
or a dissortative (nodes connect to others having very diﬀerent connectivity scores) mixing
patterns.20
3. Overlapping and Complementary Networks. The reasoning underlying ANN cen-
trality is that the dimension of the partners' self-centered networks may be relevant in
explaining the outcomes at the bilateral level. Nonetheless, these measures could reﬂect
18In directed graph, a distinction can be made between arcs departing from that vertex and those reaching it:
in this case we talk about in-degree and out-degree centrality
19Also, these measures ignore all other structural characteristics of the neighbors, or of the network itself.
20Assortativity should not be confused with homophily, which identify the tendency of actors to connect to
each other according with certain individual chateristics.
82
A network analysis of the migration-Investment nexus
some factors that do not really deal with the bilateral relationship between two countries,
not last because they refer to the importance of actors other than those in a speciﬁc dyad.
For instance, large ANND may lead to a large noise in the bilateral informative channels,
resulting in a diversion of resources from a given bilateral relationship. This is more likely
to happen if the overlapping networks between two countries is large. On the other side, a
large complementary network would constitute a bridge between two otherwise unrelated
nodes.21 For these reasons, the impact of such measures are likely to be non-trivial and con-
stitute an ultimately empirical issue. For instance, Fagiolo and Mastrorillo (2014) account
for such third party eﬀect by including both migrants overlapping and complementary
network measures to study the impact of migrants network on trade. They detected a mag-
nifying impact of both, with a stronger role for the overlapping share. Overlapping and
non-overlapping inward networks between two nodes (countries) i,j are deﬁned respectively
as the set of edges that are shared or that characterize only one of the two vertices.
overlappingij = I = (1, ..., n),J = (1, ...,m) I ∩J = 0 (2.6)
overlappingij = I = (1, ..., n),J = (1, ...,m) I ∩J ≠ 0 (2.7)
where I = (1, ..., n) and J = (1, ...,m) represent the set of immigrants in county i and j
respectively, while n and m represent the sets of countries that send migrants to i and
j respectively.22 Dealing with both shared and non-shared network linkages represents a
further improvement with respect to ANN centrality, since they allow to decompose the
eﬀect of partners' networks in the role of direct competitors (the shared links) and that of
indirect competitors (the non-overlapping connections).
4. Eigenvector and Bonachich Centrality. Degree and Strength centrality oﬀer an insight
over the size of an actor's self-centered network. Unfortunately, they do not say anything
about the position of the actor within the network. The prestige of a node within the
network may be a much more interesting information, which refers to the importance
(centrality) of a node as determined by the importance of its neighbors. An interesting
measure of prestige is constituted by the Eigenvector Centrality (Bonacich, 1972, 1987),
which deﬁnes a node's importance as proportional to the sum of the importance of its
own neighbors, which in turn depends on the importance of their own neighbors and so
on and so forth in a recursive fashion. Thus, the prestige of a node no longer depends
just on the size of its neighborhood, but also on the size of the neighborhood of the actors
it is connected to (this time negatively). Despite the eigenvector centrality works ﬁne for
binary, unweighted graphs, it can also be generalized to the weighted case (The so called
Katz prestige. See Newman, 2003; Jackson, 2010, for a review). Building upon eigenvector
centrality and Katz prestige, Bonacich (1987) proposed a measure to take into consideration
the distance decay eﬀect of the indirect connections, to discount neighbors' inﬂuence by
21Overlapping refers to the set of shared neighbours between a pair of nodes. Conversely, complementarity
refers to the share of a country's neighbors that have no relationship with the economic partner that is being
considered
22The reverse holds to compute the overlapping and complementary outward network
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the distance on the adjacency matrix. Bonachich Centrality depends on two parameters,
which are deﬁned to privilege either the local centrality of a node (degree) or the decay
eﬀect due to distance. It can be expressed in matrix form as
CeB(A, a, b) = (I − bA)−1agll (2.8)
where A is the adjacency matrix, a, b > 0 with b small captures the role of distance decay,
while a captures the importance of a node's base value.23 A high Bonachich and Eigenvector
centralities imply that a node is important as it is able to link with (many) other important
nodes, i.e., as long as it is located in the middle of a well established community, not just
at its boundaries.
5. PageRank Centrality. It is another measure of prestige based on the eigenvector of
the adjacency matrix. Though very similar to Bonachich centrality (it weight both the
number of incoming links and the centrality of the connected nodes), it also takes their link
propensity to send/receive connections from third parties into account. Thus the pagerank
centrality of a node, is proportional to the number of links received from other important
nodes, and to the degree of parsimony with which it links to other actors (or if a node is
heavily linked by others). In a simpliﬁed formulation, PageRank centrality (PR) of a given
node i is deﬁned as
PRi = α∑
k
ak,i
dk
xk + β (2.9)
α and β are constants, while kouti is the out-degree of node i. In the case a link does
not link to any other nodes, this measure is set to 1, rather than to null. Despite having
been developed to study the world wide web, PageRank presents some features that make
it relevant also for the application of this research.24 According to the existing theories
linking migration to bilateral economic exchanges, migrants' networks operate as to solve
informational problems, and as a signal for market and social conditions in both the country
of origin and of destination. Such diaspora externality (Leblang, 2010; Kugler et al., 2017)
implies that information ﬂow in a privileged way between countries with a well established
migration corridor between them. But when a country receives migrants from too many
countries or send migrants to too many countries, it is possible that a noise is introduced,
and the informative power of a certain channel is diluted by the competition of other
countries/diaspora. As in the case of the indirect measures of centrality presented above,
whether a dilution or a reinforcing eﬀect is in play remains an ultimately empirical matter.
6. Hub and Authority Scores. Kleinberg (1999) proposed two alternative measures of
centrality, the one specular to the other. The Kleinberg's HITS algorithm assigns both
an Authority (prestige as linker) and a Hub (prestige as recipient) score to each node,
according to a mutual recursive process in which the node is evaluated for how many
links it receives from authorities (hub score) and for how many links it sends to hubs. In
23Notice that all eigenvector-based measures, because of the recursive computational process, require both a
starting base centrality value (often the node degree) and a condition to stop iterations.
24Pagerank is also the algorithm which deﬁnes the ranking of Google's search results
84
A network analysis of the migration-Investment nexus
simpliﬁed terms, the hub and the authority scores of a given actor i can be deﬁned as
hubi = n∑
j=1authorityj (2.10)
authorityi = n∑
j=1hubj (2.11)
The HITS algorithm, analogously to PageRank, was originally developed to rank web
pages on the web. HITS measures may be highly informative for the application of this
study. First of all, being a hub in the IMN means that a country receives (many) migrants
from many countries characterized by high emigration rates toward many other important
destinations. The opposite is true for being an authority in the IMN. Thus, a positive
correlation between bilateral migration and FDI would rule out any evidence of a potential
dilution eﬀect of the migrants informative channel (that is, the fact that many immigrant
communities at a certain destination end up competing with each other in order to attract
investments to their homeland.25
Beyond node-level statistics, SNA oﬀer a wide range of system-level statistics, related to the
overall structure of the network. Such structure aﬀects not only the probability of actors to
establish a link, but also the resilience of a relational system, the rapidity of a potential contagion
(ﬁnancial or epidemic), the emergence of a core-periphery structure (Wallerstein, 1987; Borgatti
and Everett, 2000), the emergence of rich clubs or even riches get richer patterns (the so called
preferential attachment mechanism described at the beginning of this section), as well as many
other real-world phenomena. For instance, transitivity (also known as clustering coeﬃcient),
network density, the diameter and the average path length (APL) of a network provide other
useful information about the relational content of a network itself.26
2.3.3 Networks in Gravity
So far, I oﬀered an overview of what a network and the metrics deﬁning it are, both in terms
of size and in terms of the diﬀerent deﬁnitions of centrality/prestige. I now turn to discuss how
network features can be included in the econometric analysis of bilateral data (usually addressed
in with ad hoc extensions of the gravity model. See for instance Head and Mayer, 2014).
The underlying limitation of the usual gravity estimation (implemented by mean of FE or pooled
estimation) is that it considers the single bilateral relationships as independent from the whole set
of relationships a country may be involved in (which are usually very numerous in international
economic networks). Nonetheless, the behavior of economic actors cannot be considered as
independent from the complex web of relationships they are embedded into. To control for
this issue, Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) introduced the idea of Multilateral Resistance, to
25Garas et al. (2106) excluded this possibility, but made no eﬀort to include this class of measures into the
analysis).
26These statistics are brieﬂy described in Appendix 2.C proposes a review similar to the one above. Given the
purpose of this research, they are mostly suitable to describe the networks, rather than to be included into the
analysis
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take into account the relative attractive force exerted by potential economic partners outside
the bilateral relationship between two countries.27 Graham (2015) maintain that the empirical
counterpart of the theoretical multilateral resistance limits the control of interdependence to the
structure of the error term. Despite this strategy ﬁt satisﬁcingly the structure of the error term
in the cross-section case, a much more complex mathematical validation process would be needed
to extend the same idea to the longitudinal case.
Approaching complex longitudinal dyadic data in terms of complex networks helps showing how
the structure of interdependence between economic actors (countries) changes over time, and
how it may ultimately shape multiple structures of interdependence over time (Sciabolazza,
2018, p. 243). Yet, the practical estimation of the position of migrants networks on bilateral
FDI ﬂows remains an issue to be carefully considered. In the econometric exercise, I depart from
the traditional ﬁxed eﬀects estimation, to move towards a more ﬂexible approach based on a
multilevel mixed eﬀects model.
Empirical Approach and Estimation Methodology
In the econometric analysis I depart from most of the existing literature on complex networks
and bilateral economic exchanges in at least three respects.
First, as opposed to Fagiolo and Mastrorillo (2014); Sgrignoli et al. (2015); Garas et al. (2106) I
do not use total bilateral ﬂows as dependent variable. Indeed, taking the reciprocal ﬂows (stocks)
between two countries, and working with the resulting undirected network generally solves many
computational issues (not last, the possibility to estimate in a single step the bilateral network
eﬀect on the dependent variable). Nonetheless, it does not allow to understand the channels
through which the IMN topology aﬀects bilateral FDI.28 Collapsing both the IMN and the
GFDIN by taking the sum of the respective ﬂows at bilateral level may perfectly ﬁt the purpose
of the researcher looking for a general causal relationship between the IMN and FDI (eventually,
that is what Fagiolo and Mastrorillo found in the ITN-IMN relatioship), but does not allow to
investigate further how the migrants network aﬀects such mechanism. This whoul require both
the IMN and the GFDIN to be kept directed.29 In this sense, my approach is closer to Metulini
et al. (2017) and to the second part of Garas et al. (2106).30.
27Bertoli and Moraga (2013) provided the theoretical foundation of multilatera resistance in the context of
migration.
28Suppose to take the aggregate bilateral ﬂow between two countries (denoted i and n). This implies that the
values of the ﬂows (stocks) going in either direction between them (ni = i → n + n → i) are summed together.
Suppose that i receives a modest number of migrants from n, despite a large number of investments ﬂowing the
other direction; on the other side, n could invest very little in i, While receiving a huge number of migrants
from it. Summing up migrants and FDI ﬂows (stocks) between those two countries would make impossible to
distinguish them from another pair c,d which is characterized by average ﬂows (stocks) of FDI and migrants in
both direction.
29Remind from above that keeping the network directed implies that each node is characterized (at bilateral
level) by two arcs instead of just one edge.
30This latter study is particularly relevant. To the best of my knowledge, it represents the only existing study
of the impacts of the structure of migrants networks on FDI bilateral exchanges, despite their empirical analysis
is plagued by misspeciﬁcation issues. Indeed, applying a poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (ppml) estimator,
the authors consider the dependent variable in log form, causing the coeﬃcients not to be correctly speciﬁed
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Second, I do not limit the analysis to a single direction in the IMN, as done in most of the existing
literature: in most studies, bilateral network statistics are built summing up the reciprocal inward
migration ﬂows of the countries in each dyad and the reciprocal outward trade/investment ﬂows
between them.31 Since I am interested in the directed eﬀect of migration from an hypothetical
country n to an OECD country i and in the FDI ﬂow in the opposite direction, I expect the
outward connectivity of the emigration country to be as statistically relevant as the inward
connectivity of the destination (with respect to the IMN). As a matter of facts, both measures
capture diﬀerent aspects of the openness of the two countries, and may aﬀect the bilateral FDI
channel diﬀerently. Indeed migrants also provide information about the work ethics and labor
potentiality of a certain country. To consider only the joint bilateral ﬂow means to ignore the
possibility that the signal from a country's diaspora in a speciﬁc destination may suﬀer from
the competition arising from all other migrants communities in diﬀerent destinations (and vice
versa). Thus, the competing communities abroad may suﬀer from the higher eﬃcacy of a certain
group in directing investments or exploiting connections in the motherland. Considering the
inward connectivity in the IMN of the investing country as opposed to the outward connectivity
of the recipient economy is a way to take into account such potential dilution eﬀect. Existing
evidence seems to point in favor of a virtuous impact of IMN centrality and bilateral FDI, as they
may both indicate overall openness for both countries. Given that no existing study takes both
sides of the IMN into account, the potential existence of a dilution eﬀect remains an ultimately
empirical issue, that has to be tested in the data.
Third and last, under the estimation perspective I depart from the traditional gravity estimation.
Indeed, the hierarchical structure of the dataset I construct (by merging together bilateral data as
well as contextual information and network variables) implies that a large amount of information,
as well as all the heterogeneity across observations, would be controlled out by standard FE
estimation. As a matter of facts, the inclusion of network variables into the frame adds a new
level to the structure of the data, in which a country is located into the bilateral relationships
with its partners and, at the same time, within the (more or less thick) web of relationships
deﬁned globally within the IMN. For this reason, I detach from the existing international trade
and investment literature, to adopt a multilevel mixed modeling, similar to the one proposed
by Drzewoszewska (2014) and Giovannetti et al. (2018), which better control for the structure
of the data when in presence of such complex structures (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012).
The strength of this class of models is that they endogenize the hidden hierarchical structure
(for the purpose of this chapter, I assume bilateral ﬂows nested at country pair level, nested
within countries individual networks, nested within time), while allowing the error term to be
determined at the level of the single dyad, varying across levels. A mixed model constitutes an
alternative approach to gravity analysis (that I applied in the ﬁrst two chapters) that tends to
ﬂatten data heterogeneity by focusing on the sole within-group variability (Giovannetti et al.,
(Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). Replicating their analysis (especially the one taking the aggregate bilateral
ﬂows as dependent and explanatory variables) with the data used in this chapter conﬁrms such concerns: i.e.
their results are only robust when the dependent variable is taken in logarithmic terms, loosing consistence when
the dependent variable is correctly kept in levels.
31This make sense in the bilateral approach, but looses of justiﬁcation when incoming and outgoing directed
arcs are maintained separated, as it is in this case
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2018).32 Diﬀerently, a mixed model does not merely control out the structure of the data: it
explicitly models it, allowing for instance both the intercept and the slope of certain coeﬃcients
to vary across dyads (by letting the variance of such coeﬃcients to have a stochastic component).
For this reason, according to Bell and Jones (2015), mixed models are generally more elastic than
their FE counterpart, which should be interpreted as a special case of mixed model where the
entire between group variability is controlled out. Since the between group variability (in this
case, the diﬀerence across country pairs) is generally larger than the within group variability
(that is, within the same group of observations), the adoption of a mixed model allows exploiting
a much larger amount of information.
Such hierarchical data structure, together with the assumptions of non-homogeneity and non-
constant correlation in the structure of the error term across the diﬀerent levels considered (as
well as across dyads), implies the estimated equation to resemble
yni,t = ∑
r=1R βrX
r
ni,t + ni + eni + νt (2.12)
r = (1, ...,R) is the number of regressors included, while i, n denote the country of origin and
destination of the ﬂow of interest respectively. Finally, n,i, eni, νt explicit the three levels of the
error term. Accordingly, the empirical multilevel gravity equation is deﬁned as
lnFDIcountni, t
5y = lnmighigh,l5in,t + ∑
net=1NW γnetX
net,l5
ni,t + ∑
r=1R βrX
r
ni,t (2.13)
In equation (2.13), the dependent variable lnFDIcountni, t5y represents the 5-year cumulative
sum of the count of greenﬁeld FDI from country i to country n. lnmighigh,l5in,t is the 5-years lagged
stock of tertiary educated migrants (which proxies for highly skilled migration) from country n
to country i, while ∑net=1NW γnetXni, tnet,l5 is the vector of both direct and indirect (lagged)
network characteristics included in the regression, as described in section 2.3. I use lags to reduce
reverse causality, which might aﬀect the relationship between migration and FDI, while at the
same time acknowledging that migrants' networks (whatever deﬁned) need time to structure and
become able to establish those channels for information to ﬂow. Finally, ∑Rr=1 βrXrni,t includes
all the usual bilateral control variables, such as the log bilateral distance between i and n, and
the logs of i and n's real per capita GDP. The estimates are reported in section 2.5, while more
on debate between Mixed and Fixed eﬀects estimation is reported in Appendix 2.B, which also
reports and compare the coeﬃcients for some centrality measure when estimated in either way.
32With mixed model I refer to multilevel regression composed of a ﬁxed part as a base level, and by one or
more random levels deﬁned according to the assumptions about the hidden hierarchical structure of the data. See
appendix 2.B for a comparison with FE estimation.
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2.4 Topology and Descriptive Statistics
Below, I introduce the data used in the empirical section and provide some basic descriptive
statistics (section 2.4.1). Then, I describe the correlation between the structure of the IMN and
that of the GFDIN, in a fashion similar to the one proposed by Fagiolo et al. (2008) and Garas
et al. (2106). The objective of section 2.4.2 is to describe the relationship between a country
openness in terms of capital ﬂows and in terms of migration (inward and outward), by means of
the statistics presented in section 2.3.2.
2.4.1 Data
Data on bilateral FDI statistics, which constitute our dependent variable, come from the fDI
Market database, provided by Financial Times (2017). fDI Market constitutes one of the two
main sources of transactional investment data available (i.e. data at level of single project or
transaction). For a discussion about pros and cons of using this kind of data as compared to
traditional balance of payment records, see the data appendix in chapter 1.33
Figures on total bilateral migrants statistics come from UNDESA-population statistics division
(UNDESA, 2015), which collects data for 202 countries and autonomous territories around the
world with a 5 year span between 1990 to 2015. I compute network statistics from it, not to loose
the structural information which derive from a global coverage. Diﬀerently, high skill migration
data comes from the IAB Brain Drain Dataset (Brucker et al., 2013), which records census based
immigration ﬂows data in 20 OECD countries.34 Using both sources together allows to identify
the eﬀect of bilateral migration once the systemic network eﬀect is taken into account.35 Other
data used throughout the current and the next section come from open access sources: distance,
gdp data, and other usual gravity variables come from CEPII database (gravdata and geodist
dataset freely available from CEPII, 2017). Language data come from Melitz and Toubal (2014).
Table 2.1 above reports the summary statistics of the main variables included in the econometric
33The dataset contains information about all Greenﬁeld investments which took place between January 2003
and December 2015 (last available year at the time the database was accessed, in June 2016). As recalled in
the appendix to chapter 1, this statement is not entirely true: being based on personal interviews to MNEs'
representatives, this type of data suﬀer from both recall bias, voluntary omission, and missed response issues.
These three issues are more severe for some countries than they are for others, and some ﬂows tend to be
systematically underreported. Nonetheless, transactional data still represent the best source of FDI records
broken by sector and type.
34These countries are Australia, Austria, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and
the United States.
35Focusing on the 20 OECD countries included in the IAB dataset drops a good number of large investors, such
as Italy, Japan, and China. The latter in particular (given its fundamental role in many developing countries)
constitutes a particularly relevant loss. Results have been checked to test the sensitivity of the coeﬃcients to the
exclusion of those countries that recorded a substantial outﬂow of FDI in the period considered, but that are de
facto excluded in the reduced sample. Relaxing the skill requirement by including total migration ﬂows did not
lead to signiﬁcant changes in terms of sign, even though the numerical magnitude of the coeﬃcients is reduced
(in line with the existing evidence reviewed in section 2.2.1). Table c-3 in appendix 2.C reports basic descriptive
for both bilateral investment and migration ﬂows, divided by groups of countries, to better explain the sample
representativity issue.
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Table 2.1: Regressors Description: Estimation Sample summary statistics
Obs Mean SD min MAX
Standard Gravity Controls
Count5yni,t 9,225 0.998978 1.39583 0 7.6587
lnMigtot,l5ni,t 9,225 6.716067 2.929089 0 16.26366
lnMighigh,l5ni,t 8,039 5.944147 2.638684 0 14.09002
lndistni 9,225 8.580736 0.838096 4.708416 9.880192
lnGDPci 9,225 10.59282 0.47766 8.937813 11.54109
lnGDPcn 9,225 8.43646 1.5681 4.968309 11.54109
contiguityni 9,225 0.019079 0.136809 0 1
colonyni 9,225 0.050623 0.219239 0 1
comlegalni 9,225 0.303848 0.459943 0 1
Measures of Local Connectivity (centrality)
ln INDEGl5i 9,225 5.151201 0.226307 4.110874 5.356586
lnOUTDEGl5n 9,145 3.954678 0.446999 1.791759 5.036952
ln INSTRl5i 9,225 14.42818 1.351787 11.92099 17.58938
lnOUTSTRl5n 9,145 13.02374 1.590762 7.005789 16.56104
(NON)-Overlapping Network
ln INcommonBIN,l5i 9,225 3.405737 1.112924 0 5.313206
ln INcompleBIN,l5i 9,225 3.699064 0.521604 1.386294 5.141664
lnOUTcommonBIN,l5n 9,225 3.701753 0.434784 1.098612 4.875197
lnOUTcompleBIN,l5n 9,225 4.810991 0.259271 3.89182 5.236442
ln INcommonW,l5i 9,225 12.91427 2.089016 1.94591 17.58648
ln INcompleW,l5i 9,225 13.2609 2.116861 3.912023 17.58717
lnOUTcommonW,l5n 9,225 12.51571 1.733822 4.158883 16.32769
lnOUTcompleW,l5n 9,225 10.87305 2.296394 0 16.30458
Eigenvector-based measures of Network Prestige
lnEigenw,l5i 9,225 -3.46662 1.359396 -6.45196 -0.41093
lnEigenw,l5n 9,145 -6.91571 3.24157 -21.9757 0
lnPageRankl5i 9,225 -4.33001 1.145174 -6.23998 -1.86192
lnPageRankl5n 9,145 -6.09213 1.067524 -7.2866 -1.86192
lnBonacichl5i 1,576 -1.40723 0.455734 -1.8529 -0.5696
lnBonacichl5n 1,956 -1.16428 1.102108 -4.35237 1.064278
Kleinberg's centrality measures
lnHubBIN,l5i 9,225 -0.19265 0.107514 -0.51965 0
lnAuthBIN,l5n 9,145 -1.62914 1.111284 -4.57818 0
lnHubW,l5i 9,225 -4.76347 1.217841 -8.21987 -2.52916
lnAuthW,l5n 9,145 -7.93241 2.419418 -17.8871 0
Barrat et al.'s ANNC Measures
lnANNDININ,l5i 9,225 3.862308 0.222935 3.58575 4.849128
lnANNDINOUT,l5i 9,225 3.405628 0.277202 3.021282 4.326693
lnANNDOUTIN,l5n 9,225 4.762068 0.176364 4.157443 5.204007
lnANNDOUTOUT,l5n 9,225 4.214646 0.088371 3.928725 4.504848
Summary Statistics based on the estimation sample, computed on the observations for which data on highly educated
migration is available. This sample includes ﬂows from the IAB-20 to the rest of the world (including IAB-20 countries,
as in the second group in Panel B of table c-3 in the appendix).
Variables names are reported as acronyms.
90
A network analysis of the migration-Investment nexus
analysis, reported in the same order in which they are analyzed and discussed in section 2.5.
2.4.2 Migrants Network and Greenﬁeld FDIs: a Network Description
Following Newman (2018), I compare the basic topological structure of the the IMN and the
GFDIN over time, to spot some potential co-evolution patterns between the two, as well as to
identify the background mechanisms that drive the evolution of each network separately. Since
migration data are only available on a 5-year span, table 2.2 reports the main topological features
for the years in which they overlap (that is: 2005, 2010, and 2015).36 Complemented with table
c-2 in appendix 2.C, they provide an overview of the size and of the system-level connectivity of
the two layers (as well as their evolution).
Table 2.2: Network Comparison: General Connectivity (I)
PANEL A: Network Size
2005 2010 2015
Mig FDI Mig FDI Mig FDI
Nodes Count 220.00 228.00 220.00 228.00 220.00 228.00
Edges Count 10534.00 1802.00 10685.00 2399.00 10688.00 2347.00
Mean In-degree 47.88 7.90 48.57 10.52 48.58 10.29
Min. In-degree 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 2.00 0.00
Max. In-Degree 212.00 47.00 204.00 57.00 204.00 64.00
Mean Out-degree 47.88 7.90 48.57 10.52 48.58 10.29
Min. Out-degree 5.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 3.00 0.00
Max. Out-Degree 153.00 107.00 154.00 120.00 154.00 115.00
PANEL B: General Connectivity
2005 2010 2015
Mig FDI Mig FDI Mig FDI
Density 0.22 0.03 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.05
APL 1.67 2.17 1.67 2.08 1.67 2.08
Diameter 4.00 6.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 5.00
Assortativity -0.29 -0.23 -0.28 -0.19 -0.28 -0.25
Transitivity 0.56 0.46 0.57 0.45 0.57 0.45
Network Topological Comparison. APL = Average Path Length. Other measures of general connectivity are reported
in table c-2 in appendix 2.C. All the networks statistics reported in this table that have not been discussed in section
2.3.2 are brieﬂy described in appendix 2.A.
SOURCES: FDI data come from fDIMarket database (Financial Times ltd). Migration data from UNDESA Population
Division. The years indicated on top of the table refers to the GFDIN. Migration statistics refers to the network 5 years
earlier. (UNDESA, 2015)
The ﬁrst point to be noticed relates to the size of the two networks: as a matter of fact, the IMN
36Since I include the 5 year lagged migration network into the econometric analysis, the plot too compare the
GFDIN in a given year against the IMN as it was 5 years earlier
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is substantially larger than the GFDIN (Greenﬁeld FDI Network), at least in terms of number
of edges (the E dimension discussed at the beginning of section 2.3.1). The size diﬀerential is
also reﬂected in the remaining IN- and OUT-degree statistics shown in Panel A. It emerges that
while the IMN size remains substantially unchanged over time, the GFDIN grew substantially
between 2005 and 2010, arresting its growth in the following ﬁve years.37 These trends emerge
clearly in Panel B as well, where general connectivity is reported: again, the IMN did not
change substantially over the period considered, at least not as much as it did in the earlier
decades (see Fagiolo and Mastrorillo, 2013, 2014; Sciabolazza, 2018, for a thorough analysis
of the migrants network over a longer time span); the GFDIN on the other hand experienced a
slight decrease in both its average path length (APL) and diameter. Assortativity and transitivity
statistics remained substantially stable, notwithstanding the decrease in the dissortative behavior
recorded in the 2005-2010 window. Overall, despite the sustained growth, the GFDIN remains
far smaller than its migration counterpart (especially in terms of its intensity). Both networks
share the tendency to link countries with diﬀerent size and local connectivity structure (as
highlighted by the negative assortativity score) and an average clustering coeﬃcient (as captured
by a transitivity score around 0.5). Nonetheless, the IMN appears closer small world conﬁguretion
(Watts and Strogatz, 1998) with respect to the GFDIN.38.
Figure 2.1 plots the two networks against each other, comparing the link weights (value of the
stock of migrants and ﬂow of FDI respectively). Every coordinate (x, y) = (i, j) constitutes an
ordered pair of countries, with ﬂow going from country i to country j. Coloring (from warmer
to cooler) and size (small to large) reﬂect the product of i and j's populations and per capita
GDPs respectively, for all the three time spans considered. All in all, larger country pairs in
terms of both GDPc and population are also characterized by larger linkages in the two layers,
and this trend reinforces over time. This rough graphical comparison suggests that the IMN
and the GFDIN co-evolved over time, at least in terms of ﬂows intensity (this is diﬀerent from
the size statistics presented in Panel A of table 2.2, where the binary structures were compared,
instead of their weighted counterpart.).
Such correlation pattern is conﬁrmed when I look to the node-level centralities, both weighted
and binary. Figure 2.2 shows node level statistics for the year 2010 only.39. This time, each point
37This is not entirely true: the slowdown was mostly due to the outbreak of the global ﬁnancial crisis and its
aftermath. Yearly data allow to have a clearer picture of the evolution of the GFDIN in that period. However,
given the purpose of this exercise i.e., to compare FDI and Migrants networks, yearly network statistics for the
former are not reported here. They remain available upon request to the author
38Concerning these two last measures, it is worth noticing the discrepancies between such estimates and those
obtained by Garas et al. (2106), which represent the only other work who compare the iMN against aninvestment
network. For both networks, they detect a much higher (negative) assortative score. This fact could be due to the
diﬀerent types of data used to build the FDI and the migrants' networks (For instance, they did not distinguish
FDI stocks between Greenﬁeld and M&A. Conversely, I only focus on Greenﬁeld ﬂows). The major diﬀerence
is represented by the migrants dataset. Whilst I use migrants stocks, they adopt ﬂow data: yet, the choice of
building a migrants stock network as opposed to a ﬂow network is not trivial, and relates to the nature of the
mechanisms I want to test. As a matter of fact, the informative potential of migrants networks and their pro-
investment eﬀects are more likely to emerge when a migrant has the time to get acquainted to its new destination,
in order to establish contacts and collect knowledge about the economic tissue there. Flows are more likely to
reﬂect short run synergies that may share the same drivers of FDI, raising additional concerns about a potential
reverse causality.
39Same plots for 2005 and 2010 are not shown for reason of space. They are still available upon request.
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Figure 2.1: Link weight comparison over time
(a) Log-Log scale. Markers size is proportional to the product of the population of country i and country
j. Colors from red to light blue reﬂect the product between per capita GDP of country i and country j
on the graph represents a single country, while size and coloring maintain the same criteria as
in Fig 2.1. Every point (x, y) represents an ordinate couple (centrgfdini , centrimni ). As it was in
the dyadic case reported in ﬁgure 2.1, larger nodes (in terms of both GDPc and population) are
characterized by a larger connectivity in both binary and weighted terms (left hand side plots),
as well as a lower average connectivity of the neighbors they link to/are linked from (plots
on the right). Not only these patterns conﬁrm the relatively marked correlation between the
two networks, but also give a preliminary graphical representation of the dissortative patterns
highlighted in Panel B of table 2.2. Figure 2.3 further explores the dissortative patterns in both
networks by plotting both binary and weighted node centrality against the respective average
neighbor counterparts. Even though the trend is much better deﬁned for the weighted networks
(bottom panels), the binary structure too presents a clear dissortative trend (as suggested by
Fagiolo and Mastrorillo, 2013; Garas et al., 2106, among the others).
Finally, ﬁgure 2.4.2 plots the degree distribution (Total, IN, and OUT) for both the IMN and
the GFDIN. While the structure of the IMN has already been investigated properly (Fagiolo
and Mastrorillo, 2013; Sciabolazza, 2018), the degree distribution of greenﬁeld network has not
been reported yet. As expected, both networks share a heavily skewed distribution, with the
vast majority of nodes with little or no connections and few large hubs. Similarly for both the
GFDIN and the IMN, these ﬁgures suggest a power law distribution that may imply a preferential
attachment structure (Barabási and Albert, 1999). Nonetheless, an in depth analysis of the
GFDIN is beyond the purpose of this chapter, and is left for future analysis.
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Figure 2.2: Node Centrality across layers: Year 2010
(a) Log-Log scale. Markers size is proportional the population of the country, while colors from red
to light blue reﬂect the per capita GDP. ANN(D,S) = Average Nearest Neighbour Degree or Strength
(Barrat et al., 2007)
Figure 2.3: Dissortative Patterns: Centrality vs ANNC
(a) Log-Log scale. Markers size is proportional the population of the country, while colors from red to
light blue reﬂect the per capita GDP. ANNC = Average Nearest Neighbor Centrality (generic for ANND
and ANNS)
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Figure 2.4: Degree Distribution (Year: 2010)
(a) IMN (b) GFDIN
2.5 Empirical Analysis
Despite the clear correlation pattern that emerges from the simple graphical comparisonof the
two networks, no conclusion can be drawn on the nature of such relationship. For this reason, I
ﬁt a gravity-like model of FDI includng those mesures of network centrality into the estimated
equation. The purpose of this section is to provide an insight into how the position of a country
in IMN ultimately aﬀect bilateral greenﬁeld FDI ﬂows. Five separate exercises are conducted,
with the objective of highlighting diﬀerent aspects of the migration network-FDI relationship.
Tables 2.1 to 2.5 are all based on equation (2.13). Each column refers to a diﬀerent measure of
network centrality/privilege, or to a consistent set of them, and do not report the coeﬃcients
for the set of controls included in the empirical speciﬁcation (distance, colonial relationship,
contiguity, and legal system, per capita GDP, etc.), to focus on the migration related variables
only.40 lnMighigh,l5ni,t captures the direct eﬀect of bilateral (highly educated) migration ﬂows.
It maintains a positively stable and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, with a numerical value
ranging between 0.09 (4th column of table 2.2) and 0.323 (column 5 of table 2.3).41 All in all, it
suggests that migrants and investments are complementary rather than substitutes.
I now turn to consider the position of each country in the IMN, which constitute the innovative
part of the analysis. Table 2.1 controls for the eﬀect of the local centrality position. Conversely
40Since they are consistent in their sign across all speciﬁcations and maintain a stable magnitude (when
signiﬁcant), they are only reported in the appendices. Per capita GDPs, which account for the size eﬀect of
a given bilateral channel, also maintain a signiﬁcant and positive role throughout the whole battery of results.
Distance maintains a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, ranging between 0.08 to 0.16. The remaining dummy
variables, indicating geographic, historical, and institutional proximity respectively maintain a positive, though
not always signiﬁcant value. Only common legal system and the colonial ties dummy (1 means both countries
were part of the same colonial rule) show a bit of noise, probably due to the high correlation among the two.
Appendix 2.D reports the full speciﬁcation tables (including coeﬃcients that have been excluded from the main
text for reasons of better legibility) and the pairwise correlation between network measures included in each of
them.
41These two bounds also represent the only two irregular estimates: indeed, taking them apart implies
the coeﬃcient for the highly educated bilateral migrants channel to remain always between 0.204 and 0.263,
statistically indistinguishable across speciﬁcations.
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Table 2.1: Binary and Weighted Local Connectivity
Dep. Var. : FDI Count5y
ni,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
lnMighigh,l5
ni,t
0.263*** 0.264*** 0.207*** 0.246*** 0.209*** 0.204*** 0.121***
(16.97) (15.65) (38.08) (14.95) (32.04) (31.54) (105.72)
ln INDEGl5i -0.0343 0.0823
+
(-0.51) (1.87)
lnOUTDEGl5n 0.612*** 0.621***
(5.42) (5.72)
ln INSTRl5i 0.0598*** 0.209***
(19.75) (11.57)
lnOUTSTRl5n 0.156*** 0.250***
(5.96) (7.55)
LRtest 1545.63*** 1479.55*** 1305.26*** 1386.03*** 1363.26*** 1233.10*** 1219.51***
Obs 9308 9308 9225 9308 9225 9225 9225
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. t-statistics in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors.
The dependent variable FDI Countni,t is the 5-year cumulate count of greenﬁeld FDI from country i to country n.
Zero ﬂows are excluded by the log-linearization, even if their occurrence is risible: The selection of the investing subset
i left only 20 OECD countries, all among the top investor in the period considered (Japan, China, and Italy are ex-
cluded). Full country list can be found in the main text.
Estimates refer to a 3-level regression with random intercepts. Diads are nested in networks, all nested in time. Ta-
ble b-1 in Appendix 2.B compares local network coeﬃcients estimates obtained via Mixed Multilevel Regression with
those obtained via a two-steps FE estimator.
LRtest refers to the log-likelihood Ratio test of the multilevel speciﬁcation against the linear model (Rabe-Hesketh and
Skrondal, 2012): rejecting the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence between the standard OLS/FE estimates suggests that
the multilevel model is suitable to the data.
Notice: all equations include distance (in logs); per capita GDP (in logs) of both i an n; three dummies for contiguity,
colonial history, and common legal system; and a constant. All coeﬃcients are shown in the full table in the empirical
appendix.
from previous related studies, I distinguish between the outward connectivity of the emigration
country (which captures the size and the extent of its diaspora) from the inward connectivity
of the destination/investing country - which controls for the openness with respect to migration
and for the presence of diﬀerent migrants communities. On average, the higher connectivity of
both origin and destination countries appears to have a positive eﬀect on the bilateral number
of investments from the 20 OECD countries consiedered as investors (i) toward the rest of the
world (n), with the sole i in-degree (column 2) to have a non-statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect. This
result conﬁrms the previous evidence focused on the IMN's eﬀect on both trade (Fagiolo and
Mastrorillo, 2014; Sgrignoli et al., 2015) and FDI (Garas et al., 2106).42
Degree and Strength centralities are simple to compute and extremely easy to handle. Nonethe-
less, they ignore the complex structure of the network, to focus exclusively on the size of the
network centered in a given country. Thus, they do not say anything about who the neighbors
are, how large or how central they are, or where a node is located within the overall network.
To overcome this limitation, following Fagiolo and Mastrorillo (2014), I ﬁrst try to expand the
analysis by dividing the the IMN between overlapping or complementary networks. It could
be that a country's (local) centrality on the IMN captures a generic openness to international
ﬂows (which constitute diﬀerent layers of the same global economic network). Indeed, splitting
42A possible explanation may be that larger connectivity on the IMN implies a larger degree of integration
in the global economy in general: the lack of evidence about a potential dilution eﬀect of the bilateral signal
could be explained with a better capability to deal with diﬀerentiated ﬂows of information coming from diﬀerent
emigrant communities abroad when the countries operate in a (fairly) open economy.
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global centrality between connectivity in the common destination/origin countries and connec-
tivity outside the common set of destination/origin countries may help understanding whether
the complexity of the IMN triggers third party eﬀects. In short, third party eﬀects in the over-
lapping network would imply that the connection in the emigrants/immigrants community does
not extinguish its role at the bilateral level, but it also works as a bridge between their origin (or
destination) country and other partners, by simply connecting fellow nationals abroad. Similarly,
a large non-overlapping network could imply that two countries are embedded in diﬀerent com-
munities.43 Thus, the complementary IMN subgraph may either be negatively correlated with
the bilateral FDI ﬂow (suggesting that the two countries belong to diﬀerent economic spheres),
or positively - in case the ethnic ties between diﬀerent migrants communities team up in estab-
lishing international connections that may turn beneﬁcial for bilateral FDI.44 Table 2.2 reports
the estimates for both the binary (ﬁrst 4 columns) and the weighted (columns 5 to 8) IMN sub-
networks, constructed to favor i's inward connectivity as opposed to n's outward connectivity.
Results neither conﬁrm nor exclude any of the expected mechanism discussed above. In the
binary network, the outward connectivity of the migrants country of origin n points in favour
of such mechanism. The inward connectivity of the investing country (i) rather shows comple-
mentarity eﬀects, suggesting that high integration in a diﬀerent community is still beneﬁcial for
bilateral investments between two countries (this ﬁnding is analogous to Fagiolo and Mastrorillo,
2014; Garas et al., 2106). Nonethelss, this pattern is reversed when considering the weighted
network. This inconsistency calls for a more thorough analysis of the dualistic nature of inter-
national network when complementary and overlapping connections are considered separately.
Table 2.2 complements the results of table 2.1. It also says a little more on the eﬀect (at least in
terms of bilateral FDI) of who a country connects to. The two tables combined seem to rule out
the possibility of a dilution eﬀect, that could have emerged if being central in the IMN would
have constituted a source of noise for the bilateral informative channel set up by the bilateral
migration.
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 make an additional step forward and explore the role of a set of measures
of centrality/prestige which takes the prestige of a neighbour into account in the deﬁnition of
a node's centrality itself. These measures, which are based on the eigenvector of the adjacency
matrix, take into account not just the connectivity of a certain node in the network, but also the
importance of the connections themselves, resulting in a recursive deﬁnition of centrality. Thus,
a country is considered as central as long as its own connections are central in the network. This
is similar to distinguishing the size of a country's network to the quality of its connections. With
the only exclusion of n's Bonacich centrality and weighted hubness score of country i when taken
alone (columns 6 of table 2.3 and column 4 of table 2.4 respectively) all the proposed measures
show a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on bilateral FDI. These results conﬁrm the
idea that being highly connected in the network (as deﬁned by tables 2.1 and 2.2) is not the
43Communities in SNA refer to groups of actors/nodes characterized by high density between them and little
connectivity between them
44The evidence on the pro-trade eﬀect of the IMN connectivity actually detected this last eﬀect to be at play.
See Fagiolo and Mastrorillo (2014)
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Table 2.2: Overlapping and non-Overlapping Network Eﬀects
Dep. Var. : FDI Count5y
ni,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
lnMighigh,l5
ni,t
0.245*** 0.252*** 0.245*** 0.0965*** 0.243*** 0.244*** 0.219*** 0.208***
(16.71) (16.83) (16.71) (273.93) (14.27) (14.21) (29.93 (37.00)
ln INcommonBIN,l5
i
0.153*** 0.178***
(13.42) (12.27)
ln INcompleBIN,l5
i
0.160***
(4.94)
lnOUTcommonBIN,l5n 0.153*** 0.966***
(13.42) (10.46)
lnOUTcompleBIN,l5n -1.261***
(-10.34)
ln INcommonW,l5
i
0.0474*** 0.0505***
(8.06) (8.38)
ln INcompleW,l5
i
-0.00914**
(-3.19)
lnOUTcommonW,l5n 0.128*** 0.0820***
(5.20) (4.14)
lnOUTcompleW,l5n 0.0785***
(9.19)
LRtest 1590.11*** 1588.19*** 262.82*** 965.41*** 1584.26*** 1516.20*** 1425.06*** 1354.23***
Obs 9308 9308 9308 9308 9308 9308 9308 9308
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. t-statistics in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors.
The dependent variable FDI Countni,t is the 5-year cumulate count of greenﬁeld FDI from country i to country n.
Zero ﬂows are excluded by the log-linearization, even if their occurrence is risible: The selection of the investing subset
i left only 20 OECD countries, all among the top investor in the period considered (Japan, China, and Italy are ex-
cluded). Full country list can be found in the main text.
Estimates refer to a 3-level regression with random intercepts. Diads are nested in networks, all nested in time.
LRtest refers to the log-likelihood Ratio test of the multilevel speciﬁcation against the linear model (Rabe-Hesketh and
Skrondal, 2012): rejecting the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence between the standard OLS/FE estimates suggests that
the multilevel model is suitable to the data.
Notice: all equations include distance (in logs); per capita GDP (in logs) of both i an n; three dummies for contiguity,
colonial history, and common legal system; and a constant. All coeﬃcients are shown in the full tables in the empirical
appendix.
only thing that matters: rather, the importance of who a country links to (is linked from) is also
relevant to explain its bilateral investments patterns.
Finally, table 2.5 explores another aspect so far neglected in the related literature: the average
connectivity of a country's closest neighbors.45 A country that is small in the network (i.e. has a
reduced number of connections on its own) may take advantage from linking to highy connected
partners. Such small country may exploit the ethnic ties of its small migrant community (in or
out) and of its connections with those large emi-/immi-gration countries, via non-nationality re-
lated ethnic ties (Sgrignoli et al., 2015; Sciabolazza, 2018).46 Consistently, the average centrality
in the outward neighborhood of the investment recipient country (i.e., the average centrality in
the set of countries toward which n sends migrants) always appears to have a detrimental eﬀect
on bilateral FDI, whereas the average centrality in i's inward neighborhood (the set of countries
that send migrants to i) positively aﬀects the bilateral FDI ﬂows toward a speciﬁc destination.
Results are (partially) in line with Fagiolo and Mastrorillo (2014), and points toward the exis-
tence of a potential pro-investment eﬀect of common ethnic ties when the country of destination
45Table 2.5 reports the estimates for the binary network only.
46This is related to the idea of preferential attachment, proposed by Barabási and Albert (1999) and introduced
in section 2.3
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Table 2.3: Baseline Results: Eigenvector Based Prestige Measures
Dep. Var. : FDI Count5y
ni,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnMighigh,l5
ni,t
0.246*** 0.235*** 0.255*** 0.221*** 0.323*** 0.259***
(15.40) (18.04) (14.11) (28.40) (13.22) (8.44)
lnEigenw,l5
i
0.0649***
(14.65)
lnEigenw,l5n 0.0750***
(8.25)
lnPageRankl5i 0.0342**
(3.10)
lnPageRankl5n 0.352***
(5.08)
lnBonacichl5i 0.224***
(12.32)
lnBonacichl5n 0.0357
(1.15)
LRtest 1431.60*** 1475.05*** 1497.73*** 1246.31*** 121.43*** 156.87***
Obs 9308 9225 9308 9225 1514 1972
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. t-statistics in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors.
The dependent variable FDI Countni,t is the 5-year cumulate count of greenﬁeld FDI from country i to country n.
Zero ﬂows are excluded by the log-linearization, even if their occurrence is risible: The selection of the investing subset
i left only 20 OECD countries, all among the top investor in the period considered (Japan, China, and Italy are ex-
cluded). Full country list can be found in the main text.
Estimates refer to a 3-level regression with random intercepts. Diads are nested in networks, all nested in time.
LRtest refers to the log-likelihood Ratio test of the multilevel speciﬁcation against the linear model (Rabe-Hesketh and
Skrondal, 2012): rejecting the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence between the standard OLS/FE estimates suggests that
the multilevel model is suitable to the data.
Notice: all equations include distance (in logs); per capita GDP (in logs) of both i an n; three dummies for contiguity,
colonial history, and common legal system; and a constant. Al coeﬃcients are shown in the full table in the empirical
appendix.
Table 2.4: Baseline Results: Kleinberg's Hubness and Authority Scores
Dep. Var. : FDI Count5y
ni,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnMighigh,l5
ni,t
0.246*** 0.244*** 0.215*** 0.265*** 0.224*** 0.221***
(14.08) (17.45) (13.43) (15.52) (23.66) (22.84)
lnHubBIN,l5
i
0.764*** 1.211***
(7.64) (13.08)
lnAuthBIN,l5n 0.153*** 0.183***
(12.39) (15.35)
lnHubW,l5
i
-0.0173 0.0198***
(-1.41) (8.67)
lnAuthW,l5n 0.138*** 0.140***
(5.93) (6.02)
LRtest 1404.52*** 1554.88*** 1456.09*** 1452.04*** 1307.76*** 1219.01***
Obs 9308 9225 9225 9308 9225 9225
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. t-statistics in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors.
The dependent variable FDI Countni,t is the 5-year cumulate count of greenﬁeld FDI from country i to country n.
Zero ﬂows are excluded by the log-linearization, even if their occurrence is risible: The selection of the investing subset
i left only 20 OECD countries, all among the top investor in the period considered (Japan, China, and Italy are ex-
cluded). Full country list can be found in the main text.
Estimates refer to a 3-level regression with random intercepts. Diads are nested in networks, all nested in time.
LRtest refers to the log-likelihood Ratio test of the multilevel speciﬁcation against the linear model (Rabe-Hesketh and
Skrondal, 2012): rejecting the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence between the standard OLS/FE estimates suggests that
the multilevel model is suitable to the data.
Notice: all equations include distance (in logs); per capita GDP (in logs) of both i an n; three dummies for contiguity,
colonial history, and common legal system; and a constant. All coeﬃcients are shown in the full table in the empirical
appendix.
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is involved. In other words, immigrants communities in a certain country i may team up to
exploit ethnic ties, with the result of ultimately foster investments toward a speciﬁc country n.47
Table 2.5: Baseline Results: Barrat et al ANNC
Dep. Var. : FDI Count5yni,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnMighigh,l5ni,t 0.263*** 0.259*** 0.214*** 0.234***
(16.79) (17.22) (26.53) (20.15)
lnANNDININ,l5i 0.115
+
(1.94)
lnANNDINOUT,l5i 0.177***
(4.63)
lnANNDOUTIN,l5n -1.782***
(-5.75)
lnANNDOUTOUT,l5n -2.604***
(-6.53)
LRtest 1524.86*** 1540.36*** 1218.00*** 1382.94***
Obs 9308 9308 9308 9308
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. t-statistics in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors.
The dependent variable FDI Countni,t is the 5-year cumulate count of greenﬁeld FDI from country i to country n.
Zero ﬂows are excluded by the log-linearization, even if their occurrence is risible: The selection of the investing subset
i left only 20 OECD countries, all among the top investor in the period considered (Japan, China, and Italy are ex-
cluded). Full country list can be found in the main text.
Estimates refer to a 3-level regression with random intercepts. Diads are nested in networks, all nested in time.
LRtest refers to the log-likelihood Ratio test of the multilevel speciﬁcation against the linear model (Rabe-Hesketh and
Skrondal, 2012): rejecting the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence between the standard OLS/FE estimates suggests that
the multilevel model is suitable to the data.
** Notice: all equations include distance (in logs); per capita GDP (in logs) of both i an n; three dummies for con-
tiguity, colonial history, and common legal system; and a constant. All coeﬃcients are shown in the full table in the
empirical appendix.
2.6 Conclusions
Migration ﬂows are increasing worldwide, despite several attempts of many developed countries
to limit the incoming of people (usually, of the less skilled) (McKenzie, 2007; UNDESA, 2015).
However, their impact on economic exchanges is potentially very high, especially for those ﬂows
demanding for better coordination across actors, access to better information, or that may be
subject to more severe contract enforcement issues. Thus, understanding the impact of diaspora
on bilateral exchanges represents an important step in the understanding of the mechanisms that
dominate an increasingly integrated global economy.
47At the same time, the negative impact on the origin side partially indicates that a sort of dilution eﬀect is
at play. Nonetheless, since the earlier results do not point in this direction, further analysis would be needed to
clear this point beyond any reasonable doubt.
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This chapter analyzes the impact of the international migrants' network (particularly, the role
of highly educated migrants) on bilateral greenﬁeld FDIs exchanges between 20 OECD countries
and the world.48 Despite the relatively limited size of the dataset, which accounts for less than
2 percent of global bilateral migration channels, the results are representative for more than 40
percent of total non-null greenﬁeld FDI channels recorded worldwide.49 The descriptive evidence
collected examining the correlation patterns between the IMN and the GFDIN (discussed in
section 2.4) shows the existence of co-evolution trends between the two diﬀerent networks, that
should be considered as layers of the same global economic network rather than separate entities.
Building upon such exploratory evidence, I set up an econometric exercise focused on (a) the
identiﬁcation of the impacts of the IMN structural properties on bilateral greenﬁeld FDI ex-
changes between two countries, beyond the role of traditional bilateral factors shaping bilateral
investment ﬂows; and (b) the discussion of the potential mechanisms that may be at play.
In the econometric exercise I apply an estimation technique (multilevel mixed model Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012) not yet used in this context, in order to relax the strict assumptions
over the correlation in the error term that is proper of traditional ﬁxed eﬀect estimation (and of
longitudinal gravity models in particular: see Head and Mayer, 2014; Graham, 2015), as well as
to control for the potential hidden hierarchical structure of bilateral exchange data (Giovannetti
et al., 2018). Five separated sets of results are presented, each of them exploring a diﬀerent
network-related aspects of a country's connectivity. Bilateral FDI from country i to country
n grow with the number of connections that both countries have on the IMN, with n outward
connectivity being much more relevant than i's inward connectivity, both in terms of the weighted
and the binary deﬁnition of network. Consistently with the earlier literature on the relationship
between IMN and Trade (Fagiolo and Mastrorillo, 2014; Sgrignoli et al., 2015), I explored to
what extent the diversity in the network, split between overlapping (shared) and complementary
(not shared) connections in the IMN aﬀects bilateral FDI ﬂows between i and n. Ex ante, I
could expect the size and the variety of a migrant community in/from a country to be aﬀected
by a trade-oﬀ, in terms of openness against competition between migrants' communities. Yet,
the results of such exercise are not conclusive: while the overlapping network proved to be
always positively associated to bilateral greenﬁeld FDI, the role of the exclusive connections
(i.e. those links that are not shared by both i and n) provided mixed evidence. The results of
the Eigenvector-based measures of centrality/prestige are particularly interesting. The reason
is that they do not only take into account the quantitative aspect of the positioning in the
network, but also the quality of such position (measured in terms ot the relevance of countries
neighborhood) with respect to the whole network. This is in line with the idea of centrality not
only as a matter of who you are, but also of who you know (Jackson, 2010). These ﬁndings
are to be ultimately complemented with the analysis of the indirect network eﬀect, captured
by the average size of a node's neighbouring connectivity (Barrat et al., 2007). What emerges
is that, while average neighbors inward connectivity positively aﬀects bilateral FDI from the
investing country, the same does not hold for the investment recipient economy, where a certain
48The full list of countries is available in section 2.3
49ﬁgures based on the values reported in table c-2
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competition might be detected when its average neighbors' inward connectivity is considered.
In conclusion, results appear to be robust, and conﬁrm the importance of the network systemic
dimensions of the International Migration Network (IMN) on bilateral FDI, which increase with
a better positioning (of both countries of a given dyad) in it.
Despite this chapter add substantially to the understanding of the impacts of diaspora on bilateral
FDI ﬂows, a few limitations set the stage for the work beyond this thesis. The ﬁrst one concerns
the sample selection: in an unreported set of results I replicate the same set of regressions, ﬁrst
retaining all OECD countries as migrants destinations, then on the entire migrants network (as
a result, I could only use total migration to proxy for the direct bilateral migrants eﬀect, instead
of limiting the analysis to the highly educated diaspora only).50 While in the ﬁrst case the
results did not change substantially, they radically shifted downward when the sample includes
all countries as investors rather then reducing them to 20/23/35, becoming much less clear.51
The second issue concerns the potential endogeneity of the results. In fact, I have not been
able to identify a proper instrument for implementing a sound IV strategy. Even the two-steps
strategy proposed in Ortega and Peri (2014) and Fagiolo and Mastrorillo (2014) did not lead to
satisfactory results in terms of ﬁt and correlation. Further eﬀort should be put in this direction.
Third, as highlighted by Fagiolo and Mastrorillo (2014) and later received by Sgrignoli et al.
(2015), standard econometric techniques do not easily allow to control for the potential spatial
correlation at dyadic and extra-dyadic level (Krisztin and Fischer, 2015). A spatial ﬁltering
approach could help disentangling the severe problems related to potential correlation between
investment ﬂows when serial spatial auto-correlation cannot be excluded. The fourth and ﬁnal
consideration refers to the scope of the analysis: indeed, this study considered the IMN and the
GFDIN as two layers of the same global macroeconomic system. Previous authors focused on
the relationship between the IMN and the world trade web, or between the Corporate Control
Network and the ITN. However, as suggested by many scholars (Helpman et al., 2008; Aubry
et al., 2012, see for instance), the movements of goods, people, and capital are likely to be
co-determined: excluding one of the ﬂow may limit the analysis, with the risk of obtaining
results which are not correct, or conclusions plagued by potential endogeneity issues. Addressing
this issue by means of complex networks seems to me a promising, yet under-explored ﬁeld of
application.
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Appendix
2.A Terminology Appendix
The network statistics introduced in section ?? are by no mean suﬃcient to describe the network
itself: indeed, in section ?? as well as in appendix 2.C, I use several other measures to describe
both the IMN and the GFDIN. While many of them are quite intuitive in what they represent,
others deserve a clariﬁcation. Below, I brieﬂy review some additional notation.
(i) Triad or triplet: it represents the simplest structure which network characteristics can
be identiﬁed. As the name suggests, is composed of 3 nodes or actors. Triads can be of
diﬀerent kinds, reﬂecting diﬀerent types of basic social structures. Mapping the emergence
of each possible type of triads (the so called triad census) gives important information over
the basic structure of a network.
(ii) Density: mathematically, it is the ratio between the number of existing edges/arcs in a
network and the number of potential links that might exist in a graph of a speciﬁc size N .
It gives an idea of the overall network connectivity. Density in real world networks can be
considered a two edge blade: the denser the network, the highest its resilience (resistance
to a node's dropout); at the same time, stronger density implies also faster contagion and
faster information circulation.
(iii) Walks and Paths: A walk is a sequence of links that allow moving from a node toward
another, no matter whether such sequence includes repeated links. A path is a walk that
does not pass through the same link twice. Both walks and paths can be either directed or
not, so that they are deﬁned in both directed and undirected graphs. A path that starts
from a node and ﬁnishes at the same node is called cycle. Two nodes can be connected
by more than one walk/path/cycle.
(iv) Geodesic, Diameter and APL: the geodesic is the shortest path connecting a node to
another (in terms of number of links between the two nodes). The diameter is then the
largest geodesic in the network, and gives an idea of the size and the connectivity of a
graph. The APL (or, Average Path Length) is the average geodesic (shortest distance)
between any couple of nodes (or dyad) in the network. Small APL and limited diameter
identify small world patterns (Watts and Strogatz, 1998) .
(v) Degree Distribution (Figure 2.4.2): is the distribution of the relative frequences of
nodes having diﬀerent degree. Degree distribution is a fundamental characteristic of a
network, as it allows to detect interesting feature, such as the existence of a power law.
The identiﬁcation of Barabási and Albert (1999)'s' preferential attachment behavior (or
scale-free network) is based on degree distribution.
(vi) Clustering Coeﬃcient: Clustering refers to the tendency of nodes to form closed triads.
It is often referred to as transitivity since it reﬂects the tendency of nodes sharing a common
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neighbor to link together. Real networks exhibit higher clustering than expected by a
random generating process.
(vii) Assortativity and Homophily: two similar though unrelated concepts. Assortativity is
the tendency of nodes to link with neighbors that are similar to them in terms of network
connectivity: when nodes with diﬀerent size are more likely to link together, a network is
said to follow a dissortative pattern (that is another typical feature of scale free networks).
Homophily on the other hand reﬂects the tendency of nodes to link to their similar in terms
of a speciﬁc shared characteristics (sex, status, ethnicity among others).
2.B Mixed models vs FE gravity
Bilateral data such as trade, often rely on vairations of the gravity equation. This class of model
is generally estimated by means of ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) or pooled data estimation. However, when
the data structure is highly complex and can be ranked according to a hidden hierarchy, FE
estimation may not be the best strategy to follow. In this chapter, I overlap both bilateral and
country speciﬁc information, by including migrants' network variables into the frame. Network
variables represent higher order data that operate at diﬀerent levels compared to the usual
bilateral perspective included into gravity analysis: thus, applying multilevel regression seems
appropriate. Nonetheless, there are also other reasons to prefer a mixed approach to a FE.
The use of FE estimation and pooled regression in gravity analysis is usually justiﬁed by two
features. First, FE reduce the incidence of omitted variable bias. Second, the inclusion of the
appropriate set of eﬀects allows to control for the multilateral resistance term (MRT, Anderson
and Van Wincoop, 2003). As a matter of fact, the exclusion of MRT, in case they are correlated
with the gravity dimensions included in the model, would substantially bias the coeﬃcients
of the estimated structural gravity (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007).52 Provided the model to
be correctly speciﬁed, FE (within) estimation allows to think of the estimated coeﬃcients as
causal eﬀects (According to Bell and Jones, 2015, this constitute the stronger factor in favor
of FE modeling. Indeed, the authors express skepticism about the eﬀective capability of FE
modeling to identify a causal eﬀect, especially when the model falls into overﬁtting problems.).
However, FE gravity estimation is not free from criticalities. First, it implies a strong analytical
assumption concerning the structure of the error term and the degree of interconnection between
units. Indeed, by considering the correlation in the error term to be constant across observations
(country pairs), FE models ignore the speciﬁcity of each bilateral relationship and the resulting
average variation that occurr between country pairs. This might be particularly relevant in
the case of historical, geographical (Egger, 2000), as well as relational features. When data
are characterized by a highly complex structure, the assumption of homogeneity across units
could generate a bias in the coeﬃcients.53 Second, the inclusion of the proper set of FE to
control for the MRT complicates the estimation of all those variables that are time invariant or
monadic, as they would require the variable of interest to be regressed on the estimated ﬁxed
eﬀects in a second step (Head and Mayer, 2014; Head and Ries, 2008). Fagiolo and Mastrorillo
(2014) and many others solved this issue by summing up the trade and migration ﬂows in either
directions at country-pair level: this strategy allows to maintain the variability of the variables
52In addition, estimating structural gravity by means of ppml, allows the FE included in the equation to
precisely represent the empirical counterpart of the theoretical MRT (Yotov et al. (2016) and Fally, 2012)
53This issue is central in empirical gravity estimation. Among the others, Cameron and Miller (2015) developed
a methodology to consistently cluster SE when dealing with dyadic data, made operational in the STATA suite
by Belotti et al. (2018)
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Table b-1: Binary and Weighted Local Connectivity
Panel A: FE second stage monadic estimation
ln INDEGi 0.298***
(47.46)
lnOUTDEGn 0.804***
(82.76)
ln INSTRi 0.172***
(117.69)
lnOUTSTRn 0.171***
(60.01)
Panel B: Mixed regression (Tab 2.1 estimates)
ln INDEGi -0.0343
(-0.51)
lnOUTDEGn 0.612***
(5.42)
ln INSTRi 0.0598***
(19.75)
lnOUTSTRn 0.156***
(5.96)
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. t-statistics in parentheses.
Panel A reports the estimates from the second stage of the FE estimation as in Head and Mayer (2014). The ﬁrst stage
(available upon request) includes all the controls as in equation (??) with country×year FE to control for MR and it is
estimated via PPML, using the user-written command ppml_panel_sg (Larch et al., 2017). Standard Errors are clus-
tered at country pair. The dependent variable in the second step depends on which country's speciﬁc characteristic is
estimated. Thus, when we are interested in origin (destination) side centrality, the dependent variable is represented by
the ﬁrst stage's ln (origin×year) (ln (destination×year)) FE.
Panel B reports the estimates from the 3-level regression with random intercepts as reported in Table 2.1. Diads are
nested in networks, all nested in time.
of interest beyond the reach of the FE, but does not allow to diﬀerentiate the relative impacts
of the two coupled channels. Garas et al. (2106) solved this issue by applying a reduced set of
FE (including separately origin, destination, and time): nonteheless, their approach is likely to
incur in what Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) deﬁned as bronze, silver, and gold medal speciﬁcation
errors.
As pointed out in section 2.3.3, I detach from proper gravity analysis, to embrace a multilevel
mixed estimator. This methodology can be applied whenever data are suspected to be hierarchi-
cally structured, and the observed units have been monitored over time. In short, mixed models
merge together a ﬁxed component with one or more random parts that constitute the levels of
the hidden hierarchy. This class of models relaxes the strict homogeneity assumption over the
error term (by specifying the structure of the dataset instead of controlling out the heterogene-
ity across the observed dyads, it avoids to incur in both mispeciﬁcation and overﬁtting issues,
providing in this wayan equally eﬃcient estimator when compared to FE). See ??.
Table b-1 replicates the result in table 2.1, but compares the results of FE estimation against
the results of the baseline mixed estimator. Notice that I report the estimate for the second
stage of a two-steps procedure. In the ﬁrst step I ﬁt a full gravity equation with all the necessary
bilateral controls and the suitable set of FE. The estimated country×year FE (country alone in
the cross sectional case) is then regressed on the full set of monadic characteristics that are de
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facto absorbed by such term.
Since the second stage regresses the country×year FE on that country speciﬁc monadic feature,
it is not possible to estimate an equation including monadic information that is speciﬁc to the
partner. For this reason, table b-1 does not reports the replication of columns (6) and (7) from
table 2.1, where both in-degree(-strength) of country i and out-degree(-strength) of country n
were included. Beyond the greater ﬂexibility, this last issue reinforces our argument in favour of
adopting a multilevel mixed modelling. Also coeﬃents estimates remain relatively similar across
estimators, with the small diﬀerences that might be ascribed to the diﬀerent way FE and Mixed
models handle the stochastic component. Only the coeﬃcient for ln INDEGi turns signiﬁcant in
FE estimation when it is included alone54.
2.C Descriptive and Topological analysis Appendix
Table c-3 reports the structure of the whole dataset, splitting the world into gorups of countries.
The purpose of the table is to provide an overview of the overall dataset, and to show the rep-
resentativity of the data used throughout the empirical analysis. Table c-1 and c-2 complement
the description of the network proposed in table 2.2 and commented in section 2.4.2.
Table c-1: Network Comparison: Centralization Scores
2000 2010 2015
Mig FDI Mig FDI Mig FDI
Degree Centralization 0.56 0.29 0.56 0.35 0.56 0.35
Closeness Centralization 0.74 0.01 0.71 0.01 0.71 0.01
Betweenness Centralization 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.06
Eigenvector Centralization 0.71 0.81 0.70 0.79 0.70 0.80
Network Topological Comparison over the years included in the empirical analysis.
The normalizaed centralization indices proposed above include only those measures for which a theoretical maximum
can be estimated with no loss of accuracy: this feature allows the two networks to be compared to each other. Unfortu-
nately, other measures of interest such as PageRank centrality, Bonachich, ANND and the weighted variant of Degree
Centrality cannot be estimated normalized. They are therefore of little interest at this stage, as they could not be com-
pared. SOURCES: FDI data come from fDIMarket database (Financial Times ltd). Migration data from UNDESA
Population Division (UNDESA, 2015)
54The FE estimates replicating Tables d-2 to d-5 maintain the same trends as those reported here, and are
available upon request.
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Table c-2: Network Comparison: Connectivity
2000 2010 2015
Mig FDI Mig FDI Mig FDI
Mutual Dyads 2677.00 337.00 2747.00 484.00 2749.00 486.00
Asymm. Dyads 5180.00 1128.00 5191.00 1431.00 5190.00 1375.00
Null Dyads 16233.00 24413.00 16152.00 23963.00 16151.00 24017.00
Weak Components 1.00 66.00 1.00 50.00 1.00 54.00
Average Clique 48.00 20.00 48.00 21.00 48.00 22.00
Average Coreness 55.56 9.09 56.56 12.08 56.80 11.84
Modularity 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.08
Network Topological Comparison over the years included in the empirical analysis.
Mutual and Asymmetric Dyads refer to the share of reciprocated and not reciprocated edges respectively. Weak Com-
ponents represents the number of weakly connected components intended as the maximal subgraph that would be con-
nected if the direction of the arcs is ignored. Modularity, Coreness and Clicquishness report similar information about
the networks' internal grouping, as characterized by larger density within than between them.
SOURCES: FDI data come from fDIMarket database (Financial Times ltd). Migration data from UNDESA Population
Division (UNDESA, 2015)
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Table c-3: Looking to the data: Summary by ﬂow direction
Obs Non-missing Mean SD min MAX
Panel A - Total Sample
NUM Greenﬁeld (5 years) 145860 11,685 1.050343 15.204 0 1635
High Skill Migration (IAB) 11460 9,613 5968.422 37818.17 0 1315891
Total Migration (UNDESA) 145860 32,054 4278.237 75891.03 0 12100000
Panel B: Number of Observations by Direction in the sample
IAB-20 to IAB-20
NUM Greenﬁeld (5 years) 1140 926 36.71754 108.0213 0 1559
High Skill Migration (IAB) 1140 1135 15247.4 49524.84 0 533808
Total Migration (UNDESA) 1140 1122 44918.89 116738.5 0 1289396
IAB-20 to ROW (Including IAB-20)
NUM Greenﬁeld (5 years) 13,260 4786 7.989668 46.68598 0 1635
High Skill Migration (IAB) 11,460 9613 5968.422 37818.17 0 1315891
Total Migration (UNDESA) 13,260 5356 5390.537 39408.96 0 1289396
IAB-20 to ROW
NUM Greenﬁeld (5 years) 12120 3860 5.287541 34.68435 0 1635
High Skill Migration (IAB) 10320 8478 4943.419 36151.46 0 1315891
Total Migration (UNDESA) 12120 4234 1672.523 16048.16 0 876528
ROW to ROW
NUM Greenﬁeld (5 years) 120600 5438 0.286194 5.019805 0 826
High Skill Migration (IAB) - - - - - -
Total Migration (UNDESA) 120600 17756 2626.872 51541.64 0 3584076
ROW to IAB-20
NUM Greenﬁeld (5 years) 12000 1461 1.062083 9.443657 0 420
High Skill Migration (IAB) - - - - - -
Total Migration (UNDESA) 12000 8942 19645.36 203298.1 0 12100000
Total Dataset description by direction of the ﬂow.
IAB-20 refers to the countries available in the IAB Brain Drain database Brucker et al. (2013), and includes Australia,
Austria, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.
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2.D Estimates Appendix
In this appendix to the empirical section I report the full regression tables, excluded from the
main text to maintain the focus on the IMN. Each regression table is also complemented by a
pairwise correlation table. I do so to show how the usually high correlation between network
centrality measures (Jackson, 2010; Newman, 2018) requires to carefully choose the combination
of measures to be included simultanously, in order to avoid multicollinearity.
Full Estimates
Table d-1: Full Coeﬃcients Replica of table 2.1
Dep. Var. : FDI Count5y
ni,t
lnMighigh
ni,t
0.263*** 0.264*** 0.207*** 0.246*** 0.209*** 0.204*** 0.121***
(16.97) (15.65) (38.08) (14.95) (32.04) (31.54) (105.72)
lndistni -0.121*** -0.122*** -0.108*** -0.140*** -0.106*** -0.104*** -0.162***
(-4.39) (-4.62) (-3.95) (-5.03) (-3.88) (-4.00) (-5.61)
lnGDPci 0.350*** 0.346*** 0.364*** 0.342*** 0.359*** 0.373*** 0.341***
(5.25) (5.79) (4.99) (5.06) (5.31) (5.45) (5.02)
lnGDPcn 0.197*** 0.196*** 0.187*** 0.201*** 0.244*** 0.188*** 0.285***
(5.56) (5.67) (6.00) (5.67) (5.81) (6.11) (6.32)
contigni 0.846*** 0.843*** 1.033*** 0.843*** 1.060*** 1.042*** 1.108***
(18.65) (16.04) (24.67) (17.85) (26.70) (22.14) (23.82)
colonyni 0.159
+ 0.163+ 0.375** 0.141 0.364** 0.369** 0.418**
(1.71) (1.66) (2.79) (1.52) (2.81) (2.70) (3.20)
comlegni -0.0585*** -0.0618*** -0.0103 -0.0538*** -0.0148 -0.00177 0.0261
(-3.81) (-6.04) (-0.45) (-3.65) (-0.72) (-0.09) (1.08)
ln INDEGi -0.0343 0.0823
+
(-0.51) (1.87)
lnOUTDEGn 0.612*** 0.621***
(5.42) (5.72)
ln INSTRi 0.0598*** 0.209***
(19.75) (11.57)
lnOUTSTRn 0.156*** 0.250***
(5.96) (7.55)
Constant -4.782*** -4.551*** -7.081*** -5.351*** -7.170*** -7.673*** -10.62***
(-4.58) (-7.34) (-4.74) (-5.22) (-5.07) (-6.32) (-6.29)
lns11,1
Constant -3.068*** -3.062*** -2.855*** -3.123*** -3.404*** -2.864*** -3.910***
(-10.04) (-10.04) (-9.59) (-10.17) (-9.67) (-9.59) (-9.25)
lns21,1
Constant -0.395*** -0.395*** -0.447*** -0.410*** -0.418*** -0.446*** -0.456***
(-5.16) (-5.18) (-4.79) (-5.66) (-5.14) (-4.74) (-7.26)
lns31,1
Constant -0.325*** -0.325*** -0.335*** -0.318*** -0.353*** -0.337*** -0.371***
(-7.46) (-7.51) (-21.35) (-6.42) (-13.71) (-21.28) (-8.98)
LRtest 1545.63 1479.55 1305.26 1386.03 1363.26 1233.10 1219.51
Obs 9308 9308 9225 9308 9225 9225 9225
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. t-statistics in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors.
The dependent variable Countni,t represents the 5-year cumulate count of greenﬁeld FDI from country i to country n.
Zero ﬂows are excluded by the log-linearization, even if their occurrence is riible, due to the selection of i country, that
only include 20 OECD countries that where among the top investor in the period considered (Japan, China, and Italy
are excluded). ull list of country can be found in the main text.
Estimates refer to a 3-level regression with random intercepts. Diads are nested in networks, all nested in time.
LRtest refers to the log-likelihood Ratio test of the multilevel speciﬁcation against the linear model (Rabe-Hesketh and
Skrondal, 2012): rejecting the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence between the standard OLS/FE estimates suggests that
the multilevel model is suitable to the data.
Notice: all equations include distance (in logs); per capita GDP (in logs) of both i an n; three dummies for contiguity,
colonial history, and common legal system; and a constant. Al coeﬃcients are shown in the full table in the empirical
appendix.
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Table d-2: Full Coeﬃcients Replica of table 2.2
Dep. Var. : FDI Count5y
ni,t
lnMighni,tigh 0.245*** 0.252*** 0.245*** 0.0965*** 0.243*** 0.244*** 0.219*** 0.208***
(16.71) (16.83) (16.71) (273.93) (14.27) (14.21) (29.93 (37.00)
lndistni -0.0928*** -0.0850** -0.0928*** -0.168*** -0.128*** -0.123*** -0.106*** -0.110***
(-3.65) (-3.18) (-3.65) (-6.06) (-4.58) (-4.55) (-3.90) (-4.15)
lnGDPci 0.365*** 0.317*** 0.365*** 0.342*** 0.333*** 0.334*** 0.355*** 0.346***
(5.38) (5.05) (5.38) (4.24) (4.83) (4.84) (5.20) (5.24)
lnGDPcn 0.142*** 0.139*** 0.142*** 0.171*** 0.177*** 0.171*** 0.207*** 0.260***
(4.62) (4.66) (4.62) (5.86) (4.96) (5.07) (5.74) (6.18)
contigni 0.874*** 0.871*** 0.874*** 0.904*** 0.865*** 0.869*** 0.909*** 0.848***
(20.52) (22.20) (20.52) (18.13) (18.15) (18.56) (22.69) (19.81)
colonyni 0.201* 0.242* 0.201* 0.303** 0.153
+ 0.158+ 0.320** 0.339**
(2.10) (2.27) (2.10) (2.83) (1.66) (1.69) (2.60) (2.72)
comlegni -0.0302* -0.0414** -0.0302* 0.0451
+ -0.0563*** -0.0556*** -0.0201 -0.02645
(-1.98) (-3.04) (-1.98) (1.91) (-3.85) (-3.81) (-0.94) (-1.25)
ln INcommonBINi 0.153*** 0.178***
(13.42) (12.27)
ln INcompleBINi 0.160***
(4.94)
lnOUTcommonBINn 0.153*** 0.966***
(13.42) (10.46)
lnOUTcompleBINn -1.261***
(-10.34)
ln INcommonWi 0.0474*** 0.0505***
(8.06) (8.38)
ln INcompleWi -0.00914**
(-3.19)
lnOUTcommonWn 0.128*** 0.0820***
(5.20) (4.14)
lnOUTcompleWn 0.0785***
(9.19)
Constant -5.147*** -5.418*** -5.147*** -0.728 -4.888*** -4.814*** -6.432*** -6.961***
(-4.88) (-4.65) (-4.88) (-0.91) (-4.69) (-4.71) (-4.80) (-5.04)
lns11,1
Constant -2.810*** -2.818*** -2.810*** -2.580*** -2.958*** -2.926*** -3.202*** -3.480***
(-9.86) (-9.87) (-9.86) (-9.34) (-10.06) (-10.02) (-9.94) (-9.57)
lns21,1
Constant -0.384*** -0.405*** -0.384*** -0.506*** -0.400*** -0.397*** -0.399*** -0.445***
(-5.14) (-5.32) (-5.14) (-5.84) (-5.45) (-5.41) (-4.88) (-4.95)
lns31,1
Constant -0.351*** -0.340*** -0.351*** -0.362*** -0.327*** -0.329*** -0.353*** -0.337***
(-7.70) (-7.79) (-7.70) (-11.23) (-6.72) (-6.82) (-12.77) (-16.27)
LRtest 1590.11 1588.19 262.82 965.41 1584.26 1516.20 1425.06 1354.23
Obs 9308 9308 9308 9308 9308 9308 9308 9308
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. t-statistics in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors.
The dependent variable Countni,t represents the 5-year cumulate count of greenﬁeld FDI from country i to country n.
Zero ﬂows are excluded by the log-linearization, even if their occurrence is riible, due to the selection of i country, that
only include 20 OECD countries that where among the top investor in the period considered (Japan, China, and Italy
are excluded). Full country list can be found in the main text.
Estimates refer to a 3-level regression with random intercepts. Diads are nested in networks, all nested in time.
LRtest refers to the log-likelihood Ratio test of the multilevel speciﬁcation against the linear model (Rabe-Hesketh and
Skrondal, 2012): rejecting the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence between the standard OLS/FE estimates suggests that
the multilevel model is suitable to the data.
Notice: all equations include distance (in logs); per capita GDP (in logs) of both i an n; three dummies for contiguity,
colonial history, and common legal system; and a constant. Al coeﬃcients are shown in the full table in the empirical
appendix.
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Table d-3: Full Coeﬃcients Replica of table 2.3
Dep. Var. : FDI Count5y
ni,t
lnMighigh
ni,t
0.246*** 0.235*** 0.255*** 0.221*** 0.323*** 0.259***
(15.40) (18.04) (14.11) (28.40) (13.22) (8.44)
lndistni -0.133*** -0.0960*** -0.134*** -0.158*** -0.0128 -0.119
+
(-4.74) (-3.67) (-4.72) (-5.26) (-0.15) (-1.76)
lnGDPci 0.327*** 0.367*** 0.340*** 0.339*** 0.643*** 0.278***
(4.79) (5.50) (4.94) (4.65) (8.20) (3.31)
lnGDPcn 0.202*** 0.134*** 0.198*** 0.105*** 0.287*** 0.213***
(5.71) (5.75) (5.64) (8.34) (37.14) (16.00)
contigni 0.839*** 1.063*** 0.844*** 0.791*** 0.990*** 1.190***
(17.93) (29.05) (18.50) (9.34) (13.19) (13.80)
colonyni 0.143 0.282** 0.149 0.278* 0.119 0.237*
(1.54) (2.66) (1.56) (2.46) (1.18) (2.19)
comlegni -0.0428*** -0.0280* -0.0567*** 0.0343
+ -0.0541+ -0.168**
(-3.58) (-2.06) (-3.93) (-1.74) (-1.73) (-2.70)
lnEigenwi 0.0649***
(14.65)
lnEigenwn 0.0750***
(8.25)
lnPageRanki 0.0342**
(3.10)
lnPageRankn 0.352***
(5.08)
lnBonacichi 0.224***
(12.32)
lnBonacichn 0.0357
(1.15)
Constant -4.172*** -3.991*** -4.397*** -1.197* -9.650*** -4.057***
(-3.90) (-4.31) (-3.79) (-2.33) (-5.37) (-7.80)
lns11,1
Constant -3.330*** -3.062*** -3.025*** -2.492*** -21.74 -2.651***
(-9.93) (-9.87) (-10.06) (-8.81) (-0.01) (-4.02)
lns21,1
Constant -0.404*** -0.420*** -0.403*** -0.577*** -0.0682 -0.206*
(-5.63) (-5.00) (-5.36) (-5.28) (-0.01) (-2.17)
lns31,1
Constant -0.324*** -0.344*** -0.320*** -0.292*** -0.535 -0.603***
(-6.33) (-10.79) (-6.87) (-38.36) (-0.02) (-5.41)
LRtest 1431.60 1475.05 1497.73 1246.31 121.43 156.87
Obs 9308 9225 9308 9225 1514 1972
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. t-statistics in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors.
The dependent variable Countni,t represents the 5-year cumulate count of greenﬁeld FDI from country i to country n.
Zero ﬂows are excluded by the log-linearization, even if their occurrence is riible, due to the selection of i country, that
only include 20 OECD countries that where among the top investor in the period considered (Japan, China, and Italy
are excluded). Full country list can be found in the main text.
Estimates refer to a 3-level regression with random intercepts. Diads are nested in networks, all nested in time.
LRtest refers to the log-likelihood Ratio test of the multilevel speciﬁcation against the linear model (Rabe-Hesketh and
Skrondal, 2012): rejecting the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence between the standard OLS/FE estimates suggests that
the multilevel model is suitable to the data.
Notice: all equations include distance (in logs); per capita GDP (in logs) of both i an n; three dummies for contiguity,
colonial history, and common legal system; and a constant. Al coeﬃcients are shown in the full table in the empirical
appendix.
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Table d-4: Full Coeﬃcients Replica of table 2.4
Dep. Var. : FDI Count5y
ni,t
lnMighigh
ni,t
0.246*** 0.244*** 0.215*** 0.265*** 0.224*** 0.221***
(14.08) (17.45) (13.43) (15.52) (23.66) (22.84)
lndistni -0.136*** -0.111*** -0.133*** -0.122*** -0.160*** -0.160***
(-4.82) (-4.14) (-4.84) (-4.39) (-5.10) (-5.07)
lnGDPci 0.354*** 0.357*** 0.364*** 0.328*** 0.342*** 0.367***
(5.16) (5.26) (5.09) (6.53) (4.86) (5.32)
lnGDPcn 0.202*** 0.144*** 0.141*** 0.196*** 0.109*** 0.110***
(5.74) (4.68) (4.53) (5.64) (8.14) (8.25)
ln contigni 0.853*** 1.034*** 1.063*** 0.840*** 0.968*** 0.977***
(17.66) (30.30) (27.40) (17.38) (20.55) (19.82)
ln colonyni 0.119 0.214* 0.161 0.173
+ 0.325** 0.311*
(1.22) (2.16) (1.57) (1.71) (2.75) (2.56)
ln comleni -0.0384** -0.0381** 0.00323 -0.0630*** -0.0255 -0.0200
-3.11) (-2.64) -0.30) (-4.52) -1.38) -1.10)
lnHubBINi 0.764*** 1.211***
(7.64) (13.08)
lnAuthBINn 0.153*** 0.183***
(12.39) (15.35)
lnHubwi -0.0173 0.0198***
(-1.41) (8.67)
lnAuthwn 0.138*** 0.140***
(5.93) (6.02)
Constant -4.506*** -4.155*** -3.580** -4.625*** -2.315*** -2.468***
(-4.10) (-4.03) (-3.24) (-4.94) (-3.38) (-3.69)
lns11,1
Constant -3.070*** -2.806*** -2.755*** -3.041*** -2.611*** -2.627***
(-10.13) (-9.85) (-9.86) -10.02) (-9.20) (-9.22)
lns21,1
Constant -0.400*** -0.391*** -0.401*** -0.396*** -0.478*** -0.475***
(-5.51) (-5.42) (-6.12) (-5.15) (-4.67) (-4.66)
lns31,1
Constant -0.326*** -0.349*** -0.354*** -0.324*** -0.338*** -0.340***
(-6.25) (-7.72) (-5.88) (-7.68) (-57.17) (-52.20)
LRtest 1404.52 1554.88 1456.09 1452.04 1307.76 1219.01
Obs 9308 9225 9225 9308 9225 9225
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. t-statistics in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors.
The dependent variable Countni,t represents the 5-year cumulate count of greenﬁeld FDI from country i to country n.
Zero ﬂows are excluded by the log-linearization, even if their occurrence is riible, due to the selection of i country, that
only include 20 OECD countries that where among the top investor in the period considered (Japan, China, and Italy
are excluded). Full country list can be found in the main text.
Estimates refer to a 3-level regression with random intercepts. Diads are nested in networks, all nested in time.
LRtest refers to the log-likelihood Ratio test of the multilevel speciﬁcation against the linear model (Rabe-Hesketh and
Skrondal, 2012): rejecting the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence between the standard OLS/FE estimates suggests that
the multilevel model is suitable to the data.
Notice: all equations include distance (in logs); per capita GDP (in logs) of both i an n; three dummies for contiguity,
colonial history, and commonegal system; and a constant. Al coeﬃcients are shown in the full table in the empirical
appendix.
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Table d-5: Full Coeﬃcients Replica of table 2.5
Dep. Var. : FDI Count5y
ni,t
lnMighigh
ni,t
0.263*** 0.259*** 0.214*** 0.234***
(16.79) (17.22) (26.53) (20.15)
lndistni -0.129*** -0.138*** -0.151*** -0.144***
(-4.94) (-5.37) (-5.18) (-5.11)
lnGDPci 0.338*** 0.333*** 0.336*** 0.341***
(5.48) (5.16) (4.73) (4.82)
lnGDPcn 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.187*** 0.174***
(5.59) (5.55) (5.85) (5.50)
ln contigni 0.835*** 0.829*** 0.770*** 0.787***
(16.35) (16.83) (13.40) (14.19)
ln colonyni 0.167
+ 0.161+ 0.296** 0.218*
(1.75) (1.73) (2.75) (2.26)
ln comlegni -0.0669*** -0.0687*** -0.0273 -0.0434*
(-5.97) (-5.51) -1.33) (-2.35)
lnANNDININi 0.115
+
(1.94)
lnANNDINOUTi 0.177***
(4.63)
lnANNDOUTINn -1.782***
(-5.75)
lnANNDOUTOUTn -2.604***
(-6.53)
Constant -5.030*** -5.049*** 4.463*** 6.837***
(-4.30) (-4.56) (6.03) (8.39)
lns11,1
Constant -3.069*** -3.080*** -2.830*** -2.543***
-10.06) -10.09) (-9.27) (-9.02)
lns21,1
Constant -0.398*** -0.403*** -0.578*** -0.468***
(-5.28) (-5.47) (-4.31) (-4.71)
lns31,1
Constant -0.323*** -0.321*** -0.273*** -0.311***
(-7.42) (-7.02) (-42.65) (-17.71)
LRtest 1524.86 1540.36 1218.00 1382.94
Obs 9308 9308 9308 9308
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. t-statistics in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors.
The dependent variable Countni,t represents the 5-year cumulate count of greenﬁeld FDI from country i to country n.
Zero ﬂows are excluded by the log-linearization, even if their occurrence is riible, due to the selection of i country, that
only include 20 OECD countries that where among the top investor in the period considered (Japan, China, and Italy
are excluded). Full country list can be found in the main text.
Estimates refer to a 3-level regression with random intercepts. Diads are nested in networks, all nested in time.
LRtest refers to the log-likelihood Ratio test of the multilevel speciﬁcation against the linear model (Rabe-Hesketh and
Skrondal, 2012): rejecting the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence between the standard OLS/FE estimates suggests that
the multilevel model is suitable to the data.
Notice: all equations include distance (in logs); per capita GDP (in logs) of both i an n; three dummies for contiguity,
colonial history, and common legal system; and a constant. Al coeﬃcients are shown in the full table in the empirical
appendix.
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Pairwise correlation
Table d-6: Local Centrality: Network Pairwise Correlation Annex to table 2.1
Mig_ni, thigh INDEGi OUTDEGn INSTRi OUTSTRi
Mig_ni, thigh 1
INDEGi -0.0431* 1
OUTDEGn 0.2110* -0.1654* 1
INSTRi 0.3737* -0.1302* 0.0136 1
OUTSTRi 0.2170* -0.0934* 0.5672* 0.0122 1
* p = 0.05
Pairwise correlations between network dimensions, computed on the estimation sample (including ﬂows from the IAB-
20 to the rest of the world, including IAB-20 countries).
Table d-7: Overlapping Links: Network Pairwise Correlation Annex to table 2.2
Mig
high
ni,t
INcommonBINi INcomple
BIN
i OUTcommon
BIN
n OUTcomple
BIN
n
Mighigh
ni,t
1
INcommonBINi 0.0869* 1
INcompleBINi 0.0295* -0.2533* 1
OUTcommonBINn 0.3229* 0.5614* -0.0377* 1
OUTcompleBINn -0.2664* -0.0986* 0.0901* -0.4289* 1
INcommonWi 0.3718* 0.2991* 0.0245* 0.3475* -0.4864*
INcompleWi 0.2128* -0.2549* 0.1867* 0.0011 -0.5402*
OUTcommonWn 0.1628* 0.1773* 0.0468* 0.4923* -0.2002*
OUTcompleWn 0.1890* -0.0516* 0.0864* 0.2297* -0.1491*
INcommonWi INcomple
W
i OUTcommon
W
n OUTcomple
W
n
INcommonWi 1
INcompleWi 0.1768* 1
OUTcommonWn 0.0580* -0.0282* 1
OUTcompleWn -0.0042 0.01 0.2742* 1
* p = 0.05
Pairwise correlations between network dimensions, computed on the estimation sample (including ﬂows from the IAB-
20 to the rest of the world, including IAB-20 countries).
Table d-8: Prestige: Network Pairwise Correlation Annex to table 2.3
Mighigh
ni,t
Eigenwi Eigen
w
n PageRanki PageRankn Bonacichi Bonacichn
Mighigh
ni,t
1
Eigenwi 0.3058* 1
Eigenwn 0.0573* 0.005 1
PageRanki 0.3568* 0.7889* -0.0029 1
PageRankn 0.1312* -0.0035 0.4333* -0.0153 1
Bonacichi 0.009 0.0909* -0.0071 0.0626* -0.0051 1
Bonacichn 0.0021 -0.0121 -0.0084 -0.0008 0.0199 0.0890* 1
* p = 0.05
Pairwise correlations between network dimensions, computed on the estimation sample (including ﬂows from the IAB-
20 to the rest of the world, including IAB-20 countries).
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Table d-9: Authority: Network Pairwise Correlation Annex to table 2.4
Mighigh
ni,t
HubBINi Auth
BIN
n Hub
W
i Auth
W
n
Mighigh
ni,t
1
HubBINi 0.2250* 1
AuthBINn 0.0880* -0.0377* 1
HubWi 0.0338* 0.5556* -0.0117 1
AuthWn 0.0418* -0.015 0.1421* -0.0009 1
* p = 0.05
Pairwise correlations between network dimensions, computed on the estimation sample (including ﬂows from the IAB-
20 to the rest of the world, including IAB-20 countries).
Table d-10: Neighbors Importance: Network Pairwise Correlation Annex to table 2.5
Mighighni,t ANND
ININ
i ANND
INOUT
i ANND
OUTIN
n ANND
OUTOUT
n
Mighighni,t 1
ANNDININi 0.1023* 1
ANNDINOUTi 0.2014* 0.9022* 1
ANNDOUTINn -0.1861* -0.1456* -0.1177* 1
ANNDOUTOUTn -0.1729* -0.1078* -0.0790* 0.8474* 1
* p = 0.05
Pairwise correlations between network dimensions, computed on the estimation sample (including ﬂows from the IAB-
20 to the rest of the world, including IAB-20 countries).
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Chapter 3
The Heterogenous Impacts of Cultural
Preferences on Bilateral M&A ﬂows
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) constitute an
increasingly important factor for economic growth. Thus, understanding the mecha-
nisms that regulate cross border ﬁnancial ﬂows is a matter of the utter importance.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature by focusing on the existence of quan-
titative heterogenous patterns in cross-border investment ﬂows. Indeed, with very few
notable exceptions, none of the studies reviewed considered the possibility that bilateral
FDI might respond to economic, institutional, and cultural stimuli in diﬀerentiated ways
according to their size. This chapter explores the extent of such heterogeneity, posing
particular attention to the analysis of the non constant Explicit Cultural Preferences
and of Cultural Proximity on bilateral M&A ﬂows. By applying a Longitudinal Censored
Quantile regression with high dimensional ﬁxed eﬀects to estimate a fully consistent grav-
ity model of M&A, I explore the extent of such form of non-linearity, and discuss its
potential policy implications. The results suggest that diﬀerent stimuli do aﬀect M&A
ﬂows in a heterogenous way. It emerges that such heterogeneity is stronger when the
asymmetric and time varying components of Cultrual Proximity are considered, in whose
respect FDI ﬂows appear to diﬀerentiate both qualitatively and quantitatively. While
qualitative heterogeneity (which refers to the diﬀerences across diﬀerent modes of inter-
nationalization) is well acknowledged and extensively discussed in the existing literature,
the possibility that the diﬀerent drivers of FDI might not to be stable according to the
size of the bilateral ﬂow has remained substantially unexplored.
Keywords: Mergers and Acquisitions, Gravity, Heterogeneity, Censored Quantile, Cultural Pref-
erences.
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3.1 Introduction
The active promotion of cross-border investments (either inward or outward) is an often high-
order priority in the development strategy of many countries worldwide. For this reason, un-
derstanding the determinants of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), as well as the potentially
diﬀerentiated impacts those factors have on the various types of investment is highly relevant
under an economic policy perspective. Indeed, the entry mode of foreign ﬁrms crucially de-
termines the favour with which a recipient economy receive them. While greenﬁeld FDI are
generally favourably welcome by the public opinion, the acquisition of a existing ﬁrms often
raises perplexities in recipient countries.1 This thing is made even more relevant considering
that Mergers and Acquisitions (henceforth M&A) constitute the lion's share of overall Foreign
Direct Investments. In 1997, M&A added up to roughly 60% of total investment ﬂows worldwide
(UNCTAD, 1998), topping more than two third of total FDI ﬂows in the early 2000s. Indeed,
M&A sustained FDI ﬁgures despite the substantial drop recorded by their greenﬁeld counterpart,
as a consequence of the global ﬁnancial crisis (UNCTAD, 2017).
Also qualitatively speaking, M&A diﬀer from greenﬁeld FDI (analyzed in the ﬁrst chapter of
this thesis). Not only M&A appears to be more reversible that greenﬁelds (Sula and Willett,
2009), but also usually reﬂect diﬀerent investment strategies: for instance, they constitute an
important source of technological acquisition.2.
This chapter resumes the analysis of the ﬁrst one, focusing on the role of Cultural Proximity
(CP) on M&A. Despite a growing interest on the impact of common cultural traits on economic
exchanges, the way CP and its diﬀerent components ultimately aﬀect bilateral exchanges in
general, and bilateral FDI in particular is not yet entirely clear. Indeed, while most of the recent
theoretical contributions acknowledge the time varying, directed, and potentially asymmetric
eﬀects of CP (intended as a social and cognitive construct) on bilateral economic exchanges,
the existing empirical studies fail (with few notable exceptions) to consistently include those
dimensions into the frame. As a result, there is a shortage of empirical evidence of the relative
impact of the several dimensions of CP on economic exchanges and investment decisions. I
extend the analysis conducted in Chapter 1 in at least two main directions.
On the one side, it investigates the role of CP on a diﬀerent type of investments (Mergers and
Acquisitions - M&A), which are likely to be aﬀected diﬀerently by the directed and time vary-
ing components of CP (deﬁned in terms of Explicit Cultural Preferences - EP) as captured by
trade in cultural goods (Disdier et al., 2010).3 On the other side, this chapter acknowledges the
1For instance, UNCTAD (2016) reports several examples of domestic economic policies aimed at defending
strategic sectors from foreign acquitsition. Even wealthier economies such as France, the US, and Germany to
mention a few impose limitations under a national economic strategy perspective.
2This point explains why M&A are particularly relevant for developing countries, as well as why they are
often perceived as a threat in developed countries. Partial conﬁrmation of such diﬀerences can be found in some
recent estimates by Global Finance. According to them, M&A from developing countries exceeded those coming
from the richer economies in 2012 (197,003 millions US$ versus 151,752 millions US$ respectively). See https:
//www.gfmag.com/global-data/economic-data/value-of-cross-border-maa-by-region-country
3With explicit cultural preferences, I refer to the possibility of an economic agent to signal a positive attitude
toward a potential partner, which might imply the possibility for a preferential economic treatment. Think for
instance of bilateral trade and the related consumption of foreign goods: by consuming those goods which are
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quantitative heterogeneity of bilateral investments data, and adopts an alternative analytical ap-
proach to take it into consideration within a structural gravity framework. Indeed, heterogeneity
exists in at least two forms. Investment ﬂows diﬀerentiate in terms of composition (qualitative
heterogeneity): investments in diﬀerent sectors are likely to respond diﬀerently to economic and
bilateral relationship between two countries, as much as diﬀerent types of investments have dif-
ferent impacts in a recipient economies. But bilateral FDI ﬂows might also be quantitatively
heterogeneous (in terms of size of the single investment as much as in terms of aggregate bilateral
ﬂows): in this respect, the same factors and conditions could aﬀect diﬀerently bilateral corridors
depending on their duration and size. Nonetheless, as asserted by Baltagi and Egger (2016), bi-
lateral FDI channels are characterizad by very diﬀeret dimension and maturity: for this reason,
it is likely that not all bilateral economic partnerships are dominated by the same mechanisms
(or more precisely, they are likely to respond diﬀerently to the same mechanisms). While qualita-
tive heterogeneity is well acknowledged by the existing literature (for instance Chan and Zheng,
2017, discuss the type-speciﬁc impact of migrants network on FDI), its quantitative counterpart
remains largely unexplored, despite it could lead to severe data issues, and very few empirical
studies paid attention to such issue. Starting from the theoretical and empirical contribution
of Head and Ries (2008), which I conveniently adapt to deal with the potential nonlinearities
brough in by heterogeneity, I apply a High Dimensional Fixed Eﬀects (HDFE) Censored Quantile
estimator (CQReg) (Powell, 1984, 1986; Chernozhukov and Hong, 2003; Canay, 2011; Figueiredo
et al., 2014, 2015, among others) to investigate the eﬀect EP on bilateral M&A. The advantage
with respect to common mean value estimator (such as PPML, Negative Binomial, or Pooled
OLS) lies in the fact that HDFE-CQReg makes it possible to explore the non-constancy of the
explanatory variables along the distribution on the response one, allowing at the same time their
identiﬁcation and estimate in presence of both a large set of FE, and of a large fraction of null
ﬂows. Controlling for the overdispersion of bilateral M&A data, as much as for the large share of
null ﬂows and the multilateral resistance terms, EP appear to maintain a signiﬁcant and quan-
titatively important eﬀect on bilateral M&A. However the asymmetric patterns advocated by
Shenkar (2001) and conﬁrmed by the analysis in the ﬁrst chapter for greenﬁeld FDI is not statis-
tically signiﬁcant for M&A. The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2
reviews the state of the art of both (a) the evolution of gravity analysis as applied to cross-border
investment ﬂows; and (b) the summary of the empirical evidence about CP as a determinant
of bilateral economic exchanges. Section 3.3 presents the conceptual framework. The empirical
methodology, the description of the data and the discussion of the results are reported in sections
3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 respectively. Finally, section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Cultural Proximity and Bilateral Economic Exchanges
The economic interactions between countries are highly aﬀected by distance (either physical or
not), which is a crucial determinant of transaction costs. Until the advent of both the trans-
likely to be chosen from a basket of potential alternative and relatively homogeneous products, a certain country
may be signaling a preference for a precise economic partner (everything else equal).
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portation and the ICT revolutions, geography constituted the main obstacle to economic ex-
changes (Tinbergen, 1962), but it progressively lost importance in favor of other forms of re-
moteness/proximity. Such forms of unnatural frictions (Bergstrand and Egger, 2013) proved to
aﬀect economic exchanges with a magnitude comparable to that of geography. Cultural Proxim-
ity (CP) belongs to this broad category of intangible frictions. Nonetheless, unlike other forms
of non-physical construct, the economic literature is still far from reaching an agreement of the
dimensions that deﬁne it. Economists explored the impact of several measures of cultural simi-
larity on economic exchanges. Linguistic similarity is one of the ﬁrst and more explored proxy
of CP. Speaking the same language is an important mean of cultural transmission and generally
implies a certain degree of historical co-evolution between peoples.4 For instance, it reduces the
cost for collecting information while facilitating at the same time the transmission of non-coded
knowledge across countries. Melitz and Toubal (2014) thoroughly explored the relationship be-
tween linguistic similarity and trade, by constructing a set of measures of linguistic similarity
between countries. Controlling for many potential confounding factors, they ﬁnd a positive and
statistically signiﬁcant impact of language on both trade and migration ﬂows. Interestingly, they
detect a stronger role of common spoken idioms as opposed to oﬃcial language. Similarly, Ad-
sera and Pytlikova (2015) ﬁnd that migration is increasing in the degree of linguistic proximity:
after diﬀerentiating between oﬃcial and common spoken language, they conclude the latter to
be much more closely related to CP with respect to the former. To the best of my knowledge
no existing study explicitly focuses on the eﬀect of linguistic proximity on international invest-
ment ﬂows, despite all models of bilateral FDI exchange include a measure of linguistic similarity
(that usually maintains a positive and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. See Guiso et al., 2009;
Aggarwal et al., 2012; Chakraborty et al., 2017, among others.)5. Religion constitute another
milestone of a country's national identity (and therefore of its culture): beliefs, social norms
and even legislation are often aﬀected (in some cases directly, think of the Sharia, in other cases
indirectly) by it. Helble (2007) and Lewer and Van den Berg (2007) investigate the impacts of
diﬀerent religious beliefs on economic growth, and the role of religious mixing and similarity on
bilateral trade across countries. They both detect a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of
religious proximity on economic exchanges.6 Lee and Park (2015) explore the eﬀects of religious
beliefs on trade in services, reaching the same conclusions. CP is also positively associated with
the presence of ethnicity-based bonds. Among others, Felbermayr and Toubal (2010) include
a measure of ethnic proximity to control for a potential ethnicity bias. Hofstede (1991, 2003)
considers ethnic and genetic similarity (see for instance Cavalli-Sforza et al., 1988) while build-
ing his multidimensional index of CP, while Melitz and Toubal (2018) study the relationship
4Though the spread of colonial empires in the past loosened the relationship between language and historical
co-evolution: thus, using national oﬃcial languages often captures diﬀerent mechanisms, unrelated to cultural
proximity.
5Language is a mean through which information circulate, and it may increase reciprocal trust. However, it
does not provide any tool to interpret the way people with diﬀerent cultural background think or behave. For
this reason, despite the high correlation between language and culture, the former should be better considered as
a consequence of cultural proximity, not as a component of it.
6They also ﬁnd that economic outcomes are positively associated to religious variety within a country, while
the existence of a dominant religion, once controlled for any other factors, deters economic growth and exchanges
with countries that do not share the same beliefs
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between somatic distance and trust on trade. Still, genetic similarity does not directly aﬀect CP
(even if it might denote geographical proximity). Rather, it implies a certain degree of physical
similarity, which in turn favors trust and appreciation between people that visually recognize
each other as close. However, the mechanisms linking genetic similarity to cultural proximity
are not clear cut: it is plausible that people from the same ethnic group share the same cultural
background, but they are likely to derive from a broader national identity. Genetic distance is
more likely to capture other trust-related mechanisms, diﬀerent from those triggered by (prop-
erly deﬁned) culture. Despite both Language, religion, and ethnicity capture diﬀerent relevant
aspects of the cultural identity of a country. In general, there is a substantial lack of clarity on
the nature of CP itself, and neither language nor religion or ethnicity is able to fully account
for culture and its impact on bilateral exchanges (in particular, bilateral greenﬁeld FDI). To
begin with, both the international business (Shenkar, 2001; Tung and Verbeke, 2010, among the
others) and economic geography literature (Boschma et al., 2016) began to question the idea of
reciprocity, which is still largely (implicitly) accepted in the majority of the empirical economic
literature. Second, there is little awareness regarding the speed to which cultural proximity
evolves. This in turn translates into the fact that most of the common empirical proxies of bilat-
eral CP present a very reduced variability over time. Despite the fact that certain phenomena
(think of the progressive shift in the religious and linguistic composition of a society in response
to migratory inﬂows from abroad) are characterized by slowly adapting processes, these cannot
be considered the only channels through which cultural aﬃnity evolves over time. For instance,
there may be events generating sudden shifts in perceived proximity that cannot be explained
in terms of the cultural dimensions usually considered by international economists. Finally, the
existing evidence is quite vague on the possibility for cultural aﬃnity to be reversible in the long
term, especially when some  culturally disruptive event (such as a fashion) takes place. To
put it diﬀerently, there is no assessed evidence on whether events leading to sudden changes in
the perceived attractiveness of a country for a potential economic partner generate irreversible,
self-reinforcing shifts in perceived CP, rather than a temporary deviation from its long term
trends7. Thus, the usual deﬁnitions of CP are substantially limited. First, they appears to be
more closely related to trust rather than to cultural perceptions. For instance, speaking the same
language lowers the barriers to gather and exploit information, and at the same time it helps
communicating and sharing non-tacit knowledge. Sharing the same (or similar) religious prac-
tices deﬁnes the system of beliefs and the domain of what is considered as socially acceptable:
for this reason, sharing the same set of moral rules helps understand each other, and makes it
easier for an economic actor to anticipate the behavior of a potential (economic) partner. Second,
the proxies of CP discussed so far tend to be perfectly reciprocal, and only deﬁne whether two
countries are objectively similar between each other. But, economic actors may respond to such
similarity in diﬀerent ways, making it more or less eﬀective at determining economic exchanges.
Recently, the issue of imperfect reciprocity has been tackled resorting to directed measures of
7Dixit (1989), Baldwin (1988), and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) among others extended the idea of hysteresis,
formerly related to the analysis of unemployment in the labor market (Blanchard, 1986), to capture this kind of
phenomena in international trade.
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explicit aﬃnity between countries8. Guiso et al. (2009) analyze the impact of declared reciprocal
trust on economic exchanges within (a restricted number of) European countries. They show
how trust is strongly related to all those dimensions of objective cultural similarity, and how it
ultimately aﬀects bilateral economic exchanges across countries (Spring and Grossmann, 2016,
extended the same framework to human mobility).9 The idea of using declared reciprocal trust
between countries as a proxy for the asymmetric component of CP constitutes the ﬁrst attempt
to overcome the reduction of CP to a measure of pure similarity. In fact, similarity represents
just one of the building block of cultural proximity. Dealing with such dimension alone does
not allow to consider neither the way a country perceives and evaluate such similarity, nor the
existence of events aﬀecting those perceptions.10 In the deﬁnition of CP that I adopt here (and
in Chapter 1), similarity represents a component of a more complex construct that considers also
the role of the culture-based aﬃnity between countries. I deﬁne the latter component in terms of
explicit cultural preferences (EP), which capture the way culture is perceived as opposed to how
it is.11 In this sense, such deﬁnition encompasses the idea of psychic distance/proximity (Dow
and Ferencikova, 2010), which complements the idea of cultural similarity usually adopted in the
related economic literature. As a matter of fact, psychic distance relates to the set of factors
preventing or disturbing the ﬂow of information between ﬁrms and the market. Examples of
such factors are diﬀerences in language, culture, political systems, level of education, level of
industrial development[...]. According to (Tung and Verbeke, 2010) there is no evidence for
these factors to be time invariant, symmetric, nor undirected: there might be some occurrences,
events, innovations, fashions, etc., which change (temporarily or permanently) the way a country
is perceived by its counterparts, with no need for any change to occurr in the way such country
perceives the others. Take for instance the election of a particularly meaningful candidate to a
political rally. Despite the absence of any remarkable changes under any other observable (and
possibly unobservable) cultural dimension, the electoral turnover might trigger a major change
in the way a country is perceived abroad. Capturing such directed and time varying phenomenon
requires something more than the traditional bilateral and symmetric measures of CP. To the
best of my knowledge, there have been only three other attempt to extend the deﬁnition of CP
beyond the pure cultural similarity (apart from declared trust). Disdier et al. (2010) use trade
in cultural goods to investigate patterns in bilateral trade across OECD countries. Adopting a
diﬀerent perspective, Felbermayr and Toubal (2010) use the average Eurovision Song Contest
scores awarded in each country to the competitors from abroad: they found evidence of imperfect
reciprocity in the cultural relationship, and investigated the eﬀects brought by that asymmetry
on bilateral trade. Finally, Hellmanzik and Schmitz (2017) developed the idea of virtual prox-
imity as a proxy for cultural preferences. Building upon the database by Woo et al. (2011),
8See the ﬁrst chapter of this thesis for a more detailed description of the relationship between similarity and
aﬃnity.
9Objective similarity refers to cultural traits that are observable, whose identiﬁcation is (relatively) immediate:
in this sense, the language spoken in a country, its dominant religion or the religious composition of its population
represent objective dimensions.
10And hence, excludes the possibility for a government to adopt active cultural promotion policies with the
aim to foster its economic exchanges.
11A similar paradigm of EP/aﬃnity is well established in the International Business (IB) literature, that widely
accepts the idea of people and entrepreneurs taking decisions according to their personal scale of values.
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who collected data on bilateral hyperlink connections for a sample of nearly 90 countries in two
points in time, they test the relevance of the informative channel created by the Internet as a
driver for cross border bilateral portfolio investments. All these studies, in line with Guiso et
al. (2009), state that proximate cultural tastes boost bilateral trade and cross border portfolio
investments beyond the role of traditional measures of CP. Finally, in chapter 1 I extend the anal-
ysis of Felbermayr and Toubal (2010) using trade in cultural goods as proxy for explicit cultural
preferences (as proposed by Disdier et al., 2010). I ﬁnd evidence that both direction and time
variability play an important role in shaping the mechanisms through which CP aﬀects bilateral
Greenﬁeld FDI ﬂows. In what follows, similarly to what I do in Chapter 1, I refer to cultural
proximity as the system of shared practices and norms able to reduce both the costs of commu-
nication and the eﬀort required to source and interpret information about potential economic
partners, beyond the tangible aspects of geographical distance and institutional similarities. In
this sense, cultural proximity operates facilitating the ﬂow of information and the formation of
trust between countries, by providing a key to understand and interpret such information. This
is translated operatively into a deﬁnition of CP as a complex construct, where both the aspects
deﬁning cultural similarity and those aﬀecting the way such similarity is perceived by diﬀerent
economic actors coexist.12
3.3 The model
Gravity equations constitute a true workhorse of empirical economic analysis. Nonetheless, their
application has long being subject to an important limitation, inherently the absence of a sound
theory to refer to. This point has been highlighted by Kleinert and Toubal (2010), which demon-
strated how very diﬀerent thoeretical foundations (and therefore, very diﬀerent interpretationss)
can originate almost identical empirical gravity equations.13 To rule out any ambiguity, I borrow
the theoretical foundation from the structural gravity equation of bilateral M&A proposed by
Head and Ries (2008) (hereafter H&R2008). I expand the original model extending their deﬁni-
tion of distance in order to explicitly focus on CP, to distinguish between cultural similarity and
aﬃnity. While the former refers to the existence of an objective shared cultural trait, the latter
alludes to the possibility that a people appreciates a foreign economic partner beyond the exis-
tence of an observable cultural similarity between them. The empirical gravity equation is then
re-adapted to explicitly deal with the potential heterogeneity (via quantile estimation) of bilateral
12See Chapter 1 for a detailed discussion on the mechanisms.
13This fact explains why just in 1984, Deardoﬀ claimed that the lack of a compelling theoretical ground for
the interpretation of the results was a suﬃcient reason not to use this class of models for predictive, as well
as for analytical purposes. Indeed, the importance of a sound theoretical mechanism for the empirical analysis
is straightforward. In a proximity-concentration trade oﬀ (Brainard, 1997), the role played by geographic and
institutional factors is crucial in driving the decision to invest as an alternative to export directly. As geographic
distance captures part of the transportation costs associated to bilateral trade, we could expect it to have a
negative coeﬃcient. However, the role of distance becomes less obvious when the decision is no longer whether to
export or not, but whether to export or the set up/purchase a productive plant abroad. Everything else equal,
a MNE planning to serve a larger portion of the global market may decide to set up a new productive plant
abroad (export-platform hypothesis) in order to reduce the average transportation costs toward all the potential
destination markets. In this case, we can expect distance to positively aﬀect bilateral FDI (it is interesting that
despite few notable exceptions, this has rarely been the case in empirical FDI gravity.)
129
The Heterogenous Impacts of Cultural Preferences on Bilateral M&A flows
aggregate M&A ﬂows and the multilateral resistance terms (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003;
Baier and Bergstrand, 2007; Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006) in the context of longitudinal data.
To the best of my knowledge, this study represents the ﬁrst application of a High Dimensional
Fixed Eﬀects (HDFE) Censored Quantile Estimator (CQreg) (Powell, 1984; Chernozhukov and
Hong, 2003; Canay, 2011) to the analysis of investment ﬂows in general, and to the study of the
cultural drivers of bilateral M&A in particular.
3.3.1 The Head and Ries model
The model hinges on the trade-oﬀ between the remunerativity of an asset and the geographic
remoteness of with respect to the head quarter (HQ). The model steps from an inspection game
framework, played between a multinational corporation (MNE)'s HQ and its subsidiary (SUB).
Both players simultaneously choose their behavior anticipating strategically their opponents po-
tential decision. The HQ produces a ﬁxed output a >> 0 with no uncertainty. The SUB's local
manager has to choose between playing fair with the HQ (e > 0) and shirking: in the ﬁrst case, it
produces an output b, which sums up to the HQ total production. For this, the HQ compensates
the SUB for her eﬀort with w (b > w > e). Since the two players decide simoultaneously, there is
the possibility for the SUB to shirk, in order to get compensated without actually spending any
eﬀort. Knowing that the local manager may ﬁnd convenient to shirk provided she can go away
with it, the HQ decides whether to monitor (spending c > 0) or to trust the SUB's manager. The
payoﬀ structure is such that no pure strategy could credibly represent an equilibrium: should
the HQ always verify, the SUB would anticipate her behavior and would cooperate. Conversely,
should the HQ always trusts, the SUB would have no incentive to apply any eﬀort. Table 3.1
summarizes the payoﬀ structure
Table 3.1: Inspection Game's Payoﬀ Structure
HQ
SUB
w, a-w 0, a-c Shirk (x)
w-e; a+b-w w-e, a+b-w-c Work (1-x)
Trust (1-y) Verify (y)
Structure of the payoﬀ in the original game. By construction, a > b > w > e > c: this setting does not allow any pure
strategy to be pursued, so that no pure strategy represents a Nash equilibrium.
The table replicates table 1 in H&R2008.
The optimal equilibrium consists of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, where the SUB shirks
with probability x and the HQ veriﬁes with probability y.14 The game clears solving the expected
payoﬀ functions of both player
E(v)hq = a + b(1 − x) − cy −w(1 − xy) (3.1)
14As a consequence, the only condition for the SUB not to compensated consists in a veriﬁcation process that
conﬁrm a ﬂawed behavior on her side, which takes place with probability xy > 0
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E(v)sub = w(1 − xy) − e(1 − x) (3.2)
Both HQ and SUB maximize the expected payoﬀ taking each other's strategy (and therefore, the
probability of taking a given action) as ﬁxed. Therefore, the FOC for the optimal probabilities x
and y implies the maximization of (3.1) and (3.2) with respect to y and x respectively. Setting the
derivatives for (3.1) and (3.2) equal to zero (E(v)hq,y = −c +wx = 0 and E(v)sub,x = −wy + e = 0)
allows to ﬁnd the equilibrium mixing probabilities for y and x to be equal to c/w and e/w
respectively. Substituting y = c/w and x = e/w into (3.1) yelds
E(v)hq = a + b(1 − c/w) −w (3.3)
The derivative of equation (3.3) with respect to w (the wage HQ is expected to SUB) allows to
identify the optimal remuneration w
E[w] = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
w = √bc ifcooperates
w = 0 ifshirks
, to be substituted back into equation (3.1) to ﬁnd the expected HQ's payoﬀ
E(v)sub = a + b − 2√bc (3.4)
At least two observations can be made on equation (3.4). First, the interest of a HQ for a SUB
in a certain country is negatively correlated with the expected monitoring and veriﬁcation cost
c. Second, the value of the output b produced by the SUB enters the expected payoﬀ function in
two opposite directions. On the one side, it increases the gain a HQ expects from an acquisition.
On the other side, it acts as a magnifying factor of the monitoring cost c. Assuming two similar
HQ (1 and 2 respectively) producing respectively the same output a1 = a2 = a, it derives that
the one facing the lower veriﬁcation cost c will be also able to oﬀer the higher bid. The cost
parameter c (which determines the return of the investment and therefore the optimal allocation
of investments in a country) can be assumed to be an increasing function of both geographic and
cultural factors, that sum up in a distance vector Din, included within c's' remoteness function.
15 The remoteness function takes the form
cni = [r(Dni)/2]2, r′ > 0 (3.5)
Substituting equation (3.5) into (3.4) shows the existence of an ability/proximity trade-oﬀ, which
15Though the formulation is elastic enough to allow for alterantive deﬁnitions of distance: indeed, it could be
extended to include many other diﬀerent measures of institutional similarity (Aleksynska and Havrylchyk, 2013),
ﬁnancial development (Desbordes and Wei, 2017), etc.
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determines the proﬁtability for a HQ in a given country i to invest in a SUB in any other given
country n.
E(v)ni = a + b −√br(Dni) (3.6)
Thus, more distant HQs have to compensate greater costs with a higher output a (which proxies
for the ability of the HQ), in order to compete for more distant assets.
The HQ individual payoﬀs can be aggregated. Let us a global economy where MNE from all over
the world bid to gain control over potential aﬃliates through stylized auctions. In equation (3.6)
a MNE anticipates the expected return from a given investment depending on her personal
ability/proximity trade oﬀ. The expected bilateral stock of M&A owned by all HQs from a given
country i in a generic country n can be deﬁned as
FDIni = piniKn (3.7)
where pini reﬂects the probability for a HQ from country i to take over a random SUB in a given
country n, while Kn represents the total stock of existing assets in country n16. pini is assumed
to be distributed as a type-1 extreme value function (Gumbel), which allows to formulate pini
as depending on the largest potential bid (mmaxi ) that could be oﬀered by a HQ from a given
country i, without changing the functional form. For the same property, the probability of the
highest bid for a random target SUB in a given country n to come from a speciﬁc country i,
depends on the probability for the maximum bidmmaxi to exceed the maximum bidm
max
j , ∀j ≠ i.
pini can be rewritten17 as
pini = exp[µi/σ+lnmi−(√bσ)rDni]∑l exp[µl/σ+lnmi−(√bσ)rDni] (3.8)
Thus pi is a function of the distribution of i's HQ over the cumulative distribution of value
added a, that also determines HQs' heterogeneity. Plugging equation (3.8) into equation (3.7)
deﬁnes the impeding eﬀect of distance, obtained by re-parametrizing the expected cost function
r(Dni) ≡ δ√b/σ with Θ ≡ δ√b/σ. In this way Θ represents a compound parameter capturing the
role of distance as a function of the inspection costs (proxied by δ, increasing in remoteness) and
the potential output value of the SUB.
The expected value of all investments for country i in the recipient economy n (E[FDIni])
depends on the share of n's assets owned by all HQs from i. This deﬁnes the bid competition
between all potential HQs worldwide to take over n's assets. Let sin ≡mi/(∑ lml) be the share of
world bidders from country i, the bid competition for a given country n's asset is represented
16The authors notice how expected bilateral M&A stocks may diﬀer from the actual bilateral ﬁgures because
of the discrete distribution of potential targets in a random country n. They refer to his process as lumpiness
17This is made possible by Gumbel's properties: in particualar, the maximum m Gumbel draw maintain the
same distribution, shifted by parameter µ = σ ln(m). Thus, pini depends on mmaxi
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by
Bn ≡ exp[µ/σ−DnIΘ]smi KnB−1n (3.9)
Equation (3.9) tells that the bid competition for country n's assets grows in the bidders concen-
tration nearby (proximity eﬀect) and in the productivity of the competitors (ability eﬀect): the
consequence of a higher competition implies that a higher share of assets will likely accrue in the
portfolio of foreign competitors of a given country i (lower pini for a given i). Thus, the expected
bilateral FDI position E[FDInI] can be deﬁned as
E[FDIni] = exp[µ/σ −DniΘ]smi KnB−1n (3.10)
Equation (3.10) resembles a gravity equation, which originates from the initial inspection game,
where expected bilateral FDI's are positively related to i and n's size (smi and Kn respectively),
and decreasing in the bilateral distance vector DinΘ. The bid competition term B
−1
n , i.e. the
multilateral resistance term, captures the diﬃculty on the side of i to take control of assets in n
due to the large number of competitive rivals from other countries, and is therefore expected to
reduce the bilateral FDI position of country i in n.
Equation (3.10) can be ﬁnally rewritten (as in Eaton and Kortum, 2001, 2002) as
E[FDIni] = exp(µ/σ + ln(smi ) + ln(Kn) − ln(Bn) −D−1ni (3.11)
, to separate origin's and destination's speciﬁc terms, to be estimated via countries' speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects (FE) to better control for the multilateral resistance terms.
3.3.2 Extending the model
Including Cultural Preferences
To explicitly address the analysis of distance and to isolate the role of explicit cultural prefer-
ences (EP) I include all those characteristics that deﬁnes cultural similarity, which are likely to
co-determine bilateral exchanges.18. To control for institutional proximity, I consider the degree
of similarity of the legal environments in both countries, the existence of a free trade agreement
18H&R2008 assume inspection costs c to be increasing in distance, they are mostly concerned about the role
of multilateral investments, so that their analysis over the role of distance was merely instrumental to include
attrition in the model. They include geographic distance (symmetric), two indicators for common colonial ties
(directed), and they control for common oﬃcial language (COL, symmetric) as a measure of cultural proximity.
However, both measures capture very similar aspects. On the one hand, they are highly correlated: in most cases,
the language of the hegemonic power has been maintained in the form of oﬃcial language by most of the newly
independent colonies. On the other hand, despite Common Oﬃcial Language (COL) does aﬀect international
ﬂows, Common Spoken Language (CSL, computed as the percentage of a certain language speakers over total
population) is much more relevant in cultural terms, as demonstrated by Melitz and Toubal (2014) and Adsera
and Pytlikova (2015)
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(FTA), and the existence of colonial ties. These measures control for the capability of an en-
trepreneur/CEO to orient herself into the bureaucratic environment of the recipient country. I
also control for the phisycal remoteness, incuding a dummy for contiguity in addition to the
usual goedesic distance.19 Finally, to control for both cultural similarity and aﬃnity I include
a variable for common religion and the two directions of bilateral cultural trade, which capture
the role of reciprocal perceived aﬃnity (in terms of explicit cultural preferences). Including the
two terms of reciprocal aﬃnity implies that I can test whether cultural proximity is actually
symmetric or not. In chapter 1 I dealt with this issue focusing on greenﬁeld FDI. However, there
is no theoretical justiﬁcation for the same mechanism to aﬀect all types of bilateral investments.
More speciﬁcally, M&A are likely to be less subject to asymmetric cultural determinants: the
size of the investment is usually smaller, and the risk is shared among diﬀerent actors (unless the
acquisition leads to a 100% ownership). In addition, the fact that the potential aﬃlate is already
operating (no matter how well it is performing) oﬀers to a potential investor the possibility to
evaluate strengths and weaknesses of the deal, allowing to make better informed investments.
For this reason, I expect the two terms of perceived aﬃnity to remain signiﬁcant, but with no
evidence of the same asymmetric patterns detected in Chapter 1.
Flows, Time, and Heterogeneity
With respect to the empirical equation, I extend H&R2008 model in three directions.
First , the original model was intended for stock data.20 As pointed out by the same authors,
A model of ﬂows requires accounting for divestitures of assets in a speciﬁcation of the adjustment
costs associated with convergence to desired FDI levels (Head and Ries, 2008, p. 6). Nonetheless,
I investigate whether explicit cultural preferences (EP) play (or do not play) a role in shaping
M&A transactions and, in case they do, whether the asymmetric patterns detected for Greenﬁeld
FDI hold for M&A too. In this sense, the model allows to extend the gravity equation to ﬂows
without any loss in terms of theoretical interpretation of the coeﬃcients.
Second , I introduce the temporal dimension, a foundamental aspect for EP. The way a
country perceives the culture of its economic partners may be driven not only by the objec-
tive/observable cultural traits (such as language, religion, historical co-evolution, etc.), but also
by temporary shocks that may either reduce or increase bilateral exchanges. Given the impor-
tance of the time variability in EP, I extend the gravity equation to take such temporal dimension
into account.
Third, the original model does not oﬀer any insight about the potential heterogeneity and the
related role of EP with respect to (a) the diﬀerent levels of the bilateral M&A; and (b) the relative
19Irrespectively of distance, contiguity may facilitate cultural transmission and assimilation. Its omission could
therefore introduce an upward bias into the estimates for both the similarity and the aﬃnity related terms.
20H&R2008 collapse ﬂow data in order to obtain an approximation of bilateral FDI stocks for one point in
time. Indeed, equation (3.10) is a stock equation that makes no prediction about the annual ﬂow level needed to
reach the observed level of FDI stock.
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importance of the EP components as opposed to other measures of distance, at diﬀerent levels of
bilateral M&A. Despite the high heterogenity of bilateral M&A, very little eﬀort has been spent
so far to identify the implications of such high dispersion (Paniagua et al., 2015; Cuadros et al.,
2016; Desbordes and Wei, 2017). I use Quantile Regression to explore how cultural proximity
(and its time varying and potentially asymmetric component, EP) shapes bilateral M&A taking
their quantitative heterogenity into account.
3.4 Empirical Framework
I adopt a censored quantile estimator with high dimensional ﬁxed eﬀects. Before discussing the
results, it is worth to discuss the appropriateness of such methodology and to review the main
challenges in the empirical estimation of gravity models.
The eﬀect of distance on bilateral M&A (and on economic exchaneg in general) is crucially
aﬀected by their heterogeneity. An investing MNE weights diﬀerently the economic conditions
of a given destination when it has some experience operating in that country with respect to a
situation in which it moves there for the ﬁrst time. In aggregate bilateral terms, this is likely
to apply as well. Economic, institutional, and cultural conditions are likely to aﬀect diﬀerently
large and well established investment corridors as opposed to small ones.
The fact that over-dispersion might hide the possibility that smaller channels are qualitatively
diﬀerent from larger ones in terms of the underlying ruling mechanisms has only been recently
acknowledged in the gravity literature. Despite the rising concern for the heterogeneity of the
determinants of bilateral economic exchanges, the related empirical evidence is still scant. With
respect to mean value estimation, quantile regression presents some interesting advantages. Con-
versely from the log-linear transformation, quantile regression is not subject to the Jensen's In-
equality. With respect to PPML, it also relaxes the strict assumption on the distribution of the
error term, which raised several concerns in the critical assessment of Martínez-Zarzoso (2013)
and Figueiredo et al. (2014). Finally, quantile decomposition generally returns robust estimates
even when the outcome of interest is highly dispersed.21 Cairns and Ker (2013) and Baltagi
and Egger (2016) estimate a structural gravity model by means of quantile regression, to as-
sess whether observable trade costs are ultimately constant across diﬀerent country pairs. As a
matter of facts, the assumption of homogeneous eﬀects is implicit in the empirical estimation of
structural gravity models. Since the estimated coeﬃcients diﬀered not only quantitatively, but
also statistically, they both concludeed that the elasticity of trade to trade costs might actually
be heterogeneous. Similarly, Paniagua et al. (2015) estimated a quantile gravity equation to
take into account the diﬀerent weight a ﬁrm attach to any potential attraction factor at country
level, depending on the size of the expected investment. They detect a substantial instability
in the coeﬃcients along the distribution of the ﬁrms size. Cuadros et al. (2016, 2019) pro-
posed two analogous application to study the role of migrants' network over bilateral FDI ﬂows.
21Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) consider the error term to be distributed as E[ηi∣x] = 1. Thus, it may
return inconsistent estimates whenever this assumption fails. Figueiredo et al. (2014) proved quantile regression
to perform better than PPML when this happens, while performing the same when the assumption over η holds.
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Consistently with the assumption of heterogeneous returns, they found that only less mature
(i.e. small) bilateral FDI channels are positively and signiﬁcantly eﬀected by migration (with
the eﬀect to be more pronounced in case of skilled migration). This is likely to occurr because
null and small FDI investment channels are more likely to be sensitive to information frictions,
which tend to be alleviated by migrants network. All those applications, the use of mean value
estimators would have prevented to detect the quantitative importance of heterogeneity. All the
studies reviewed above applied a conventional quantile estimator, which remains highly sensible
to the presence of null ﬂows. While both PPML and GPML perform relatively well in presence
of a large number of zeroes, provided the error term to be correctly speciﬁed (Santos Silva and
Tenreyro, 2011), the same does not apply to quantile regression, which is based the log-linear
transformation of the dependent variable. Since log-linearization drops null values, the lower
quantiles would be actually composed by observations which are actually ranked higher in the
real distribution of the response variable. All the studies mentioned so far ignored the pres-
ence of null ﬂows. Such limitation can be solved via censoring techniques (Powell, 1984, 1986;
Chernozhukov and Hong, 2003). Similarly to simple quantile regression, the outcome variable is
log-linearized. However, null ﬂows are considered as left-censored. Applying CQReg (in order to
retain null ﬂows), Figueiredo et al. (2014) estimate the impact of WTO membership on bilat-
eral trade. They conclude that WTO eﬀectively had a positive impact on worldwide trade. In
particular, they conclude that WTO has been particularly eﬀective at promoting small and new
trading partnerships, i.e. between countries that did not use to trade much before entering the
WTO, which beneﬁted more than well established (and large) trading channels.
I apply a CQreg model with high dimensional ﬁxed eﬀect (HDFE, Canay, 2011; Figueiredo et
al., 2014, 2015) to study the eﬀect of the diﬀerent components of CP on bilateral M&A.22
To account for censoring, I transform the dependent variable as in equation (3.12), where Cit
represents the minimum uncensored value of the dependent variable for country i in the tth
period.23
lnYCitijt = ln(max(Cit; lnYijt)) (3.12)
Coherently with the discussion in Section 3.3.2, the empirical gravity equation takes the form
log(FDI)C,τijt = βτ1 log(CulImp)ijt + βτ2 log(CulExp)ijt + ϕτ1 log(dist)ijt + ϕτ2contigijt + δτ1comlangijt+δτ2colonyijt + δτ3comreligionijt + γτ1 comlegalijt + γτ2FTAijt + υτit + ντjt + εijt
(3.13)
22The way ﬁxed eﬀects should be included in quantile estimation still represents a major concern. According
to Paniagua et al. (2015), there is no consensus on how to incorporate ﬁxed eﬀects into a longitudinal quantile
decomposition. This issue becomes problematic in gravity analysis. In this paper, I do not address this issue, but
I simply apply the methodology developed by Canay (2011).
23This methodology essentially extends to the longitudinal case the strategy proposed by Eaton and Kortum
(2001) and reported in Head and Mayer (2014)
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The βτk coeﬃcients (with k = 1,2) refer to the two EP terms (proxied by trade in cultural goods).
ϕτk, δ
τ
k , and γ
τ
k coeﬃcients refer to geographic, cultural, and institutional proximity measures
respectively, while υit and νjt account for country-time ﬁxed eﬀects for origin and destiantion
respectively. τ refers to the estimated quantile, which takes into account the heterogenity of
bilateral M&A ﬂows. Finally, εijt represents the error term.
3.4.1 Data Description
Bilateral Transactional M&A data Investment data come from the Thomson Reuters
M&A dataset, provided by the Thomson Financial Securities Data Corporation24. The dataset
contains information at origin-destination-year level of aggregation and covers all the transactions
occurred in the period between 1995 and 2011. Interestingly, the assumption of left-censoring
implied by Equation (3.12) is justiﬁed by the fact that Thomson Reuters data only records M&A
transactions which involve the transfer of at least the 50% of the equity assets. The omission of
all those investments that do not reach such threshold can be dealt with as a form of censoring.25
Thus. it is reasonable to think of a null ﬂow as either signaling the absence of any ﬂow from
a given country toward another (a real zero), or the censoring of all those deals implying less
than the 50% equity threshold.26
Geographic, Institutional, and Cultural Variables Distance and contiguity (accounting
for the facility of information to circulate as well as for the cost of monitoring), and the two
dummies for common legal system and co-participation in a free trade agreement (capturing
the ability of an investor to cope with the legal and bureaucratic environment at destination)
come from CEPII's gravdata. To capture the eﬀect of the Explicit Cultural References (EP) I use
trade in culture-intensive goods (as deﬁned by UNCTAD, 2010) allows to capture the preferential
component related the idea of perceived aﬃnity, beyond the eﬀect of actual similarity. Bilateral
trade data come from the CEPII's BACI dataset.27 Finally, the remaining cultural variables to
control for cultural similarity (the objective and observable dimensions of CP) come from CEPII's
gravdata dataset, and from Melitz and Toubal (2014), which is also available from CEPII.
Table 3.1 reports some selected descriptive statistics for the included variables.
24Data have been accessed mid 2012
25This point constitutes the main limitation of this kind of data, as for obtaining the control into the BoP it is
not necessary to possess the 50% of the equity value. For instance, the threshold set by the World Bank to capital
movements in order to be considered FDI amounts to a 10% ownership transfer of the total stock of assets.
26Both the advantages and the limitations of using transactional FDI data are further discussed in Ap-
pendix 3.A.
27In chapter 1 I discuss the pros and cons of using trade in cultural goods as a proxy of EP.
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Table 3.1: Data description: Selected summary statistics
Variable N Mean Std.Dev 25th pct Median 75th pct min MAX
Invni,t 72278 140.35 1734.65 0 0 0 0 2.07E+05
ln InvCni,t 72278 1.84 1.88 0 1.79 2.83 0 12.24
lnCultIMPni,t 72278 0.18 3.23 -2.2 0.37 2.56 -6.91 10.48
lnCultEXPni,t 72278 0.4 3.06 -1.72 0.56 2.58 -6.91 10.48
lndistni 72278 8.53 0.93 7.87 8.88 9.19 4.11 9.89
colonyni 72278 0.03 0.18 0 0 0 0 1
langni 72278 0.15 0.35 0 0 0 0 1
comreligni 72278 0.17 0.26 0.01 0.03 0.25 0 0.99
contigni 72278 0.04 0.19 0 0 0 0 1
comlegni 72278 0.27 0.44 0 0 1 0 1
FTAni,t 72278 0.24 0.43 0 0 0 0 1
The table contains a selection of descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical section computed on the
estimation sample. The inclusion of both directions of cultural trade and of a large set of controls fo CP might raise
collinearity issues, threatening estimates' consistency. The issue is addressed in Appendix 3.A, which rules out the pos-
sibility that collinearity poses a relevant threat to the consistency of the results.
3.5 Results
Table 3.1 reports the main estimates of the econometric exercise. I have two main objectives.
First, I want to identify the contribution of the various components of CP, posing particular
attentoin to the relative contribution of the EP terms. The aim is to ﬁnd evidence (if any) of the
existence of the asymmetryc relationship identiﬁed in greenﬁeld case (see Chapter 1). Second,
I explore the extent of the potential heterogeneity of the CP-M&A relationship across diﬀerent
levels of bilateral M&A ﬂows.
The main results are reported in Table 3.1 below. For reason of space, only the estimates for
the EP coeﬃcients (namely Cultural Imports and Cultural Export) are reported in the main
text.28 All ﬂows are labelled and commented with respect to the investing country i. Thus,
lnCultIMPni,t represents the log of the imports in country i of culturally-intensive goods from
country n; analogously, lnCultEXPni,t represents the log of the cultural exports from country
i to country n. Their coeﬃcients (reported in bold when statistically signiﬁcant) capture the
impact of country i and of country n perceived reciprocal aﬃnity on the bilateral M&A ﬂow
respectively.
In Table 3.1 emerges that the impact of both EP terms can be identiﬁed beyond the role of
the objective and symmetric components of CP, the geographical frictions, and the inclusion
28The remaining coeﬃcients are reported in Appendix 3.C.
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Table 3.1: Baseline Results: Heterogeneous Impacts of Revealed Preferences on M&A.
Dep. Var. : M&A Invni,t Tests
Quantile lnCultIMPni,t lnCultEXPni,t βimp = βexp = 0 −βimp + βexp = 0
ppml
0.14*** 0.21***
χ22 = 47.05 χ21 = 1(0.04) (0.04)
τ = 10 0.29* 0.06 χ22 = 3.01 χ21 = 2.54(0.14) (0.04)
τ = 20 0.38** 0.18*** χ22 = 12.81 χ21 = 3.61(0.12) (0.04)
τ = 30 0.42*** 0.28*** χ22 = 22.43 χ21 = 2.61(0.12) (0.04)
τ = 40 0.47*** 0.31*** χ22 = 21.71 χ21 = 2.94(0.13) (0.05)
τ = 50 0.42*** 0.35*** χ22 = 33.50 χ21 = 0.42(0.11) (0.04)
τ = 60 0.38** 0.35*** χ22 = 14.84 χ21 = 0.17(0.12) (0.07)
τ = 70 0.39*** 0.39*** χ22 = 12.82 χ21 = 0.00(0.09) (0.08)
τ = 80 0.31*** 0.41*** χ22 = 75.69 χ21 = 1.66(0.07) (0.03)
τ = 90 0.27*** 0.41*** χ22 = 33.57 χ21 = 8.41(0.03) (0.06)
Notes:  p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard Errors in parentheses. Standard errors for PPML are
clustered by country-pair.
The dependent variable Vni,t refers to the aggregate bilateral value of M&A from country i to country n. PPML includes
null ﬂows. According to equation (3.12), CQReg treats zeroes as censored. All equations include country-time ﬁxed ef-
fect for both i and n. The sample size refers to the speciﬁcation featuring both cultural imports and cultural exports.
The the fourth and ﬁfth columns report the χ2 statistics for the wald tests on the coeﬃcients of cultural imports and
exports. Test scores reporting opposite-than-expected results are ﬂagged in red.
This table only reports the coeﬃcents related to the EP coeﬃcients. The remaining parameters included in each regres-
sion (see Equation (3.13)) are reported in Table c-1 in the appendices.
of the multilateral resistance terms.29 The ﬁrst row reports the estimates for the benchmark
PPML. Quantitatively, EP terms show an asymmetric pattern, which seems to conﬁrm the
ﬁndings of Chapter 1. However, unlike Greenﬁelds, the diﬀerence in magnitude between the
two coeﬃcients is not statistically signiﬁcant. The small χ2 statistic in the ﬁrst row of column
(4) suggests that, despite the reciprocal aﬃnity of both trading partners remains relevant, the
asymmetric patterns detected in the case of Greenﬁelds do not concern M&A. The estiamtes of
the censored quantile regression (for τ = [10,20,30,40,50,60,70,80,90]) are listed in rows 2 to
10. In all speciﬁcations but τ = 10, both directions of EP are statistically diﬀerent from zero at
the individual level, and never fail to be jointly signiﬁcant (as shown by the Wald test for joint
29All equations include country×time ﬁxed eﬀects for both the investing and the recipient economy, as suggested
by Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) and Baier and Bergstrand (2007) in order to control for the multilateral resistance
term (see section 3.3.2).
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signiﬁcance, reported in column (3)). Results can be summarized in two main points. First, the
dominant EP channel is not consistent across quantiles. The relative importance of the investing
country's relative preference for a given economic partner is quantitatively larger in small ﬂows,
but looses relevance in larger and well established channels. The coeﬃcient for Cultural Imports
remains larger than the Cultural Exports one until the 7th decile, but its magnitude changes non-
monotonically. Its magnitude keeps an upward trend in the early quantiles, to reverse around the
4th decile. In addition, no direction of EP prevails as a driver of bilateral M&A when estimated at
mean level. This suggests that, compared to the Greenﬁeld FDI case (investigated in Chapter 1),
diﬀerent mechanisms might be at play. The quantile-wise analysis of the CP-M&A relationship
oﬀers a much less straightforward pattern for the relationship between CP and M&A. Second,
PPML estimates appear to be systematically underestimated. Figure 3.5 graphically conﬁrms
the importance of addressing correctly the quantitative heterogeneity that characterized bilateral
FDI exchanges data. The quantile plot (Panel A in) sheds further light on the heterogeneity
of the dependent variable, and shows that the importance of EP may be larger than previously
stated (Panel B reports the trends for both Cultural Imports and Cultural Exports separately).30
All in all, the quantile decomposition conﬁrms the presence of the quantitative heterogeneity
discussed in Section 3.3.2. Both the EP coeﬃcient change substantially across deciles, both in
quantitative and in statistical terms.
Figure 3.5 is interesting as it shows graphically how the asymmetric patterns detected in Chapter
1 does not hold for M&A, at mean levels as well as across quantiles.31
The comparison of the estimates across quantiles (explored both numerically in table 3.1 and
graphically in ﬁgure 3.5) helps at disentangling the heterogeneous relationship between EP and
bilateral M&A ﬂows. Such trends would have passed unnoticed under the usual mean-level
estimators, for instance by mean of PPML.32. The exercise reported above also highlights a
second major drawback related to PPML when applied to overdispersed data. By contruction,
PPML tends to overweight large observations, as noticed by Martínez-Zarzoso (2013) and Burger
et al. (2009). This feature introduces a non-negligible bias when the dependent variable is highly
heterogeneous, as it is the case for aggregate bilateral investment ﬂows. Quantitatively, PPML
estimates suggest a stronger role of the destination side preference mechanisms, even if the
quantitative asymmetry remains statistically non signiﬁcant.33 Conversely, CQReg shows that
30The issue of the underestimation of the coeﬃcient is not limited to the coeﬃcients of interest but applies to
all coeﬃcient included into the regression with the sole exception of the common religion dummy.
31Just in three cases, for τ = [20,40,90], the EP coeﬃcients are statistically diﬀerent from each other, with
the relative importance of the EP terms reversing in the higher quantiles. As a matter of facts, the relative
importance of the preference awarded by the investing country to a potential economic partner remains stronger
than the other way around until the 70th quantile, a pattern which reverses in the higher quantiles. If robust,
this ﬁnding would suggest that a completely diﬀerent mechanism is at play for M&A compared to Greenﬁeld FDI
(see Chapter 1)
32The same reasoning would apply to more sophisticated control functions and two stage procedures: despite
providing a robust alternative when dealing with large shares of null ﬂows, they would not allow to spot the
heterogeneous patterns highlighted by quantile decomposition.
33This result is in line with the expectations. While I might expect (as conﬁrmed by the empirical evidence)
a statistically signiﬁcant asymmetric pattern for Greenﬁeld FDI, I expected the issue of non-reciprocity in the
CP-M&A relationship to remain quantitatively present but not statistically signiﬁcant. See section 3.3.
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Figure 3.1: Censored Quantile Plot of Explicited Cultural Preferences
(a) Shaded area indicate 95% C.I. ppml coeﬃcients reported as solid lines.
(b) Below, imports and exports are reported separatedly.
this equilibrium is driven by large investments channels, with the origin-side preference channel
dominating in smaller bilateral M&A ﬂow.
3.6 Robustness Checks
The results reported in Section 3.5 oﬀer an interesting insight on the relationship between EP
and M&A ﬂows, as the asymmetric CP pattern detected in Chapter 1 do not apply to bilateral
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M&A.34. Nonetheless, Table 3.1 leaves at least three open questions.
To begin with, the censoring of the dependent variable retains a large share of null bilateral ﬂows,
which are likely to severely aﬀect the results (See for instance Head and Mayer, 2014; Figueiredo
et al., 2014; Larch et al., 2017).35 The scant related literature generally ignored the issue,
limiting to strictly positive channels. In addition, the large number of cultural and institutional
variables might generate collinearity in the vectorDni.36. Despite perfect multicollinearity can be
excluded, the high correlation among covariates may still bias the coeﬃcients. Table 3.2 estimates
equation (3.13) without including the EP terms, to check the robustness of the remaining proxies
of cultural similarity. Stable coeﬃcients would support the relevance of the empirical strategy
provided, as much as provide additional insight on the CP-M&A relationship. These tests are
reported in Section 3.6.2. Finally, the relationship between the non-reciprocal and time varying
components of CP and M&A might be non-linear within quantiles. On the one hand, it might
be increasing in the geographical distance between two countries. Such cultural bridge eﬀect
hypothesis (Cuadros et al., 2016) implies that two countries with high cultural aﬃnity may be
characterized by larger than expected ﬂows of bilateral investments (compared to other dyads
located at the same distance from each other). In terms of heterogeneous impacts, such a bridge
eﬀect would be particularly relevant in case it is present (and stronger) at lower quantiles, as
it would denote the ability of EP to reduce the detrimental impacts of geographical frictions,
by narrowing the perceived distance between countries. On the other hand, the marginal eﬀect
of EP on investments could be non constant. The impact of EP might decrease the more two
countries appreciate each other: in other words, the more two countries perceive themselves as
close, the lower the marginal role of further displays of reciprocal appreciation. Non-linearity
tests are reported in Appendix 3.D.
3.6.1 Sensitivity to the Exclusion of Null Flows
Table 3.1 restricts the sample to those channels for which the censored dependent variable is
strictly positive, and estimates equation (3.13) by mean of traditional (uncensored) quantile
regression.
As expected, accounting for the presence of null ﬂows, and not just for the censoring, dramatically
aﬀects the estimates. To begin with, the numerical value of the coeﬃcients decreases sharply
when null censored ﬂows are excluded. This is true for all coeﬃcients across all quantiles (see
Table c-2 for the remaining coeﬃcients). This is no threat to the consistency of the baseline
results, since a direct comparison between Table 3.1 and Table 3.1 would not be appropriate.
As a matter of facts, the exclusion of null ﬂows changes the interpretation of the results, not
just their magnitude: from the study of the determinants of M&A, to the analysis of those
34This might not be the case for all countries in the sample. Boschma et al. (2016) explore the role of diﬀerent
concepts of distance/proximity on Italian M&A, concluding that a symmetric eﬀect of proximity cannot be taken
for granted either.
35As a matter of facts, this is the ﬁrst study to estimate a structural quantile gravity model of FDI retaining
all the null investment ﬂows.
36Multicollinearity tests are provided in the data Appendix 3.A
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Table 3.1: Sensitivity to the Exclusion of Null Flows: impact on QReg and ppml estimates.
Dep. Var. : M&A Invni,t Tests
Quantile lnCultIMPni,t lnCultEXPni,t βimp = βexp = 0 −βimp + βexp = 0
ppml
0.11*** 0.18***
χ22 = 28.55 χ21 = 0.702.55 3.86
τ = 10 -0.032 -0.00525 χ22 = 1.06 χ21 = 0.41(-1.30) (0.20)
τ = 20 -0.0256 0.0173 χ22 = 0.85 χ21 = 1.39(-1.27) (0.72)
τ = 30 0.02 0.03  χ22 = 3.80 χ21 = 0.20(0.83) (1.85)
τ = 40 0.1 0.05** χ22 = 5.08 χ21 = 1.45(0.78) (2.6)
τ = 50 0.01 0.08*** χ22 = 17.55 χ21 = 6.62(1.13) (4.8)
τ = 60 0.06*** 0.09** χ22 = 48.40 χ21 = 0.55(3.49) (3.1)
τ = 70 0.08*** 0.12*** χ22 = 59.63 χ21 = 1.77(5.09) (5.36)
τ = 80 0.11*** 0.16*** χ22 = 129.2 χ21 = 2.3(7.24) (8.07)
τ = 90 0.13*** 0.19*** χ22 = 32.62 χ21 = 3.76(5.63) (6.88)
Notes:  p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard Errors in parentheses. Standard errors for PPML are
clustered by country-pair.
The dependent variable Vni,t refers to the aggregate bilateral value of M&A from country i to country n. Null (cen-
sored) ﬂows are excluded. All equations include country-time ﬁxed eﬀect for both i and n. The sample size refers to the
speciﬁcation featuring both cultural imports and cultural exports.
The the fourth and ﬁfth columns report the χ2 statistics for the wald tests on the coeﬃcients of cultural imports and
exports. Test scores reporting opposite-than-expected results are ﬂagged in red.
This table only reports the coeﬃcents related to the EP coeﬃcients. The remaining parameters included in each regres-
sion (see Equation (3.13)) are reported in Table c-2 in the appendices.
factors that facilitates them provided an investment ﬂow already exists. Thus, Table 3.1 suggests
that EP does not play any role in small size channels. The destination side EP term is only
signiﬁcant from the 30th percentile onward, while the investor side appreciation turns signiﬁcant
above the 6th decile. In both cases, the impact is quantitatively modest, if compared to the
full sample speciﬁcation. In addition, the investing side preference coeﬃcient is systematically
smaller than the destination side one at all levels. Similarly to Table 3.1, the coeﬃcients for the
two directions of EP remain statistically not diﬀerent from each other in all but the 50th and
90th percentile (test reported in column (4)). Once more, results suggest that the two channels
are simultaneously important in driving M&A ﬂows, but that, diﬀerently from greenﬁeld FDI,
no direction dominates the other. Moreover, the fact that excluding null ﬂows sharply reduces
the size of the coeﬃcients of interest signals that EP do play a role in driving the decision to
invest in a country: however, once the decision to invest in a country is taken, EP become less
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relevant. The perception of an investor for a country, as well as her awareness of how she is
perceived abroad, are reasonably taken into higher consideration at the decisional stages. This
fact also suggests that non-reciprocity in cultural preferences might still be relevant for bilateral
M&A, but that the value data in use are not the most suitable to detect the impact of culture
on FDI.37
3.6.2 Stability/Sensibility of the Symmetric Measures of Cultural Proximity
Table 3.2: Sensitivity of the impacts of the symmetric components of Dni on M&A ﬂow
Dep. Var. : M&A Invni,t
(ppml) (10th) (30th) (50th) (70th) (90th)
lndistni -0.602*** -0.448*** -0.348*** -0.279*** -0.179*** -0.0782**
(-8.89) (-10.11) (-21.06) (-18.21) (-13.33) (-3.23)
colonyni 0.499*** 0.495*** 0.272*** 0.270** 0.367*** 0.922***
(4.38) (5.51) (6.42) (3.26) (5.14) (5.55)
langni -0.136 -0.11 -0.0142 0.309*** 0.387*** 0.441*
(-1.07) (-0.95) (-0.21) (3.84) (5.2) (2.08)
comreligni 2.280*** -0.214* 0.484*** 0.226* 0.202*** 0.348**
(7.58) (-2.10) (4.57) (2.15) (5.47) (2.72)
contigni -0.0366 0.886*** 0.917*** 0.958*** 0.830*** 0.967***
(-0.28) (8.93) (10.7) (9.62) (10.33) (5.75)
comlegni 0.220* -0.0135 0.205*** 0.217*** 0.158*** 0.241**
(2.15) (-0.18) (3.73) (3.56) (4.96) (3.09)
FTAni,t 0.208 -0.00303 0.372*** 0.465*** 0.427*** 0.894**
(1.56) (-0.03) (5.28) (4.03) (3.88) (2.76)
Obs 116873 116873 116873 116873 116873 116873
Censoring -
√ √ √ √ √
Notes:  p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard Errors in parentheses. Standard errors for PPML are
clustered by country-pair.
The dependent variable Vni,t refers to the aggregate bilateral value of M&A from country i to country n. PPML includes
null ﬂows. According to equation (3.12), CQReg treats zeroes as censored. All equations include country-time ﬁxed
eﬀect for both i and n. The sample size refers to the speciﬁcation featuring both cultural imports and cultural exports.
Table 3.2 reports the results of Equation (3.13), but excluding the EP terms. The comparison
with Table c-1 in the appendix (which reports the coeﬃcients for the measures of cultural similar-
37Indeed, as argued in Chapter 1, cultural processes are more likely to aﬀect the extensive margin rather than
the intensive one. This could be explained in terms of aggregate ﬂows: the existence of an economic partnership
(no matter the number/size of the investments, the quantity and the value of the goods traded, etc.) may oﬀer
itself an encoureging signal to prospective investors. This possibility seems to be supported by the trend of the
cultal similarity terms too (See for instance the coeﬃcient for common religion in Table c-2). Also in this case,
excluding null ﬂows reduces the coeﬃcients in all speciﬁcations (including PPML). I consider this fact as an
additional evidence of the relevance of the information embedded in null/censored ﬂows, which embed the eﬀects
of frictions and attracting factors on the decision to make investments. In this respect, the results by Figueiredo
et al. (2015); Cuadros et al. (2016) and Paniagua et al. (2015) might actually be biased downward.
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ity in presence of the EP terms) oﬀers interesting insights on the potential impact of collinearity
between cultural aﬃnity (captured in terms of explicit preferences) and cultural similarity. The
inclusion/exclusion of bilateral cultural trade appears to rescale the usual symmetric dimensions
of distance/proximity. Excluding the EP terms biases downward the remaining cultural dimen-
sions. While distance results quantitatively less important (even remaining highly signiﬁcant
in all speciﬁcations), contiguity absorbs much of this change. This is not surprising, given that
shared borders might imply the historical coevolution of two contigous countries: cultural aﬃnity,
as captured by trade in cultural goods, might partially reﬂect this issue. Finally, the coeﬃcients
related to institutional similarity, such as colonial ties and language, shifts upward. This result
may be partially driven by the high correlation across FTA, geographical distance, and cultural
trade. Nonetheless, once perfect multicollinearity is excluded (see table a-2), the inclusion of a
measure able to capture the time varying and directed dimension of CP results in a redeﬁnition
of the impacts of the traditional, symmetric measures of proximity/distance.
3.7 Conclusions
Foreign Direct Investments constitute a potentially important tool for promoting economic
growth: they can favor capital accumulation, foster technological circulation, and create oc-
cupation. For all these reasons, to understand the factors that increase the attractiveness of a
country is a fundamental issue for many governments. However, FDI are not all equal (in terms
of economic eﬀects as muchas in terms of their determinants). The size of an investment, its de-
gree of reversibility, and the degree of uncertainty are often very diﬀerent across types of FDI.38
Building upon the results of Chapter 1, I focus on the eﬀects of the potentially asymmetric com-
ponent of cultural proximity (proxied by trade in cultural goods) on bilateral M&A to investigate
the non linear eﬀects of Explicit Cultural Preferences on bilateral M&A. I ﬁt a gravity equation
by mean an innovative estimation technique (Censored Quantile Regression with High Dimen-
sional Fixed Eﬀects) to deal with the marked heterogeneity in the data, taking into account
the panel structure, the large share of null ﬂows, and the high dispersion of the distribution of
bilateral M&A at world level. The quantile decomposition highlights a substantial instability of
the coeﬃcients. When focusing speciﬁcally on the directed components of cultural preferences,
the results are coherent with the idea of CP as a complex construct, characterized by poten-
tial non-reciprocity and time variability. The fact that both directions of cultural preferences
remain simulataneously signiﬁcant indicates that there may be some event inﬂuencing bilateral
economic exchanges beyond the role of traditional measures of CP. Contrarily to greenﬁeld FDI,
the analysis shows no evidence of a statistically signiﬁcant asymmetric pattern between the two
direction of EP. This fact suggests that unilateral cultural promotion (attraction) initiatives,
though eﬀective means to promote bilateral greenﬁeld FDI, could have no impact on M&A.
Some aspects remain unexplored and would deserve further analyses. Under a methodological
perspective, it may be interesting to investigate how CP and its intangible components (which
38Even though the size of certain types of M&A increased substantially in the recent period, making reversibility
extremely costly: in this respect, the diﬀerences between the two tyes of investment is fading away
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capture the reciprocal aﬃnity) aﬀect cross-border ﬁnancial ﬂows across the diﬀerent sectors.
Unfortunately, the larger heterogeneity of investment data, joint to the even larger share of
null ﬂows at sectoral level, constitutes a severe impediment to this type of analysis. A possible
solution would be to focus only on positive FDI ﬂows, a commonly adopted strategy in the
related literature. However, the high sensitivity to the inclusion of null ﬂows discussed here
suggests that this strategy may lead to biased results. This issue could be solved by applying a
longitudinal multilevel quantile regression methodology (Giovannetti et al., 2018), able to isolate
the impact of the factors that are speciﬁc to a particular bilateral channel from those operating
at sectoral and global level. This point is left for future research.
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Appendix
3.A Data Appendix
On the use of Transactional FDI data
The focus of this chapter is on bilateral M&A investment ﬂows. Since oﬃcial FDI statistics
rarely distinguish between diﬀerent types of FDI, I use transactional FDI data. This particular
type of data presents a few technical advantages with respect to the traditional BoP ﬁgures.
To begin with, transactional data are divided in two major investment entry mode, M&A and
Greenﬁeld: given the diﬀerent characteristics of the two types of investments in terms of risk,
reversibility, and even motivation, the possibility to divide the two types of ﬂow oﬀers the chance
to understand not only the common drivers, but also the speciﬁc features that promote them.
Second, transactional data keep track of the single investment by collecting information about
all the parties involved in each transaction: this allows identifying not only the immediate owner
of a subsidiary company, but also the ultimate owner. This is relevant for policy purposes too, as
a MNE could follow particular country-speciﬁc proﬁt-maximization strategies not only through
the actions carried out at the HQ level, but also through its directly controlled partners. Think
of those countries that grant special economic treatments to FDI: a locally located MNE may
ﬁnd convenient to invest back home via an immediate partner abroad in order to beneﬁt from
such policies, in a sort of round-tripping investment. Finally, transactional data only report the
value of the capital invested in origin, and do not update the size of the investment according
to further ﬁnancings that may occurr later in the life of a controlled ﬁrm. Since I am interested
in understanding the role of explicit cultural preferences (EP) on bilateral investment decision, I
need to know only the initial value of the capital investment39: later re-investment may be due
to factors that have nothing to do with cultural proximity. I am aware that using transactional
FDI data also imply a trade-oﬀ. Two major limitations apply, relatively to the way data are
collected, due to the fact that they are based on direct interviews to MNE's CEO or private
sector compilation. First, the bilateral activities of certain countries tend to be systematically
underreported: this issue is particularly severe when large MNE are publicly owned and respond
to strategic national interest (think of China). Second, these data are usually dominated by large
transactions, as they are generally easier to track: thus, large transaction may be overrepresented,
to the detriment of the smaller, harder to track, ones. Yet, the advantages of using such form of
data more then compensate such issues.
39In the ﬁrst chapter, I stressed the idea that both cultural proximity and the aﬃnity component captured by
EP may be more eﬀective in driving the decision to invest rather than its amount. Unfortunately, because of data
availability, I am not able to test the EP-M&A on the number of investments. This issue, though not aﬀecting
the quality of the results, make them only partially comparable to the ﬁndings discussed in the ﬁrst chapter.
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Further descriptive tables
Table a-1: Correlations across RHS variables
Variable lnCultEXPni,t lnCultIMPni,t FTAni,t lndistni comreligni comlegni colonyni langni
lnCultEXPni,t 1
lnCultIMPni,t 0.577 1
FTAni,t 0.2543 0.2513 1
lndistni -0.2159 -0.2012 -0.5336 1
comreligni 0.0177 0.0117 0.1617 -0.1562 1
comlegni 0.0332 0.0138 0.0565 -0.1512 0.2636 1
colonyni 0.143 0.12 0.0235 -0.036 0.0663 0.1839 1
langni 0.0387 0.028 0.072 -0.1059 0.2597 0.353 0.2059 1
contigni 0.1652 0.156 0.2091 -0.3812 0.1406 0.1658 0.0993 0.1365
Matrix of Correlation Coeﬃcients for the RHS covariates as in equation (3.13). Coeﬃcients are computed over the es-
timation sample.
Table a-2: Correlations across RHS variables
Variable VIF Sqrt. VIF Tolerance R2
lnCultEXPni,t 1.55 1.25 0.6445 0.3555
lnCultIMPni,t 1.54 1.24 0.651 0.349
FTAni,t 1.47 1.21 0.679 0.321
lndistni 1.59 1.26 0.629 0.371
comreligni 1.14 1.07 0.8739 0.1261
comlegni 1.23 1.11 0.816 0.184
colonyni 1.09 1.04 0.9199 0.0801
langni 1.22 1.1 0.8228 0.1772
contigni 1.21 1.1 0.8253 0.1747
Mean VIF = 1.34
Matrix of Collinearity Diagnostic. The table provide the estiamted Variance Inﬂation Factors (VIF), its squared root,
the tolerance coeﬃcient, and the R2. Additional statistics (eigenvalues and condition index) are available upon request.
The text in green ﬂags those coeﬃcients respecting the tolerance criterion: in general, tolerance above 0.6 is to be con-
sidered acceptable to avoid perfect collinearity. As for Table (a-1), collinearity is tested over the estimation sample.
Table a-1 shows the matrix of the correlations among the variables included in the empirical
model. The major concern is about the high correlation coeﬃcient between the two cultural
preference channels which may lead to severe measurement errors in the estimates (since it
would make diﬃcult to identify the impact of the single variables in the LHS on the dependent
variable).
Table a-2 reports several tests for collinearity. Considering collinearity not to be particularly
woryying above a tolerance of 0.6, we can safely assume that we are able estimates the coeﬃcients
of interest as well as for any other potential controls included in a relatively precise way.
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3.B Strength and Weaknesses of Mean-Value Gravity Estimators
Bilateral data (and particularly, investmment ﬂows data) are generally aﬀected zero-inﬂation and
over-dispersion (See for instance Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006, 2011; Head and Mayer, 2014;
Yotov et al., 2016), two issues that might heavily bias the estimates when not properly dealt
with. Zero-inﬂation becomes problematic when it concerns the dependent variable, as it reduces
data variability: this makes it diﬃcult for standard estimators to obtain consistent estimates.
To get rid of the issue, the dependent variable is usually transformed in logarithmic terms. As
it drops null observations, it also causes a substantial loss of information (not last the potential
existence of some types of friction, either geographical, political, institutional or cultural, that
prevents bilateral exchanges). Early studies addressed this issue by adding a unit value to the
variable of interest and then taking the log, not to drop any null ﬂow
Early studies solved this issue by taking the log of the dependent variables plus one.40 Under
a technical perspective, this strategy yelds non-robust estimates and is neither robust to the
Jensen's inequality, nor to heteroscedasticity (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). In order to
retain the simplicity of the log-linear form while retaining the null ﬂows into consideration, some
alternative procedure has been developed. Eaton and Tamura (1994) proposed a modiﬁed Tobit
estimator, where the dependent variable Y is replaced with ln(Y + a), where a (which accounts
for the amount of traded value that gets lost during the exchange) is itself a parameter to be
estimated in the model. A diﬀerent but very similar approach is adopted by Eaton and Kortum
(2001). Diﬀerently, Helpman et al. (2008) developed a revised Heckman correction procedure41.
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) depart from the idea of linearizing the empirical gravity equa-
tion. They proposed a family of modiﬁed poisson estimator with constant elasticity, in order
to maintain the dependent variable in levels, retaining the multiplicative form of the gravity
equation. In this way, the empirical speciﬁcation remains closer to the theoretical model and cir-
cumvents the Jensen's Inequality problem, with a minimal loss of information. The fact that the
coeﬃcients can still be interpreted in terms of elasticity, joint to the robustness to heteroscedas-
ticity42 makes the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (ppml) estimator the benchmark for
gravity models in presence of null ﬂows. The main critiques to ppml concern its potential incon-
sistency. On the one hand, Martínez-Zarzoso (2013) warns against the fact that despite ppml
performs better than many of the proposed alternative estimators in presence of heteroscedas-
ticity, it is outperformed when the data follows diﬀerent generating processes. For instance,
the standard errors of GPML (Gamma Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimator) are lower when
the dependent variable has small shares of null values. Analogously, Feasible Generalized Least
Squares (FGLS) perform as well as PPML when the sample is small. She concludes that the
choice of the estimator should depends on the structure of the data, rather than being considered
in axiomatic terms. A similar conclusion is reached by Head and Mayer (2014) and D'Ambrosio
and Montresor (2017). On the other hand, Burger et al. (2009) criticize the eﬀective capability
of PPML to account for data over-dispersion. They advocate in favor of a diﬀerent class of
estimators, such as the negative binomial and the zero-inﬂated poisson. Despite their concern
40Indeed, there may be some country pairs that do not trade with/invest in each other for very speciﬁc
reasons (even excluding the issue related to data misreporting). The intentional drop of those observations would
underestimate the relevance of certain types of friction. Adding a unit value to the bilateral ﬂow allows to get
log(Y + 1) = 0 when Y = 0. Nonetheless, as Head and Mayer (2014) points out, adding an arbitrary unit value to
the dependent variable lacks of a compelling structural interpretation, and reduces the reliability of the resulting
estimates.
41Nonetheless, according to Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2014), their assumptions on the structure of the error
term threatens the consistency of their results
42This point has been recently challenged by some recent works such as the one by Figueiredo et al. (2014,
2015). See section 3.3.2.
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remains relevant, the adoption of a negative binomial or a zero-inﬂated estimator is sensitive
to the scale of the dependent variable, so that they only remain optimal exclusively for count
data43.
3.C Extended Tables of Results
Table c-1: Impact of CP on M&A ﬂow (aggregate value) at diﬀerent quantiles - Including Null Flows
Dep. Var. : M&A Invni,t
(ppml) (10th) (20th) (30th) (40th) (50th) (60th) (70th) (80th) (90th)
lnCultIMPni,t 0.142** 0.289* 0.382** 0.421*** 0.472*** 0.418*** 0.379** 0.389*** 0.312*** 0.269***
(3.19) (2.1) (3.14) (3.61) (3.67) (3.62) (3.03) (4.24) (4.2) (8.01)
lnCultEXPni,t 0.214*** 0.0578 0.182*** 0.277*** 0.310*** 0.353*** 0.352*** 0.387*** 0.413*** 0.410***
(4.83) (1.28) (5.05) (6.46) (6.26) (8.14) (4.68) (5.04) (11.98) (6.51)
lndistni -0.336*** -0.742*** -0.803*** -0.818*** -0.798*** -0.688*** -0.618*** -0.612*** -0.445*** -0.295***
(-4.57) (-9.27) (-10.01) (-10.79) (-9.61) (-11.46) (-7.57) (-8.60) (-13.06) (-13.79)
colonyni 0.276* 0.546*** 0.270*** 0.304*** 0.595*** 0.425*** 0.334*** 0.597*** 0.275** 0.511***
(2.3) (8.21) (5.32) (4.45) (9.63) (5.11) (7.82) (5.88) (2.78) (4.41)
langni -0.163 -0.0514 0.204** 0.324* 0.554** 0.442*** 0.317*** 0.388* 0.331* 0.416***
(-1.32) (-0.65) (3.06) (2.57) (2.87) (3.6) (4.05) (1.99) (2.41) (4.92)
comreligni 2.038*** 0.307*** 0.230*** -0.0445 0.510*** 0.463*** 0.321*** 0.596*** 0.616*** 0.647***
(6.76) (6.76) (6.92) (-0.51) (11.81) (6.11) (11.14) (8.86) (4.67) (3.77)
contigni -0.275 0.290*** 0.231 0.522*** 0.295 0.540*** 0.631*** 0.207 0.828*** 0.547***
(-1.94) (3.84) (1.82) (3.77) (1.4) (4.22) (3.52) (1.14) (10.62) (6.71)
comlegni 0.102 0.163 0.248** 0.369** 0.465*** 0.184 0.244* 0.107* 0.154 0.335***
(0.96) (1.49) (2.76) (3.13) (4.36) (1.81) (2.52) (2) (1.71) (4.09)
FTAni,t 0.0578 -0.183 -0.0764 -0.337 -0.398 -0.477** -0.143 -0.189 -0.0574 0.00247
0.4 (-1.33) (-0.46) (-1.61) (-1.65) (-2.84) (-0.67) (-1.26) (-0.37) -0.08
Imp×Year FE √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Exp×Year FE √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Obs 72278 72278 72278 72278 72278 72278 72278 44680 72278 72278
Censoring -
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
F-test 1 2.54 3.61 2.61 2.94 0.42 0.17 0.00 1.66 8.41
Estimator PPML CQ CQ CQ CQ CQ CQ CQ CQ CQ
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors of PPML are clustered by
country-pair.
This table reports all coeﬃcients of the speciﬁcation summarized in table 3.1. The dependent variable Vni,t represents
the aggregate bilateral value of M&A from country i to country n. It includes the zero ﬂows in the PPML. The same
ﬂows are treated as censored in the CQ regressions.
The sample size in this table is invariant to the number of covariates included and refers to the regression which features
both imports and exports of cultural goods. The information which belong to groups with all zeros or missing values
are automatically dropped by the estimator as FEs cannot be computed.
F-test over revealed preference channels' equality. H0 ∶ β(culimpni,t) = β(culexpni,t)
43Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2011) respond to such critique proving that PPML is reliable even in presence of
a very large fraction of null values.
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Table c-2: Impact of CP on M&A ﬂow (aggregate value) at diﬀerent quantiles - Excluding Null Flows
Dep. Var. : M&A Invni,t
(ppml) (10th) (20th) (30th) (40th) (50th) (60th) (70th) (80th) (90th)
lnCultIMPni,t 0115* -0.032 -0.0256 0.0155 0.013 0.0153 0.0563*** 0.0786*** 0.109*** 0.132***
(2.55) (-1.30) (-1.27) -0.83 -0.78 -1.13 -3.49 -5.09 -7.24 -5.63
lnCultEXPni,t 0.176*** -0.00525 0.0173 0.0288 0.0481** 0.0814*** 0.0874** 0.139*** 0.157*** 0.195***
(3.86) (-0.20) -0.72 -1.85 -2.6 -4.8 -3.1 -5.36 -8.07 -6.88
lndistni -0.307*** -0.503*** -0.441*** -0.416*** -0.359*** -0.326*** -0.307*** -0.297*** -0.243*** -0.157***
(-4.14) (-22.11) (-30.77) (-38.78) (-32.23) (-34.80) (-25.78) (-27.53) (-15.45) (-10.59)
colonyni 0.289* 0.384*** 0.419*** 0.406*** 0.394*** 0.444*** 0.380*** 0.376*** 0.464*** 0.506***
(2.52) -3.68 -7.24 -5.17 -7.76 -9.98 -7.28 -4.08 -17.73 -7.65
langni -0.172 0.278*** 0.244*** 0.201*** 0.207*** 0.132*** 0.224*** 0.200*** 0.16 0.0775*
(-1.43) -3.38 -4.89 -5.45 -5.78 -5.76 -4.84 -4.15 -1.41 -1.99
comreligni 2.012*** 0.178 0.419*** 0.419*** 0.285*** 0.364*** 0.212*** 0.538*** 0.255*** 0.663***
(6.33) -1.79 -5.68 -6.14 -4.72 -8.62 -5.81 -10.94 -4.77 -5.81
contigni -0.235 0.501*** 0.460*** 0.404*** 0.645*** 0.440*** 0.400*** 0.327*** 0.482*** 0.550***
(-1.68) -8.27 -7.43 -11.45 -18.57 -15.58 -18.82 -9.03 -13.83 -11.57
comlegni 0.13 0.263* 0.135* 0.244*** 0.227*** 0.246*** 0.285*** 0.271*** 0.175*** 0.177*
(1.26) -2.35 -2.52 -12.03 -3.67 -5.09 -6.29 -5.73 -4.03 -2.51
FTAni,t 0.128 -0.0611 0.0157 -0.0337 -0.00417 0.063 0.0655 -0.0525 0.0741* 0.174
(0.9) (-1.03) -0.43 (-0.93) (-0.14) -1.56 -1.51 (-1.01) -1.99 -1.13
Imp×Year FE √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Exp×Year FE √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Obs 48608 48608 48608 48608 48608 48608 48608 27177 48608 48608
Censoring - no no no no no no no no no
F-test 0.70 0.41 1.39 0.20 1.45 6.62 0.55 1.77 2.3 3.76
Estimator PPML CQ CQ CQ CQ CQ CQ CQ CQ CQ
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors of PPML are clustered by
country-pair.
This table reports all coeﬃcients of the speciﬁcation summarized in table 3.1. The dependent variable Vni,t represents
the aggregate bilateral value of M&A from country i to country n. It does not include null ﬂows in the PPML.
The sample size in this table is invariant to the number of covariates included and refers to the regression which features
both imports and exports of cultural goods. The information which belong to groups with all zeros or missing values
are automatically dropped by the estimator as FEs cannot be computed.
F-test over revealed preference channels' equality. H0 ∶ β(culimpni,t) = β(culexpni,t)
3.D Potential non-linearitites
The EP-M&A relationship may also be non-linear. There are two potential sources of non-
linearity worth exploring. First, the marginal eﬀect of EP on bilateral investment may be char-
acterized by diminishing returns: this means that its marginal eﬀect may be decreasing in the
degree of proximity between two given countries. The second and more interesting source of
non-linearity is related to the possibility that EP becomes more eﬀective when two countries are
geographically more distant. Geographic distance reduces the opportunities to establish contacts
between people, a fact that may easily translate into lesser familiarity (and therefore, in lesser
exchanges): thus, EP may generate a bridge eﬀect that narrows the detrimental eﬀect of dis-
tance. Table d-1 tests these two potential sources of non-linearity, reporting the estimates for
ppml and for the 25th, 50th, and 75th quantiles respectively.
Panel a in table d-1 reports the coeﬃcients for both directions of cultural trade and their
quadratic term. The coeﬃcients of the ppml are not stable; moreover, the coeﬃcients of the
higher quantiles suggest a self-reinforcing impact of both directions of cultural trade (positive
sign in both the level and the squared terms). Thus, the presence of a non-linear quadratic rela-
tionship does not seem to be supported by the data. Panel b tests the potential bridge eﬀect by
displaying the results related to the interaction between the EP terms and geographic distance.
The auspicated bridge eﬀect seems to be only partially at work: despite both EP terms maintain
the same trend as in ﬁgure 3.5, the virtuous relationship with distance turns signiﬁcant only in
the upper quantiles, beyond the median. Notwithstanding this partial evidence in favour, results
are not very interesting. For a bridge eﬀect to be eﬀective and economically meaningful, it should
be operational at lower quantiles, where geographic remoteness may be the crucial factor pre-
venting the existence of a ﬂow, not just a determinant of its numerical magnitude. Even though
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Table d-1: Impact of CP on M&A ﬂow (aggregate value) - Potential non-linearities
Dep. Var. : M&A Invni,t
(ppml) (25th) (50th) (75th)
Panel (a) - Squared Cultural Trade
lnCultIMPni,t -0.348*** 0.0519 0.116*** 0.179***
-4.73 (1.14) (4.04) (4.79)
lnCultEXPni,t 0.299* 0.0213 0.0643*** 0.183***
(2.55) (1.16) (4.35) (4.66)
lnCultIMP2ni,t -0.175 0.0428** 0.0447*** 0.0382***
(-1.42) (2.88) (6.1) (6.15)
lnCultEXP2ni,t 2.032*** 0.0288* 0.0441*** 0.0398***
(6.7) (2.45) (13.32) (7.57)
Panel (b) - Interaction term with distance
lnCultIMPni,t -0.407 0.259*** 0.200*** 0.116***
(-1.22) (10.82) (26.08) (6.64)
lnCultEXPni,t 0.622 0.262*** 0.312*** 0.341***
(1.82) (10.88) (33.97) (25.1)
lnCultIMP × distni,t 0.0638 0.00413 0.0168 0.0361***
(1.66) (0.22) (1.24) (5.63)
lnCultEXP × distni,t -0.0484 -0.0171 -0.00164 0.0183***
(-1.22) (-1.59) (-0.16) -4.1
Obs ppml 72278 72278 72278
Censoring -
√ √ √
F-test
Estimator ppml CQ CQ CQ
Notes:  p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors of ppml are clustered
by country-pair.
The dependent variable Vni,t represents the aggregate bilateral value of M&A from country i to country n. It includes
the zero ﬂows in the ppml. The same ﬂows are treated as censored in the CQ regressions.
The sample size in this table is invariant to the number of covariates included and refers to the regression which features
both imports and exports of cultural goods. The information which belong to groups with all zeros or missing values
are automatically dropped by the estimator as FEs cannot be computed.
Panel (a) reports coeﬃcient estimates for the log and the squared log coeﬃcients of cultural trade. Panel (b) reports
the coeﬃcients for the two cultural trade variables and their interaction with distance (in log).
F-test over revealed preference channels' equality. H0 ∶ β(culimpni,t) = β(culexpni,t)
the relationship between EP and geographic distance cannot be considered trivial (at least at
higher quantiles), its role proved not te be crucial in the deﬁnition of new investment ﬂows44.
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